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ABSTRACT 
 The aim of this thesis is to examine a radical relational agency, applied to contemporary 
environmental resistances, that incorporates both the thought of Michel Foucault and complexity 
theory.  While FoucaultÕs thought, following from his argument that power is a relation, implies a 
relational agency, it does not, however, account for the agency of nonhumans and environments.  
Because power is a relation and not a possession, it can no longer be viewed as an attribute of 
individual subjects.  Similarly, a relational agency is defined as an aspect of power relations.  
Complexity theory, on the other hand, acknowledges that humans interact with nonhumans and 
environments, but does not acknowledge that all relations are relations of power.  In addition to 
FoucaultÕs explanation of power relations, complexity theory explicitly describes the processes of self-
organization through which individual and diverse agents interact and change can emerge.  Thus, a 
radical relational agency is defined as an aspect of the power relationships between many diverse 
agents.  Change, according to both Foucault and complexity theory, happens nonlinearly.  As a result, it 
often occurs unpredictably.  However, change within complex systems is also limited by previous 
historical emergences.  In this sense, both possibility and risk are inherent in the relationships between 
humans, nonhumans and environments.  Indeed, I argue that a radical relational agency occurs because 
there are both possibilities and risks generated within ecological relations and relations of power.  
Therefore, I argue that any environmental action must account for the unpredictability inherent to the 
complex interactions between humans, nonhumans and environments.
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INTRODUCTION
 There is a photograph of me in a family album; I am wearing a t-shirt emblazoned with a logo 
from Earth Day Õ92.  It is a photograph that locates me within a specific geography, the country and the 
city of my birth, and it locates me within a particular local culture, politics and community.  The 
contextual references of the Earth Day Õ92 t-shirt imply a specific set of relations that are at once social 
and ecological because they situate me not only within the particulars of my community, but also infer 
a more profound ecological interaction.  Indeed, such evidence indicates that I have grown up informed 
by the threat of human-induced climate change, a threat that necessarily problematizes the relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Likewise, and both in their own ways, the thought of 
Michel Foucault and complexity theory problematize Modern1 assumptions about how humans, 
nonhumans and environments interact.  According to Modern systems of thought, there is an inherent 
distinction between humans and nonhumans2, to the extent that Modern systems of thought only 
constitute humans as agents.  In this sense, Modern definitions of agency are unable to account for the 
implications that humans are situated within vast social and ecological relationships.  However, 
throughout this thesis, I will argue that a radical relational agency is generated explicitly because 
humans, nonhumans and environments are all agents interacting within interconnected systems. 
 Isabelle Lanthier and Lawrence Olivier (1999) argue that Òenvironmentalism refers to a broader 
field of knowledge that seeks to rethink our relationship to nature and to take action to transform the 
system of values on which this relationship has been based for a long timeÓ (64).  Contemporary 
environmentalism overtly concerns itself with the relationships between humans, nonhumans and 
environments and demands that we rethink those relationships.  EnvironmentalistsÕ claims that humans 
have caused changes in the global climate, precipitated the collapse of various local ecosystems, and 
contributed to the extinction of diverse species, suggests that an assumption that humans, nonhumans 
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1 Throughout, I will be using capitals to denote the bracketing of a term.  This bracketing is required to highlight 
the fact that a term may be questionable.  Thus, use of the term ÔManÕ requires a bracketing to point out the fact 
that I am using it to refer to a certain historical occurrence only, as opposed to a transhistorical term that is meant 
to refer to all human beings.  It is for the same reason that I capitalize the word ÔNatureÕ.  ÔModernÕ is capitalized 
to indicate a certain timeframe, which is at once more complicated than the word suggests.  I use capitals to 
prevent having to complicate these terms each time I use them.
2 The term ÔnonhumanÕ used throughout this thesis is employed as a general term to indicate all that is not human, 
this may include animals, plants, machines, minerals, texts, media or anything that is not included in the Modern 
definition of ÔhumanÕ.  Indeed, integral to my argument is precisely that this distinction between what is human 
and what is not is subject to change and redefinition.  Likewise, the term ÔenvironmentÕ is employed as a general 
term that denotes a kind of spatiality which is nonhuman (in the sense described above).  I use the term in order to 
refer to a notion of Ôthe environmentÕ that is implied by contemporary environmental resistances ÐÐ a kind of 
ÔspaceÕ in which we live.  However, I will be evaluating the term ÔenvironmentÕ and its historical emergence 
throughout this thesis.
and environments are distinct is becoming untenable.  However, contemporary environmental 
resistances ÐÐ though they acknowledge that humans, nonhumans and environments are radically 
interconnected ÐÐ do not always recognize that nonhumans and environments are agents in their own 
right.  But environmentalism could benefit by explicitly acknowledging nonhumans and environments 
as agents.  Because contemporary environmental resistances are specific actions, the theoretical and 
practical implications of defining agency are such that it could require contemporary environmentalism 
to reformulate its actions.  Indeed, throughout this thesis, I will argue that a radical relational agency 
can underpin environmental action because such a definition of agency multiplies agents, and offers 
both possibilities and risks for the future.
 The aim of this thesis is to elucidate a radical relational agency, applied through examples of 
contemporary environmental resistances, that incorporates both the thought of Michel Foucault and 
recent insights from complexity theory.  To describe a radical relational agency it is necessary to 
combine both Foucauldian thought and complexity theory; each omits key attributes of the other.  On 
the one hand, FoucaultÕs thought suggests that a relational agency is the outcome of omnipresent power 
relations, yet it does not, however, account for nonhuman and environmental agency.  Even though a 
relational agency implies that nonhumans and environments are also embedded within the limits of 
power relations, Foucault does not explicitly acknowledge their participation.  On the other hand, 
complexity theory explicitly locates humans within ecological limits.  What complexity theory omits is 
the recognition that all relations ÐÐ between humans, nonhumans and environments ÐÐ are relations of 
power.  The importance of recognizing both ecological relations and relations of power is that it is 
precisely those relations that generate a radical relational agency.  Throughout this thesis I will argue 
that a radical relational agency responds to the destabilization of Modern notions of agency because it 
describes how agency is generated within ecological limits and within the constraints imposed by 
power relations.
 FoucaultÕs early texts3 critique Modern definitions of agency by exposing those definitions as a 
particular historical emergence.  Recognizing the historical emergence of Modern notions of agency 
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3 There is a distinction made between FoucaultÕs early archaeological texts and his later genealogical texts; 
throughout this thesis I will be referring to this distinction in order to make arguments which acknowledge that 
FoucaultÕs interests shifted throughout his work.  Jon Simons describes this shift in FoucaultÕs thought; ÒFoucaultÕs 
earlier work analyses the limits of the discourses of those human sciences in which various definitions of human 
subjectivity developed.  His attention shifts to the power axis because Foucault found that the conditions of 
possibility for true discourses about human subjects include complex relations between knowledge about people 
and systems of governmentÓ (2).  At the same time as acknowledging this shift in FoucaultÕs thought, I will also be 
suggesting that it is possible to take FoucaultÕs genealogical analyses of power and recognize that the relations of 
power that he described in those texts are likewise evident in the discursive practices that he described in his 
archaeological texts.
problematizes those definitions because it reveals that they are contingent upon a whole series of 
knowledges and power relations, rather than the outcome of one historically and culturally 
homogeneous explanation.  According to Modern definitions, agency is an immutable characteristic of 
individuals that allows humans to act and to speak.  This notion of agency is legitimized by 
philosophers who viewed agency as an ontological a priori; with ÒJohn LockeÕs rejection of the 
binding power of tradition, his location of beliefs in individual experience, [...] a new conception of 
agency emerged that affirmed the capacity of human beings to shape the circumstances in which they 
liveÓ, a conception that Òembedded agency in an individualist and calculative conception of action that 
still underlies many Western accounts of freedom and progressÓ (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 964-65).  
By acknowledging that the emergence of such notions was not a historical necessity, it allows other 
definitions of action to be considered.  Put simply, it opens up Modern definitions of agency to 
reinterpretation.
 Foucault argued that throughout the history of Western thought, there have been a series of 
paradigm shifts which have radically altered what it is possible to think.  Within each episteme (as 
Foucault called it) each system of thought is profoundly different from either previous or subsequent 
epistemes.  Thus, the notion of an immutable and innate human agency is associated with the Modern 
episteme.  In his early texts, Foucault argued that the Modern episteme emerged with the appearance of 
Man.  This does not suggest that humans did not exist prior to the Modern episteme, but that particular 
ways of understanding what it means to be human are not historically consistent.  The notion of Man 
emerged because humans became an object of scientific study, and because all knowledge then centred 
on human thought, action and materiality.  Prior to the emergence of these knowledges, it was not 
possible to understand the category of ÔManÕ, but, from them, Man emerged as a scientific concept and 
as a material reality.  The importance of this emergence is that with the constitution of Modern Man, 
the notion of agency as a quality possessed by individual humans simultaneously emerged.  In this 
sense, I will argue that Modern notions of agency exclude certain individual humans, as well as 
nonhumans and environments, from being constituted as agential.  Any failure to fulfill the 
requirements of Modern subjectivity would therefore correlate to a lack of agency.
 Examination of Modern systems of thought reveal that Man was constituted as radically distinct 
from Nature.  In this sense, Nature could not be constituted as an agent precisely because Nature was 
viewed as a passive object of scientific study, rather than as a participant within scientific investigation.  
Thus, Man was also constituted as an agent because, as the subject who studies Nature, Man was 
presumed to have the ability to change the laws of Nature.  Such a distinction is important because the 
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emergence of environmental resistances occurred, in part, as a result of that distinction.  Early 
environmental resistances arose in order to ÔprotectÕ Nature from the continual encroachment of Man 
and industrial processes.  Throughout the Industrial Revolution, the increasing mechanization and 
urbanization of Western nations initiated the emergence of environmental resistances which aimed to 
prevent the mechanization and urbanization of ÔnaturalÕ rural and wilderness spaces.  In order for 
natural spaces to be preserved, these conservationists argued that Nature must be protected and kept 
separate from human spaces.  Early environmentalists and conservationists reinforced the distinction 
between Man and Nature through their efforts to protect rural and wilderness spaces from urban 
encroachment.  Their attempts to ÔsaveÕ Nature from humans required that Man and Nature be 
constituted as radically distinct.  Thus, Modern definitions of Nature have intersected, changed and, in 
part, created environmental resistances.
 Because epistemes will necessarily shift, and out of that shift will emerge new systems of 
thought, Foucault denied the Modern assumption that history progresses linearly.  History is manifestly 
not teleological.  Instead, history proceeds apace without plans; a nonlinear notion of history suggests 
history can deliver the unexpected.  What is certain, however, is that the knowledge formations of the 
Modern episteme are sure to be surpassed by future systems of thought.  To be sure, the problematizing 
of Modern notions of agency and the primacy of Man indicate that such an occurrence has already 
begun.  Foucault himself (1970b) found it Òa profound source of relief to think that man is only a recent 
invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will 
disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new formÓ (xxv).  Indeed, FoucaultÕs own 
critiques of Modern systems of thought have demonstrated that it is possible to constitute humans in 
other ways and, in doing so, have cleared the way for subsequent redefinitions.  Along with the 
disappearance of Man, Modern definitions of agency that are contingent upon the category of Man will 
also disappear.  As I have suggested, Modern definitions of agency are unable to account for the radical 
interconnectivity that exists between humans, nonhumans and environments.  In this sense, the 
recognition that humans participate in diverse relationships with nonhumans and environments leads to 
redefinitions of agency.  Because Modern notions of agency are problematized by both FoucaultÕs 
thought and complexity theory, I argue that new definitions will emerge.
 Subjectivity, according to Foucault, is constituted only within relations of power.  In other 
words, there can be no characteristic of an individual that is given prior to the subjectÕs constitution 
within power relations.  We cannot escape these power relations because there is nowhere that is 
external to relations of power.  As Foucault (1978) emphatically stated, ÒPower is everywhereÓ (93).  
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FoucaultÕs argument that individual subjects are embedded within relations of power, to the extent that 
no subjectivity is possible outside power relations, critiques the Modern assumption that agency is 
derived from the innate qualities of subjects.  Thus, FoucaultÕs thought implies that agency cannot be 
an a priori quality of subjects, but must also be constituted within relations of power.  In his 
genealogical texts Foucault argued that not only are our identities constituted within relations of power, 
but this power also marks our bodies.  Accordingly, the very materiality of human bodies is constituted 
through power relations.  Indeed, a biopolitics has emerged that aims to produce humans in particular 
ways so that they remain healthy, productive and can contribute to capitalist economic production.  
Relations of power are not immaterial.  However, FoucaultÕs description of biopolitical production 
implies even more than he acknowledged, because biopower now extends its management from human 
productivity, to the economic productivity of nonhumans and environments.  In fact, contemporary 
environmental prohibitions, rules and regulations contribute to the biopolitical management of 
nonhumans and environments by developing more efficient uses of natural resources and nonhuman 
productivity.  It is in this sense that the Modern notion of Nature is reframed as Ôthe environmentÕ 
because, whereas Man and Nature are distinct, Ôthe environmentÕ is precisely that which can be 
managed and made productive.  
 Many theorists Òhave criticized Foucault for putting us in a situation in which we can do nothing 
but express bewilderment at an overwhelming world around us ÐÐ a world in which the potential for 
human agency seems to have vanished altogetherÓ (Bleiker 2003: 28).  Because power is inescapable, 
omnipresent and constitutes our subjectivities, the view that agency is absent within FoucaultÕs 
characterizations of power is perhaps understandable.  But, the argument that agency is absent in 
FoucaultÕs thought is premised on Modern notions of agency.  Indeed, it is correct that there is no 
notion of an innate and immutable agency within his thought, because his assertion that subjects are 
constituted through the relations of power explicitly contradicts such a possibility.  Thus, FoucaultÕs 
genealogical texts successfully undermine such a notion of agency.  However, I argue that a notion of 
relational agency is implicit within FoucaultÕs descriptions of power relations.  That power is precisely 
a relationship means that it is always possible to act in other ways and, therefore, an omnipresent 
power does not entail stasis.  Rather, agency is refigured as an aspect of power relations.  Foucault 
pointed out that there are always risks imposed by power relations because the result of any action can 
never be guaranteed.  Yet, it is because there are risks that I argue a relational agency is generated.
 Often theorists locate a Foucauldian redefinition of agency in FoucaultÕs notion of self-
fashioning.  In his final texts, Foucault developed a notion of self-fashioning as a potential means for 
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individuals to recreate themselves, despite the omnipresence of power relations.  Though individuals 
are constituted within the limits of power relations, self-fashioning is theorized as a way for individuals 
to re-constitute themselves using those corrupted materials given to them.  Thus, the possibility of re-
fashioning oneself intuits the relational agency that exists within omnipresent power relations.  The 
limitation of FoucaultÕs notion of self-fashioning is, however, that it is a peculiarly individual pursuit.  
Foucault (1989b) explicitly argued that: ÒCare for others should not be put before the care of 
oneselfÓ (287).  The individual orientation of self-fashioning is strange given that such an agency is 
generated as an effect of a relational power.  I will argue that the very idea of relationality indicates 
that isolation is not possible because a relation implies more than one participant.  Furthermore, a 
notion of self-fashioning ignores the implication that agency includes nonhumans and environments.  
In this sense, FoucaultÕs thought again suggests more than even he acknowledged.  Because self-
fashioning always entails the re-fashioning of identities and relationships within the limits of a 
relational power, it cannot be an explicitly isolated practice.  Moreover, I will argue that such practices 
need not require a specifically human agent.
 A radical notion of relationality extends FoucaultÕs notions of power relations to acknowledge 
the environments, geographies, animals and other nonhuman participants that he did not.  Foucault 
Òinsisted that he loathed natureÓ and perhaps such an opinion underscores his omission of nonhuman 
and environmental agents (Macey 1993: 74).  But FoucaultÕs omission of nonhuman and environmental 
agents could equally be viewed as indicative of the anthropocentrism consistent with the Modern 
episteme.  By denying the agency of nonhumans and environments, Foucault demonstrates a latent 
anthropocentrism and a failure to interrogate the particular binary construction of Man and Nature.  
Relationality aims to replace dichotomies and binaries as a way of describing the world.  A relational 
agency opposes binary thinking because, instead of arranging participants according to dichotomous 
definitions, a radical relational agency sees participants engaged in multiple relationships ÐÐ sometimes 
across vast geographic distances.  Because a relational power is necessarily dispersed throughout every 
relationship, and because it constitutes nonhumans and environments as well as humans, such a 
relationality implies a radicalness that even Foucault did not acknowledge.  In this sense, a more 
radical relational agency recognizes that humans, nonhumans and environments are all participants 
within relations of power.  FoucaultÕs thought both implies a radical relational agency, and yet, does not 
quite acknowledge it.
 My argument flips around a hinge that at once moves beyond Foucault and keeps his lessons 
immanent; the notion of a radical relational agency links humans, nonhumans and environments in 
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interconnected relationships that extend FoucaultÕs understanding of power relations.  FoucaultÕs 
theoretical challenges destabilize notions of subjectivity, power and agency; his challenges reverberate 
and the upheaval is extended to conventional notions of space, environments, animality and all that is 
nonhuman.  The destabilization of Modern Western notions of ÔnaturalÕ space and the nonhuman are 
not fully interrogated by Foucault, but the reverberation of FoucaultÕs challenges are a necessary 
outcome to his work.  Unlike FoucaultÕs thought, complexity theory underscores that humans are 
always embedded within complex ecological systems.  Because complexity theory recognizes that 
complex systems include humans, nonhumans and environments, it provides a theoretical legitimation 
for a radical relational agency.  Because a Foucauldian agency on its own is not a radical relational 
agency, the use of complexity theory is needed in order to radicalize the relationality which FoucaultÕs 
thought implied.  Complexity theory makes it clear that human isolation from environments and from 
nonhumans is impossible; there are no purely social relations of power because complex systems are 
always both social and ecological.
 Chris Jenks and John Smith (2006) argue that there are many Òtheories in post-modernism and 
post-structuralism that stress the primacy of language; the construction of worlds in languageÓ and 
deny the effects of material and ecological limits (130).  FoucaultÕs thought is implicitly included in 
this category and, as I have argued, his omission of nonhumans and environments leaves an enormous 
gap in his descriptions of a relational power.  Yet, FoucaultÕs insistence that power is implicated in the 
production of any knowledge or system of thought does not explicitly deny the existence of materiality 
or ecology.  Rather, Foucault (2000d) argued that Òknowledge is absolutely not inscribed in human 
natureÓ and is instead a function of power (7-8).  And, as I have suggested, this argument implies that 
power and knowledge constitute nonhumans and environments, but do not deny them.  The subtle 
differences that do not make the constitution of nonhumans and environments synonymous with the 
erasure of nonhumans and environments is, precisely, FoucaultÕs insistence on an omnipresent 
relational power.  That power is implicated within every relationship between humans, nonhumans and 
environments, means that there are always limits placed on those relationships ÐÐ it does not mean that 
materiality ceases to exist altogether.  The importance of recognizing that power is inherent within 
every interaction ÐÐ both social and ecological ÐÐ is that it shapes those relationships in particular 
ways.  Thus, all relationships within complex systems are necessarily relations of power and, as such, 
they are never purely ecological.
 Complex systems, however, Òare not ÔthingsÕ in the noun like sense but processes; nor are they 
ÔthingsÕ in the categorical sense because nothing underwrites the linguistic academic habit of collecting 
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them togetherÓ (Jenks and Smith 2005: 23).  Complexity theory does not take complex systems to be 
an object of study.  Rather, complexity theory describes the processes that occur within complexly 
arranged systems.  That complex systems are defined by processes is consistent with a radical 
relational agency because it underscores the interactions that occur within these systems.  A complex 
system is not defined by any innate characteristics, but by the processes enacted by the social and 
ecological participants that make it up.  In other words, complex systems cannot be ÔthingsÕ because 
they are by definition the set of complex interactions that take place between humans, nonhumans and 
environments.  Complexity theory Òexamines how components of a system through their interaction 
ÔsimultaneouslyÕ develop collective properties or patternsÓ (Urry 2005b: 5).  These collective properties 
or patterns are what make up complex systems.  The relationality of complex systems is thus radical, 
not only because it includes nonhumans and environments, but because the individual actions of each 
participant accumulates into collective properties.
 In his popular science work entitled Emergence, Steven Johnson (2001) describes how complex 
systems can shift and develop emergent characteristics.  Emergent systems are: 
bottom-up systems, not top-down.  They get their smarts from below. [É]. In these systems 
agents residing on one scale start producing behaviour that lies one scale above them: ants 
create colonies; urbanites create neighbourhoods; simple pattern-recognition software learns 
how to recommend new books.  The movement from low-level rules to higher-level 
sophistication is what we call emergence (18).
Emergent systems are not teleological and do not follow the guidance of one particular leader, 
emergent phenomena occur when individual behaviour aggregates into collective patterns.  Although 
each individual participant might not be working towards a collective goal, within complex systems 
collective results occur when enough participants acting independently can shift a system into a new 
pattern ÐÐ a complex system is more than the sum of its parts.
 Because complexity theory describes how the interactions between humans, nonhumans and 
environments develop collective properties, it shares such a recognition with environmental activism.  
The emergence of the contemporary environmental movement is often pinpointed as the 1962 
publication of Rachel CarsonÕs Silent Spring which documented the effects of DDT on the 
environment, fish, birds and other species.  Paul Hawken (2007) suggests that, after CarsonÕs book, the 
notion of Òenvironment now include[s] peopleÕs bodies, motherÕs milk, African Americans, 
farmworkers and the poorÓ because she traced the pollution from industrial wastes through to the 
environment and into human bodies (51).  By showing how industrial chemicals could change physical 
bodies and environments, Carson illustrated that there are processes at work that suggest a profound 
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interconnection between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Thus, the goal of many 
environmental resistances is for human behaviour to reflect the recognition that human actions can 
generate consequences within radically interconnected complex systems.  Moreover, because agents ÐÐ 
spaces, animals, plants, inanimate objects and humans ÐÐ are in multiple relationships with other 
agents, it is certain that they will be affected by the behaviour of the diverse agents with whom they 
interact.  In this sense, complexity theory describes complex systems as Òopen systems, exchanging 
energy or matter (and, one might add, information) with their environment.  Surely biological and 
social systems are openÓ (Toffler 1985: xv).  Open systems are never independent, and so they are 
always constrained by the external  limits imposed on them.  
 While complexity theory and contemporary environmentalism make it clear that there are 
ecological limits placed on human systems, they sometimes do not recognize the limits imposed by 
relations of power.  CarsonÕs book may have been the catalyst that formed the environmental 
movementÕs popular understanding of human relationships to the environment, but Steven Best and 
Anthony J. Nocella (2006) argue that contemporary environmental resistances forgot contributions to 
an understanding of the environment by non-whites, the working classes, women, non-heterosexuals, 
children and Indigenous peoples.  They point out that; ÒLong before Rachel Carson, African-American 
abolitionists opposed the use of chemicals such as arsenic being used to grow cropsÓ (13).  Best and 
Nocella make it clear that there are more to environmental issues because they intersect with issues of 
race, gender, class, ethnicity and sexual orientation.  They are quick to point out that the environmental 
movement arose in conjunction with the other social movements of the 1960s (15), and so could 
benefit by paying attention to the issues of other Ôsocial justiceÕ movements (20).  What this implies is 
that environmental resistances are necessarily embedded within relations of power, yet the effects of 
power are not necessarily taken into account either by those resistances or by complexity theory.
 Best and Nocella (2006) remind us that the distinction between humans, nonhumans and 
environments also intensifies binary distinctions which differentially constitute human subjects 
according to class, gender, age, race, sexual orientation, and ethnicity.  They argue that:
If, [É], the definition of revolutionary environmentalism is broadened to include environmental 
justice [É] and indigenous struggles against corporate exploitation and imperialism ÐÐ which 
bring to the table key issues of race and class ÐÐ then the contributions of Native Americans, 
Black liberationists, Latino/as, non-western peoples, and others can be duly recognized and 
integrated into a broader and more powerful resistance movement (13).
By pointing out that there are prejudices inherent within contemporary environmental resistances, Best 
and Nocella locate those resistances unambiguously within relations of power.  Because the 
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environmental movement is embedded within relations of power, it can reinforce contemporary 
relations of power.  Thus, a more radical relational agency necessarily recognizes that it is impossible 
to abstract particular kinds of agents or relationships from any other, precisely because the 
omnipresence of power relations necessitates that power is dispersed throughout every relationship.
 Because resistances are always embedded within the power relations that they seek to overturn, 
there is the need to recognize the embeddedness of resistances within Modern relations of power, 
otherwise, those power relations could be unwittingly reinforced.  Foucault (1989b) argued that 
resistances that naively seek to step outside power relations Ò[run] the risk of falling back on the idea 
that there exists a human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, economic, and 
social processes, has been concealed, alienated, or imprisonedÓ (282).  The return to an idea of human 
nature is conceived as a risk because it ignores the constitutedness of identities and materialities.  Such 
a risk, as FoucaultÕs analyses of Modern power relations suggest, entails that an inability to recognize 
the constitutedness of identities and materialities will reinforce the hierarchical ordering of subjects and 
come to see certain individuals or objects as more ÔnormalÕ or superior than others.  Thus, according to 
Foucault, resistances should not advocate the return to some ÔnaturalÕ or essentialized identity.  Rather, 
Foucault argued that any resistance should entail continual redefinition of what is the most acceptable 
form of existence or ways of living in the world.
 Unlike environmentalism and complexity theory, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) 
explicitly acknowledge that power relations are dispersed throughout every relationship.  More 
specifically, they examine how the increased biopolitical production of identities and relationships 
contributes to contemporary processes of globalization; ÒBiopower is a form of power that regulates 
social life from its interior, [É].  Power can achieve an effective command over the entire life of the 
population only when it becomes an integral, vital function that every individual embraces and 
reactivates of his or her own accordÓ (23-24).  They argue that the spread of biopolitical production has 
facilitated the movement of Western systems of thought and capitalist economics throughout the globe.  
Moreover, Hardt and Negri argue that the spread of Western systems of thought and capitalist 
economics throughout the world has generated a globalized Empire.  Empire successfully infiltrates 
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every corner of the planet because it is associated with deterritorializing flows4 that generate a 
multitude of identities and relationships which fracture current identities and territories.  A globalized 
Empire is so successful because it produces identities and fractures territories; it is able to continually 
open up new spaces to biopolitical production.  In this sense, Empire avails itself of deterritorializing 
flows that create multiple interconnections between different territories and individuals across the 
globe.  Yet, at the same time, as Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari make clear, processes of 
deterritorialization are always followed by a reterritorialization that absorbs what has been opened up 
back into the management of a globalized capitalism.  In this sense, Empire likewise increases global 
homogeneity.
 Because the spread of globalizing processes indicates that the worldÕs social-ecological systems 
are becoming increasingly complex and interconnected, it is contributing to the destabilization of those 
systems.  As I have stressed, there are both ecological relations and relations of power that are inherent 
within every relationship.  In this sense, both ecological limits and relations of power are likely to 
contribute to the destabilization of contemporary social-ecological systems.  The importance of 
recognizing the complexity, interconnectivity and instability of globalized systems is that such systems 
can potentially shift into a radically different state.  Like FoucaultÕs epistemes, complex systems are 
nonlinear; they can radically and unpredictably shift.  Moreover the recognition that shifts occur within 
complex systems Òis the absolute of complexity theoryÓ (Jenks and Smith 2006: 62).  What this means 
is, like systems of thought, complex systems are not historically homogeneous.  When radical shifts 
occur within a complex system it is precipitated by some ÒÔsingular momentÕ or a Ôbifurcation pointÕ ÐÐ 
it is inherently impossible to determine which direction change will takeÓ (Toffler 1985: xv).  Precisely 
because complex systems are nonlinear, it is impossible to predict when, or under what circumstances, 
a shift will occur.  And it is likewise impossible to predict what new stable state will emerge.  
Importantly for contemporary systems, it is destabilized systems that are more prone to unexpected 
shifts.  Thus, the more complex global systems become, the more destabilized they can become and, 
hence, more prone to shift unexpectedly.
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4 Deleuze and GuattariÕs notion of deterritorialization and reterritorialization will be discussed throughout this 
thesis as aspects of contemporary globalized capitalism.  Deterritorialization and reterritorialization are Òdiffering 
trajectories or lines of force [that] hold differing consequences for territories [É].  Thus, lines of flight can work to 
unify territorial spaces (perhaps using processes of governmentality) or can work to disrupt territorial coherence 
thereby revealing multiplicities of various kindsÓ (Murdoch 2006: 92).  Those disruptions to spaces or identities 
are caused by deterritorializing flows while those actions that can unify spaces or identities are Òa counter 
movement, a reterritorializationÓ (93).  Both of these processes or flows are inherent within contemporary 
globalized capitalism because capitalism a once needs to open up new multiplicities and spaces to global markets 
through deterritorializing flows while at the same time it needs to stabilize those multiplicities under the unifying 
identity of capitalism through a subsequent process of reterritorialization.  Throughout this thesis, I will examine 
how both deterritorializations and reterritorializations present both possibilities and dangers.
 I began this introduction with a photograph that served as a metaphor for the complex 
interconnections between diverse social and ecological systems.  The Earth Day Õ92 t-shirt represents a 
particular set of relationships that are not only personal, but also social, ecological, national, local, 
environmental and political.  But, I did not begin with such an image to locate myself within a 
particular historical trajectory as if to say Ôhere is me, interested in the environment even at age ten and 
now here is my doctoral thesis about the ways in which humans, nonhumans and environments are 
interconnectedÕ.  I never look at that photograph, and that t-shirt represents the majority of my own 
involvement with any sort of active environmental resistance.  Rather, I returned to study 
environmental resistances and a radical relational agency years later as the result of particular 
contingent circumstances.  While such events have constituted me in particular ways, my doctoral 
interest was by no means a necessary outcome.  Instead, there have been many intervening events 
between then and now that complicate any reading of such contingent circumstances as linear.  Indeed, 
the necessity of examining contemporary environmental resistances as an example of a radical 
relational agency stemmed from the relationality expressed both in the thought of Foucault and 
complexity theory ÐÐ not the other way around.  Therefore, the story of that Earth Day t-shirt is 
decidedly nonlinear and, as such, it represents not only the radical interconnectivity of complex 
relationships, but the nonlinearity of those relationships as well.
 Hardt and Negri likewise recognize that contemporary globalized systems can be transformed.  
They argue that, because biopolitical production generates identities and relationships, it is 
simultaneously generating an emergent Multitude that opposes Empire.  This Multitude thus functions 
as a bottom-up emergence which could potentially cause a new stable state to emerge.  And, on the face 
of it, this globalized Multitude appears to acknowledge all implications of a radical relational agency.  
The Multitude is made up of diverse agents participating in many interconnected relationships that 
nevertheless contribute to widespread results.  But Hardt and Negri (2005) explicitly argue that 
ÒMultitude is a class conceptÓ (103).  To the extent that the Multitude forms a globalized class, the 
implication is that it functions according to a specific set of goals.  In this sense, Hardt and Negri 
assume that the collective emergence of a globalized Multitude is necessarily beneficial.  But such an 
assumption fails to acknowledge that emergent phenomena are inherently unpredictable ÐÐ there is 
never any guarantee that an emergent Multitude will generate change that is preferable to the current 
system of globalized capitalism.  
 Because Hardt and Negri argue that the Multitude is generated through deterritorializing flows, 
they suggest that such an emergence is likewise deterritorializing.  Their insistence on a 
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deterritorializing resistance further reinforces the possibility that an emergent Multitude could have 
unforeseen consequences.  For example, Indigenous peoples throughout the world have 
disproportionately experienced the negative effects of deterritorializing flows.  Through colonization 
Indigenous peoples were evicted from their lands and experienced the fracture that is associated with 
deterritorializing flows.  Thus, deterritorializing flows can have negative effects ÐÐ they are by 
definition destabilizing.  Deterritorializing flows are destabilizing and so, by insisting on processes of 
deterritorialization, Hardt and NegriÕs Multitude is similarly prone to destabilization.  The failure to 
account for the possibility that a deterritorializing Multitude could generate harmful effects means that 
Hardt and Negri have not recognized the unpredictability that is implicated through the creation of a 
radical relational agency.  A radical relational agency is generated, in part, because the outcome of any 
action is unpredictable.  And so, in this sense, deterritorializing resistances do not acknowledge the 
implications of a radical relational agency.
 Inspiration for developing resistances consistent with a radical relational agency can be found in 
non-Western systems of thought.  Many Indigenous peoples and cultures, who have experienced effects 
of deterritorializing flows, exist within systems of thought that reflect the relationality and 
interconnectivity of humans, nonhumans and environments.  Because Indigenous systems of thought 
often do not constitute a distinction between humans, nonhumans and environments, deterritorializing 
flows that evict Indigenous peoples from their territories likewise deterritorialize their cultural practices 
and knowledges.  Thus, Indigenous resistances necessarily work to reterritorialize their own lands, 
identities and knowledges.  By developing practices and knowledges that reterritorialize, and affirm the 
interconnectedness between humans, nonhumans and environments, Indigenous ecological practices 
resist deterritorializing flows.  Hence, Hardt and NegriÕs notion of a deterritorializing Multitude not 
only fails to acknowledge the potential risks in generating deterritorializing flows, but also the 
possibilities inherent within practices of reterritorialization.  Indeed, by asserting the interconnections 
and associations between humans, nonhumans and environments, practices of reterritorialization can 
generate new identities and relationships.
 As I have already argued, a radical relational agency is generated because ecological relations 
and relations of power are not static.  Such vast and interconnected relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments make up the complex social-ecological systems in which we exist and, 
as a result of such complex interactions, unpredictability is characteristic of complex systems.  Instead 
of assuming the outcome of any action, an environmental practice consistent with a radical relational 
agency aims to generate flexibility and adaptability when confronted with disturbances and 
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fluctuations.  Flexibility and adaptability are important because they do not seek to establish one 
system of thought, or one type of complex system as an end goal; flexibility and adaptability are 
important because they are an acknowledgement of unpredictability.  Thus, throughout this thesis, I will 
examine the possibilities and risks associated with the radical interconnectivity of humans, nonhumans 
and environments.
 To map a radical relational agency in more detail, the argument of this thesis begins with 
FoucaultÕs thought and its intimations of a radical relational agency.  The purpose of Chapter One is to 
situate the definition of a radical relational agency as a response to Modern notions of agency.  To do 
this, Chapter One examines FoucaultÕs early texts and the contingencies of ManÕs emergence in the 
Modern episteme.  This examination is important because it exposes the correlative understanding of 
Nature as a passive object.  Chapter Two explores the explicit investigations of power relations that 
Foucault produced in his genealogical texts.  In these texts, Foucault made it clear that there are risks 
inherent within power relations.  Yet, Foucault also argued that it is possible for any relation of power 
to be overturned.  Thus, Chapter Two initiates the theorization of a relational agency.  But, Chapter 
Three critiques FoucaultÕs latent anthropocentrism in order to fill the gaps in his thought.  As such, it is 
a transitional chapter that begins to combine both Foucault and complexity theory.  By proceeding first 
through the thought of theorists influenced by Foucault ÐÐ Judith Butler, Donna Haraway, actor 
network theory ÐÐ Chapter Three explicitly acknowledges the existence of nonhuman agency and 
hence, a more radical relational agency.  
 Chapter Four examines contemporary globalized food systems that now span across the globe.  
In this sense, both ecological relations and relations of power necessarily reinforce the complex 
destabilization of those systems.  Because a radical relational agency is not a possession of individuals, 
but is generated as a result of the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments, the 
recognition that complex systems are self-organizing helps to explicate such a notion of agency.  
Chapter Five examines Indigenous ecological practices as a counterpoint to Modern systems of 
thought.  In this sense, they provide inspiration for how contemporary environmental actions can 
remain consistent with a radical relational agency.  As acts of reterritorialization, Indigenous ecological 
practices also expose the dangers of deterritorialization.  Thus, Chapter Five also addresses the 
possibilities of how we can respond to the instability of contemporary globalized systems.  Finally, 
Chapter Six poses questions and asks; ÔWhere do we go from here?Õ  In Chapter Six, I examine both 
the risks, and the possibilities, that are generated as an effect of a radical relational agency.
Picard 14
CHAPTER ONE
The Emergence of Man and Modern Agency
 To investigate a radical relational agency, it makes sense to contrast it with what it is not.  The 
necessity of determining what a radical relational notion of agency is not, is that such a notion of 
agency contradicts Modern notions of agency which view it as a quality embedded within individual 
humans.  If a radical relational agency is counterintuitive to Modern understandings of agency, then it 
is assured to encounter opposition.  Thus, the necessity of understanding what a radical relational 
notion of agency is not, is to examine Modern notions of agency as a theoretical development to which 
a radical relational agency responds.  A radical relational agency responds to Modern notions of agency 
not only as a matter of course, but because Modern notions of agency are found to be insufficient in 
addressing a number of problems.  First, Modern notions of agency are very limited in the sense that 
only particular subjects are granted the possibility of being identified as agents.  The possibility of 
nonhuman or environmental agency is not addressed by Modern notions of agency because such 
restrictions on who or what is defined as an agent are integral to it.  Furthermore, the limitation of 
agency to certain human individuals demonstrates that relations of power are embedded not only within 
agential practices, but also within the very definitions of Modern agency.  Finally, because Modern 
notions of agency are dependent upon a series of contingent knowledges, they are not the 
transhistorical definitions that they purport to be.
 In his early archaeological texts, Foucault implicitly critiqued a Modern notion of agency 
because his investigations explicitly undermine the correlative notions on which a Modern notion of 
agency is dependent.  Through his examinations of shifts in what is thinkable, Foucault argued that any 
system of thought necessarily governs and organizes all that is thinkable within an episteme.  In other 
words, within each episteme, the systems of thought and discursive orderings will be structured 
differently.  The episteme that is relevant to discussions of contemporary notions of agency is the 
Modern episteme.  In particular, the Modern episteme is associated with the emergence of Man as a 
discursive construction.  As this chapter will argue, Modern notions of agency are dependent upon the 
emergence of Man.  The term ÔManÕ, as it is used without being problematized, implies the notion of 
ÔmankindÕ or a universalized humanity.  But this implied definition obscures the contingent history and 
power relations that are integral to its functioning as a unified category.  The notion of Modern Man 
functions within a series of hierarchical binary oppositions that deny agency to certain individuals and 
so the term ÔManÕ excludes, rather than includes.
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 While FoucaultÕs critiques of Man help to situate Modern notions of agency as a counterpoint to 
a radical relational agency, his analyses fail to interrogate the nonhuman and environmental 
specificities that are necessary to developing a radical relational agency.  The term ÔManÕ, because it 
distinguishes (certain kinds) of humans from nonhumans and environments, reflects back onto those 
nonhuman categories; it underscores the dualism that Western thought has created in the relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Man is thus, by definition, not Nature.  The category 
of Man philosophically reinforces not only the discursive binaries between Man and Nature, but 
material realities as well.  However, Foucault did not examine the particular binary oppositions which 
function to constitute Man and Nature as distinct.  Although Foucault recognized that spatial and 
material arrangements can serve to reinforce the discursive constructions within an episteme, he did not 
address the Modern assumption that nonhumans and environments are not granted agency.  In order to 
investigate a radical relational agency, FoucaultÕs insufficiencies will have to be addressed because 
explicit to the development of radical relationality is that humans, nonhumans and environments are all 
participants within relations of power.
 Integral to FoucaultÕs archaeological texts are his descriptions of epistemic shifts as nonlinear 
and unpredictable.  According to Foucault, history does not proceed in agreement with a teleological 
imperative.  Rather, history is defined by unpredictable shifts that can cause a new episteme or system 
of thought to emerge.  A nonlinear notion of history has a twofold relevance for notions of agency.  In 
the first instance, FoucaultÕs investigations of the Modern episteme indicate that, because of the 
nonlinearity of history, a new system of thought could emerge that will actually replace the Modern 
episteme.  Associated with this recognition that the Modern episteme is not the end of history, is the 
corresponding implication that any notion of agency also does not encompass all possible definitions.  
A radical relational agency is both an alternative notion of agency to that of the Modern episteme and a 
notion of agency that itself recognizes nonlinearity.  In what follows, this chapter will examine 
FoucaultÕs archaeological analysis of the emergence of Man and some of the broader implications of 
this emergence that were not discussed by Foucault, but are necessary to the development of a radical 
relational agency.  In particular, the granting of agency to only certain individuated subjects indicates 
that definitions of agency are embedded within relations of power.  Thus, I will place such exclusionary 
practices within the context of FoucaultÕs later, genealogical, notion of power/knowledge.  But, I also 
argue that Foucault ignored the relations of power between humans, nonhumans and environments and, 
in doing so, neglected the radical implications of a relational agency to which his critiques lead.  
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Finally, this chapter will initiate an examination of the possibility of future emergences and what those 
might mean for emergent notions of agency.  
The Emergence of Man and the Emergence of a Modern Notion of Agency
 Rather than accepting the existence of Man as a transhistorical fact and cultural given, Foucault 
argued that the idea of ÔManÕ is a discursive construction.  This argument does not suggest that human 
beings did not exist, but that certain ways of conceptualizing humans, and hence of being human, are 
not historically or culturally homogeneous.  For Foucault, the emergence of Man was neither necessary 
nor essential, but dependent upon corresponding shifts in what was thinkable.  Foucault contended that 
the idea of Man, or any idea, cannot occur unless contingent circumstances make it possible.  Thus, 
before a certain historical moment, Man was unthinkable ÐÐ the conditions for ManÕs emergence did 
not always exist.  Likewise, the Modern notion of agency that I am examining and contesting is not 
historically or culturally homogeneous.  Rather, it emerged via the relations of power within the 
historically constrained context of Western cultures.  In this sense, Modern notions of agency are both 
historically recent in that they have not existed throughout the entirety of Western history and they are 
specific to Western cultures; they are limited definitions of agency that are not universally applicable.  
Thus, the emergence of Modern Western notions of agency is similarly impossible without the 
existence of particular historical and cultural conditions ÐÐ conditions that include the emergence of 
Man.
 In the epistemes previous to the Modern episteme, the Renaissance and Classical epistemes, the 
conditions for the emergence of Man as a category of knowledge did not exist.  The shift to the Modern 
episteme occurred roughly between 1775 and 1825 because the conditions for ManÕs emergence 
appeared at this time; Foucault argued that the conditions for the emergence of Man included the 
establishment of a series of knowledges and disciplines about human beings.  Man emerged in the 
Modern episteme because, at that time, there were established knowledges about human beings which 
pertained to health, education, biology, economics, politics and society.  Prior to the Modern episteme, 
disciplines which took human beings as their object of study did not exist and so, without them, it was 
not possible to conceive of human beings in the same way.  Thus, Foucault claimed that the central 
feature of the Modern episteme is that all human philosophical inquiry began to take on an 
anthropological tone and knowledge came to revolve around an understanding of what it means to be 
human.  In short, Man could not have existed without the concomitant knowledges that created the 
conditions for emergence.  
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 Modern notions of agency are similarly dependent upon the knowledges of Man because 
Modern notions of agency are explicitly human notions of agency.  Prior to the anthropologization of 
systems of thought, agency was located outside humans and within God.  It is only once the figure of 
Man emerges that a notion of human agency can be theorized.  FoucaultÕs dating of the Modern 
episteme locates its emergence within the secularized knowledges of Enlightenment humanism.  
Humanism Òresurrected the notion of human agency and challenged GodÕs monopoly to anchor all 
aspects of human existence.  Humanism placed the subject at the centre of history and expressed a 
profound belief in peopleÕs dignity, in their own ability to solve problemsÓ (Bleiker 2000: 54).  It is 
only within the Modern episteme that human agency becomes possible because a secularization of 
thought allowed human subjects to be constituted as individual agents in charge of their own histories.  
Whereas previous systems of thought denied humans such a privilege, Modern thought is characterized 
by the centrality of humans within philosophical and scientific thought.  Human agency, far from being 
a necessary human characteristic, is a historically contingent notion dependent upon the death of God 
and the emergence of Man.
 The emergence of Man, as Foucault made clear, required the simultaneous emergence of a series 
of knowledges that aimed to study human beings.  These knowledges included the human sciences with 
which we are familiar with today.  The category of Man emerged because the human sciences created 
entire disciplines and discourses that aimed to describe the material, sociological, psychological and 
social existence of human beings.  Prior to the existence of the human sciences, Man could not be 
understood as an object of knowledge, or as a discursive category.  Man thus acquired an existence that 
had not previously been thinkable; ÒWestern man could grasp himself in his own eyes as an object of 
science, he grasped himself within his language, and gave himself, in himself and by himself, a 
discursive existenceÓ (Foucault 1973: 243).  Because human beings became the object of knowledge in 
the Modern episteme across a variety of disciplines, Man emerged as the product of those knowledges.  
The human sciences characterize Man as an objectively existing category.  By generating vast amounts 
of knowledge about what it means to be human, in the Modern episteme, Western thought constituted 
Man as a seemingly incontrovertible fact.  Man exists in the Modern episteme not only as an object of 
knowledge, but as an identifiable category that includes a number of presuppositions.  One of these 
presuppositions includes the assumption that Man is endowed with agential capacities.  Through the 
thought of the human sciences, Man was constituted as a unified category that included the capacity for 
agency.
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 The Modern notion of Man underscores the conventional conclusion that Òagency is attached to 
a ÔselfÕ and conceived as an element of psychological being, it is said to be an individualÕs capacity for 
action realized through decision and actionÓ (Messer-Davidow 1995: 25).  In order for a Modern notion 
of agency to emerge, there required a corresponding notion of the ÔselfÕ who would be endowed with 
agential capacities.  The constitution of Modern Man via the human sciences generated just such an 
understanding of selfhood to which a notion of agency could be attached.  In other words, Modern Man 
serves as the unitary category that provides agency the being to which it attaches.  Because Modern 
agency is defined as a possession of human beings, it requires the Modern notion of Man in order to be 
the possessor of that agency; Òagency is attached to an entity ÐÐ an individual, a collective, or a social 
structureÓ (Messer-Davidow 1995: 24).  According to such definitions of agency, agency cannot exist 
without something to which it can attach itself.  Thus, within the Modern episteme, agency emerged 
only because Man was constituted as a discursive and objective category. 
 While disciplines in the Modern episteme were anthropologized, and took Man as the object of 
knowledge, Man was also constituted as the subject who studies.  Man was constituted as a subject 
who studies because, as the pursuant of knowledge generated by the human sciences, Man is the active 
agent who produces those knowledges.  It is in this sense that Foucault argues Modern Man is 
constituted as both subject and object.  Foucault (1970b) argued that during the Modern episteme; Òin 
the profound upheaval of such an archaeological mutation, man appears in his ambiguous position as 
an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed spectatorÓ (340).  
There can be no Man-as-subject without a notion of Man-as-object.  This doubling, though it is hidden, 
is the essential fact of the existence of Modern Man.  Indeed, that Man is both subject and object is a 
necessary precondition for ManÕs emergence.  Without the anthropologized knowledges of the Modern 
episteme, there would be no anthropologized disciplines in which to situate a knowledge of Man as an 
object.  However, as the active pursuant of these knowledges, Modern Man is also constituted as a 
subject; without such a subject none of these knowledges would be possible.  Because Man emerged 
only within the anthropologized knowledges of the Modern episteme and was simultaneously endowed 
with the ability to obtain those knowledges, the necessity of both subjectivity and objectivity becomes 
apparent.  
 FoucaultÕs recognition that Modern Man is both subject and object is important because it serves 
as a critique of Modern Man.  The recognition of the doubling of Man functions as a critique of Man 
because it destabilizes the Modern assumption that Man is an active agent.  As Foucault (1970b) 
pointed out, Man is: 
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an individual who lives, speaks, and works in accordance with the laws of an economics, a 
philology, and a biology, but who also, by a sort of internal torsion and overlapping, has 
acquired the right, through the interplay of those very laws, to know them and to subject them to 
total clarification ÐÐ all these themes so familiar to us today and linked to the existence of the 
Ôhuman sciencesÕ (338).
The Modern assumption that Man is able to understand those laws generated by the human sciences is 
contingent, in part, on the constitution of Man as a subject who studies.  However, the recognition that 
Man is also the object of study complicates this assumption.  Modern ManÕs objectivity is masked by a 
seemingly unproblematized subjectivity.  Within the Modern episteme, ÒFoucault argues that there is 
no possible solution to the problem of knowledge, or of Man and his doubles.  His critique of the 
modern episteme which targets the humanist foundation in the figure of Man undermines the claims to 
authority of discourses of knowledgeÓ (Simons 1995: 25).  Thus, FoucaultÕs critique of Modern Man 
acknowledges that the doubling of Man is a fundamental and unresolvable inconsistency inherent 
within the Modern episteme.  In this sense, as a contradictory condition, ManÕs doubling actually 
destabilizes Modern notions of agency.
 ManÕs position as both subject and object complicates notions of agency that regard human 
agents as only ever subjects.   The emergence of Man as a category requires that Man is positioned as 
both an object of knowledge and as the subject who knows.  Without the constitution of Man as both 
subject and object, the emergence of Modern Man would not have been possible.  But, Modern notions 
of agency are challenged by ManÕs position as both subject and object because the very definition of 
Modern agency is premised on the assumption that ManÕs agency is derived from a subjectivity.  In this 
sense, subjectivity is viewed as the Modern precondition for agency.  However, if Man is 
simultaneously constituted as an object of knowledge, then such definitions of agency no longer seem 
to apply.  The constitution of Man as an agential being therefore appears as an illusion.  The limitations 
of Modern notions of agency include not only its inability to theorize the agency of particular 
individuals that are defined as objects, but to theorize any agency as attached to a knowing subject, 
given that Man is always simultaneously both subject and object.  Do away with distinctions between 
subject and object, and agency must be theorized as something else altogether.
 Agency, within the Modern episteme, is necessarily a human characteristic because it is viewed 
as an essential quality of Modern Man.  Modern agency denies agency to those who are not included 
within the category of Man, to some extent, because such individuals are not constituted as subjects.  
Man exists, in part, because the category is defined in hierarchical binary opposition to other 
(presumably) less complex living organisms or non-living entities.  Within the Modern episteme, Man 
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is situated in relation not only to other non-agential humans, but in relation to nonhuman species as 
well.  The Modern episteme Òestablishes in the whole living world a vast resemblance which can be 
arranged in a scale of decreasing complexity, from man down to the zoophyteÓ (Foucault 1970b: 295).  
Thus, because Man is the presumed subject of all knowledge, the Modern episteme locates humans at 
the pinnacle of biological and cultural development.  Modern Man was viewed as more developed than 
any other nonhuman organism and so nonhumans and environments were denied agential capacities.  
Nonhumans are not afforded agency according to Modern definitions because they are explicitly 
constituted in opposition to Man.  Thus, Modern notions of agency are unable to account for the 
possibility of nonhuman agents.  This demonstrates a theoretical limitation to Modern notions of 
agency because they are inadequate for theorizing the agency of any humans, nonhumans and 
environments not included within the Modern notion of Man.
 Foucault (2000f) argued that the task of the intellectual Òis to try and isolate in their power of 
constraint, but also in their contingency in their historical formation, the systems of thought that have 
become familiar to us, that appear self-evident and are integral to our perceptions, our attitudes, our 
behavioursÓ (384).  The Modern notion of agency is an artifact of familiar systems of thought and, as 
such, it appears as natural.  However, Foucault argued that his task as an intellectual was to 
denaturalize systems of thought.  And that is precisely what he endeavoured to do to Modern systems 
of thought because the process of denaturalization exposes systems of thought to some of the pressures 
that may result in their eventual disintegration.  Thus, Modern notions of agency can be destabilized by 
questioning their seeming naturalness.  In the following section, I will examine in greater detail the 
contingencies that deny nonhumans and environments agency within the Modern episteme.
The Emergence of Life and the Importance of Human Finitude
 Paradoxically, the inability to account for the agency of nonhumans and environments is 
partially dependent upon ManÕs constitution as an animal and as a natural, living being dependent upon 
the environment.  Associated with the emergence of Man is a correlative notion of life.  Foucault 
(1970b) argued that prior to the Modern episteme, Òlife [did] not exist: only living beingsÓ (175).  Life 
did not exist as a thinkable possibility until the Modern episteme because the notion of life is 
dependent upon a particular understanding of natural, biological processes.  Until the emergence of the 
Modern episteme, knowledge was not concerned with natural biological processes because such 
concerns were not the object of human knowledge.  Rather, they remained ÐÐ as with the notion of 
agency ÐÐ subject to GodÕs determinism.  The emergence of life in the Modern episteme is important 
because it situates Man as a biological being who is no longer subjected to the whims of God.  Modern 
Picard 21
biology inaugurates the idea that Man is a living being who exists within the laws of Nature.  Man is 
characterized as a living being, in part, because of the anthropologization of thought and, in part, 
because of its need to discover those laws of Nature that affect humans as living beings.  Man acquired 
Òthe strange stature of a being whose nature [...] is to know nature, and itself, in consequence, as a 
natural beingÓ (338).  Man emerged as a living being not because of an identification with Nature, but 
because of an ability to study and classify Nature.  Because Modern sciences constituted Nature as 
knowable, there emerged the correlative notion that Man would be able to conquer Nature. 
 Although Man emerged in the Modern episteme as a being endowed with agency, in part, 
because Modern knowledge became secularized, this secularization came at a cost.  Without the 
existence of God to endow humans with religious immortality, humans were faced with the notion of 
our own finitude.  When Man emerged as a living being subject to the laws of Nature, part of this 
fundamental recognition was that living beings ÐÐ including humans ÐÐ are destined to die.  Foucault 
(1998d) argued that within the Modern episteme Òthe problems of philosophy are [É] all lodged within 
the domain that can be called that of human finitudeÓ (250).  Not only are Modern knowledges 
anthropologized and secularized, but they are also contingent upon the recognition of human finitude.  
In order to confront the certainty of death, Modern thought is characterized by ManÕs search for ways 
in which to overcome the inevitability of death.  For example, Foucault (1970b) argued that Modern 
economics Òis related, in fact, to the biological properties of a human speciesÓ (279-280).  Thus, 
Modern economics deals with human finitude to the extent that its aim is to successfully create a 
balance between human needs, namely food, and the ability for that food to be produced.  By doing so, 
economics should ensure that death (by starvation) is prevented.  It is in this sense that Modern 
knowledge is concerned with human finitude.
 Through the recognition of human finitude, Modern medicine endeavoured to examine the 
limitations imposed by the human body.  The necessity of studying human physiology and disease was 
generated by the goal of increasing longevity.  Foucault (1973) argued that ÒWestern man could 
constitute himself [...], only in the opening created by his own eliminationÓ (243).  Modern Man was 
constituted through death because the recognition of human finitude necessitated the emergence of the 
human sciences.  In other words, the acknowledgement of death actually directly initiated the 
emergence of Modern Man.  Man emerged, in part, because Modern medicine was able to examine 
dead human bodies and establish medical knowledges that aimed to extend the lives of human beings.  
It is paradoxically via death that knowledge about human life is established; Òthe medical gaze pivots 
on itself and demands of death an account of life and diseaseÓ (179).  Knowledge about life is 
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generated by observing the human body in death and, in doing so, contributing to medical discourses 
that seek to extend life as much as possible.
 In the Modern episteme, death was no longer associated with a religious immortality, instead it 
became observable in its minute details to knowledgeable medical researchers.  Humans are no longer 
immortal, but medicine offers Man the ability to observe death and, in the process, establish systems of 
knowledge about life and health.  Rather than seek religious immortality, doctors now offer the promise 
of eternal good health; Òmedicine offers modern man the obstinate, yet reassuring face of his finitude; 
in it, death is endlessly repeated, but it is also exorcizedÓ (Foucault 1973: 244).  As the keepers of good 
health, doctors supply Man with the possibility of temporarily expelling death.  Within Modern 
medicine, medical knowledge is presented as a possible route to conquer the immanence of death.  
Doctors became the saviours of the human body to the extent that Òhealth replaces salvationÓ (244).  
Although the Modern episteme is characterized by secularized knowledges, those knowledges have 
transferred the importance of God into the possibility of understanding the laws of Nature.  Foucault 
argued that Òthe army of priests watching over the salvation of souls would correspond [to] that of the 
doctors who concern themselves with the health of bodiesÓ (37).  While it is clearly impossible to 
escape death as an individual, the human sciences hold out the possibility that an increase in 
knowledge could sustain life just a little bit longer.  
 Through the anthropologization of knowledge in the Modern episteme, Man was consecrated as 
a being in nature rather than in the image of God.  With the death of God, Man no longer looked to 
religion to answer questions, but instead established a series of scientific knowledges.  The emergence 
of the human sciences in the Modern episteme, premised as they are on the recognition of finitude, 
actually represent ManÕs attempt to overcome the limitations of mortality.  Foucault (1970b) argued 
that ÒmanÕs finitude is outlined in the paradoxical form of the endless; rather than the rigour of a 
limitationÓ (342).  In other words, the knowledges generated by the human sciences can be seen as an 
effort to understand the means through which immortality, without the necessity for God, could be 
restored.  For example, the human sciences point out the possibility that the Òevolution of the species 
has perhaps not reached its culminationÓ or that Òforms of production and labour are still being 
modifiedÓ and, as a result, limitations might one day be overcome (342).  And so, the Modern episteme 
rejects the possibility of immortality, but nonetheless aims towards a triumph over the limitations of 
ManÕs finitude.  The importance of recognizing the Modern epistemeÕs relationship with human 
finitude is that it underscores the relationship between Man and Nature that is characteristic of the 
Modern episteme.
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 The recognition that Man is a finite being, subject to the laws of Nature, indicates that the 
Modern episteme does not ignore that humans are situated within material environments and in 
relationships with nonhumans.  Indeed, the cognizance of human finitude demonstrates that Modern 
Man is constrained by biological and ecological limitations.  However, this recognition nevertheless 
serves to reinforce antagonistic relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  As the 
attempts made by the human sciences to overcome the limits of finitude attest, Modern Man 
experiences great anxiety of the prospect of mortality.  Because all humans must die, ÒNature can no 
longer be goodÓ (Foucault 1970b: 302).  Within the Modern episteme Nature becomes the enemy of 
Man because ManÕs position as a natural, living being exposed humans to death and reveals the 
finiteness of existence.  Nature thus becomes that which Man must tackle in order to confront the 
surety of human finitude.  Not only do Modern knowledges attempt to overcome the limits imposed by 
being recognized as a living thing within Nature, but the ability to know Nature is refigured as ManÕs 
ability to dominate Nature.  Thus, Man actually endeavours to replace God as the being who is able to 
know and alter the laws of Nature. 
 Jenks and Smith (2006) argue that Modern humanist thought has yet to be completely 
secularized because it Òstill rests on something akin to Ôman in the image of GodÕ, particularly with 
respect to the centrality of mind and autonomyÓ (59).  In other words, Man is simply the substitute for 
God because Man is positioned at the centre of all knowledge.  Man is the being with the capacity to 
comprehend ÔhimselfÕ as a being within Nature and, in doing so, open up the possibility for 
circumventing the limitations imposed by that Nature.  This ability to know and to change the laws of 
Nature is correlative to the Modern notions of agency that established Man as the entity to whom 
agential capacity is attached.  Modern notions of agency are dependent not only upon the knowledges 
that constituted Man as a thinkable category, but also upon ManÕs position as a natural, finite being that 
necessitated the definition of Man as a being with the capacity to acquire knowledge.  ManÕs 
recognition of finitude generated the need to study the laws of Nature and, hence, established Man as 
an agent who knows.  Thus, Modern notions of agency are constituted not only through the death of 
God, but also through ManÕs position as a replacement for God.  Modern thought is not fully 
secularized because it has not questioned the centrality of humans as the source of all knowledge and 
as the sole possessors of agency.
 For Modern thought the inability to account for nonhuman agency is a characteristic embedded 
within the very knowledges that generated it.  Nonhuman agency is inconceivable because Modern 
knowledges have not completely secularized thought, the Modern notion of Man is simply a 
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replacement for God.  A more truly secularized agency would include human, nonhuman and 
environmental actors.  However, the attempt to overcome the limits of finitude prevents nonhuman 
agency from being recognized because Nature is viewed simply as a series of ultimately knowable 
laws.  The constitution of Nature as an understandable field of inquiry through Modern thought reveals 
its failure to account for nonhuman agents because, according to this constitution of Nature, 
nonhumans are essentially defined as passive objects of study.  The constitution of nonhumans as 
passive and devoid of agency is troubling because it demonstrates that there are (often concealed) 
relations of power that function within the human sciences.  Indeed, this is precisely FoucaultÕs point 
that power and knowledge ÐÐ such as the knowledge generated by the human sciences ÐÐ are 
inextricably intertwined.  In his early texts, Foucault did not explicitly intend to expose that 
knowledges are always embedded within relations of power, but the exclusionary practices of the 
Modern episteme illustrate that the knowledges generated by the human sciences function to prevent 
the recognition of nonhuman agency.  Because Modern definitions of agency explicitly exclude 
nonhumans, it represents not only an example of how power relations are embedded within the 
knowledges generated by the human sciences, but reveals a deficiency within those knowledges to 
account for relationships between humans and nonhumans.  In the following section, I will argue that 
the constitution of Nature as only an object underlies the inability for Modern notions of agency to 
acknowledge the ways in which nonhumans and environments participate in relationship with humans.  
This inability to acknowledge nonhumans and environments complicates definitions of Modern agency, 
and points to the need for alternate theorizations.
Modern Man and Nature
 Modern Man emerged through the human sciences as a natural being, in part, because of the 
recognition of the limits of human finitude ÐÐ a recognition that instigated a correlative need for 
humans to understand the laws of Nature.  The ability to understand the laws of Nature emerged as the 
corollary to the death of God and as an outcome of the secularization of knowledge because, in the 
absence of God, Man emerged as the entity at the centre of all knowledge.  In other words, Man 
emerged at the centre of all knowledge not only as an identifiable reality, but also as the subject who 
studies the reality of the ÔnaturalÕ world.  Modern knowledges thus not only constitute Man, but 
because they endeavour to understand the laws of the natural world, they also constitute Nature.  As 
Bruno Latour (2004) points out, Ònature becomes knowable through the intermediary of the sciences; it 
is formed through networks of instruments; it is defined through the interventions of professions, 
disciplines, and protocolsÓ (4).  In other words, the relationship between humans and nonhumans ÐÐ at 
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least in the Modern episteme ÐÐ is mediated through the knowledges generated by science.  Science 
serves as the primary source of connection between Man and Nature.  However, as described in the 
previous section, Man and Nature are constituted as distinct because, through the intermediary of the 
sciences, Man is the subject who studies while Nature is the object of study.
 Although ManÕs position as a natural being necessitated the correlative impulse to discover the 
laws of Nature, the knowledge that is generated through the sciences actually serves to reinforce the 
distinction between Man and Nature.  Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (1985) recognize this 
contradiction, they argue that:
Science initiated a successful dialogue with nature.  On the other hand, the first outcome of this 
dialogue was the discovery of a silent world.  This is the paradox of classical science.  It 
revealed to men a dead, passive nature, a nature that behaves as an automaton which, once 
programmed, continues to follow the rules inscribed in the program.  In this sense the dialogue 
with nature isolated man from nature instead of bringing him closer to it (6).  
Like FoucaultÕs investigation of the Modern episteme, Prigogine and Stengers recognize in Modern 
science the paradox that allows Man to study Nature, while at the same time rendering that Nature inert 
and absolutely separate from humans.  Thus, Nature moves in parallel opposition to Man.  Although 
Nature is made to speak using the intermediary of Modern science through the accumulation of 
information about its natural laws, it is ÐÐ at the same time ÐÐ delineated as essentially silent.  Thus, 
the distinction between Man and Nature is characterized as a distinction between those who know, 
speak and act, and between those who are observed, silent and static.
 The Modern distinction between Man and Nature describes a relationship that not only renders 
nonhumans and environments as fundamentally passive, but is also a relationship that is undeniably 
antagonistic.  Because Nature is, by definition, constituted as a passive object of study, in accordance 
with this formulation Nature is viewed as primarily inadequate.  Foucault (1970b) argued that, within 
the Modern episteme, Man is Òconfronted by a nature that in itself is inertÓ (279).  With Nature 
constituted as passive and inert, it becomes that which can be remade into objects suitable for human 
consumption.  If humans are Òconfronted by a nature that in itself is inertÓ, then it must be changed into 
something else altogether in order to be useful.  In order for humans to survive in the natural world, 
this inert nature must be transformed into something that is productive.  Thus, the distinction between 
Man and Nature reinforces the view that Nature is passive because it underscores the interpretation of 
Nature as a static background against which the more fundamental activities of Man take place.  
Furthermore, Man only finds use in Nature once it is made into something of inherent value to human 
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beings.  Within the Modern episteme, Nature is constituted as an essentially passive resource to be 
forced by Man into useful productivity.
 Man is constituted as the centre of all knowledge, in part, because Nature is rendered useful 
only through the intermediary of human scientific knowledges that transform passive resources into 
usable goods.  The necessity of transforming Nature into useable resources is underscored by ManÕs 
position as a natural being who, faced with the prospect of finitude, must live within the limits imposed 
by Nature.  ManÕs position as the centre of all knowledge is strengthened by the desire to study Nature, 
to know the laws of Nature, and, in order to address the prospect of inevitable death, to perhaps change 
those laws.  The relationship between Man and Nature is characterized by this antagonistic and 
dichotomous, hierarchical arrangement.  Man is defined as superior to Nature because Man is 
constituted as the one living being who is able to overcome the limitations imposed by Nature.  The 
hierarchical distinctions between Man and Nature reinforce Modern definitions of agency which deny 
agential capacities to anyone, or anything, that is defined as passive.  According to these hierarchically 
arranged definitions of agency, nonhumans are necessarily incapable of agential capacities.  The 
distinction between Man and Nature thus underscores the inability for Modern notions of agency to 
account for nonhuman actors.
 The paradox of ManÕs dichotomous relationship to Nature is that it emerged as a result of the 
recognition that Man is a natural being subject to the laws of Nature.  Although Man was recognized as 
a natural being, Man was constituted as an agent with the capacity to learn those laws of Nature and to 
transform a passive Nature into products for human use.  Thus, the relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments within the Modern episteme are characterized by binary orderings and 
antagonism.  While Man is endowed with agency, Nature is not.  It is against the background of an 
antagonistic relationship between humans, nonhumans and environments that an environmental 
resistance was able to emerge.  In short, environmental resistances emerged as an effect of the 
distinctions between Man and Nature.  As a result, environmental resistances are often unable to 
theorize adequately the relationship between humans, nonhumans and environments.  In the next 
section I will examine how contemporary environmentalism emerged as a consequence of this 
distinction.
A History of Early Environmentalism
 The Modern episteme constituted Nature as fundamentally distinct from Man.  Because Man 
was characterized as the active surveyor of Nature, Nature was viewed as an inert backdrop and as an 
infinite resource to be consumed.  According to this interpretation of Nature, the environment is merely 
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a static container in which human culture takes place.  With the emergence of the Industrial 
Revolution,5 ManÕs dichotomous relationship to Nature reinforces the increased extraction of natural 
resources from the environment.  The Industrial Revolution signalled the beginning of an intense 
interaction with the planetÕs resources through the use of coal, oil, gasoline and other petroleum 
products.  Furthermore, the knowledges accumulated through the Modern sciences allowed Western 
Man to further increase the transformation of Nature into useful goods; Òknowledge of these 
constitutive laws of the environment allow us to become aware of the wealth and weaknesses of the 
environmentÓ and Òto organize the exploitation of our natural resources in a logical, productive 
wayÓ (Lanthier and Olivier 1999: 67).  Modern ManÕs need to transform a passive Nature into a 
productive set of resources underscores the processes of industrialization that occurred throughout the 
Industrial Revolution.  Thus, the distinction between Man and Nature served as the philosophical 
legitimation out of which economic benefits were reaped from the environment in the form of oil, 
petrochemicals, increased agricultural output, mechanization of labour and colonial expansion.
 With the invigorated extraction of natural resources that powered the Industrial Revolution, and 
the increased urbanization that mechanized factory work instigated, some individuals began to question 
the continued exploitation of Nature for economic gain.  Nature functioned as a resource for human 
economic growth during the Industrial Revolution, but an oppositional move that aimed to protect 
Nature emerged simultaneously.  Steven Best and Anthony J. Nocella (2006) trace the beginning of 
Western environmentalism to Luddites, Romanticism and American Transcendentalism (11).  While 
Luddites protested the mechanization of their jobs, Romantic writers and artists criticized 
industrializing processes and, following Rousseau, Òthey praised nature as the antithesis to all that was 
rotten in modern life, and extolled the beauty and divinity of the wildÓ (11).  Through these beliefs, 
Nature was promoted as a good in and of itself that was in need of conservation and protection, and 
that was to be held apart from industrialized human activities.  Paradoxically, the distinction between 
Man and Nature was reinforced both by industrialists and those who opposed industrialization.  The 
argument that Nature should be protected from industrial processes cements the distinction between 
Man and Nature because it assumed that Nature is a passive object that needs protection from the 
encroaching practices of Modern Man.
 The beginning of a popular environmental movement can be traced to shifts in living, labour 
and economic arrangements that began with the Industrial Revolution.  Early conservationists saw 
increasing industrialization and mechanization as an issue that affected their ability to pursue leisure 
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5 The Industrial Revolution occurred simultaneously with the emergence of the Modern episteme.
activities in rural wilderness and pastoral settings.  Thus, concerned citizens and conservationists aimed 
to protect the countryside and wilderness from creeping human intervention.  In Britain, after the 
increased urbanization of the Industrial Revolution, Òit was town dwellers who sought to protect nature 
from further destruction, or gain access to nature to escape from the pollution of the industrial 
townsÓ (Rdig 1995: 222).  With the shift away from agricultural communities to urbanized 
settlements, city dwelling individuals felt the need to prevent development in particular rural locales in 
order to preserve Nature and to maintain access to outdoor recreational activities.  Urbanized and 
industrialized spaces of cities were defined in opposition to the rural spaces of the countryside, 
reinforcing the distinction between Man and Nature.  Conservationists explicitly aimed to protect rural 
spaces from the possibility of human intervention.  Through these preservationist tactics, the 
relationships between Man and Nature remained antagonistic because they viewed Nature as being 
damaged by ManÕs intervention.  Thus, Nature was continually constituted as passive even within early 
environmental movements.  
 In the United States, the transcendentalist movement is often identified as the beginning of 
contemporary environmentalism on the North American continent.  In the nineteenth century, American 
environmentalism was characterized by Òrugged individualism and solitary journeys into wildernessÓ 
that were undertaken by men in order to prove their manliness and virility (Best and Nocella 2006: 12).  
Best and Nocella (1995) argue that the distinction in the United States between wilderness and urban 
environments was even more pronounced than it was in Britain.  By opposing a masculine wilderness 
to ÔsoftÕ urban spaces, the early American environmentalistÕs definition of Nature served to isolate rural 
wildernesses from urbanized developments.  A distinction between Man and Nature is implicit in these 
early environmentalist resistances because they emerged as actions that aimed to further separate Man 
from Nature by cordoning off sections of Nature from ManÕs interference.  Furthermore, the 
characterization of early environmentalists as rugged, male individualists, demonstrates that these 
environmental resistances are embedded within the very systems of knowledge and relations of power 
that facilitated the Industrial Revolution.  Again, Nature is constituted as in need of protection while 
white, male, wealthy, heterosexual, sane, able-bodied humans are constituted as active protectors of 
that essentially passive Nature.
 The emergence of early environmentalism within the Industrial Revolution functions as a 
response to the Modern knowledges that served to increase ManÕs ability to extract resources from a 
passive Nature.  These environmental resistances do not demonstrate an alternative means of 
conceiving the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments, but illustrate that a 
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discourse of protecting the environment emerged simultaneously with ManÕs need to increase the 
productivity of Nature.  The constitution of Nature within early environmental resistances does not 
oppose the Modern separation between Man and Nature because, in fact, the distinction is a 
precondition for their emergence.  Without a correlative acceptance of the distinction between Man and 
Nature, it would have been impossible for conservationists to argue that Nature is in need of protection.  
Nature is in need of protection because Nature is fundamentally separate from the human processes of 
industrialization and mechanization.  The sciences that generated ManÕs understanding of Nature 
underscore not only the extraction of resources for human use, but also the desire to protect Nature 
from such development.  Because Man studies a passive Nature, Man is constituted as having the 
available knowledges necessary to protect Nature.
 Because Nature was constituted as passive within early environmental resistances, those 
resistances do not account for nonhuman agency any more than the Modern knowledges that 
contributed to the conditions of their emergence.  Nature is denied agential capacities and so is in need 
of the protection that only Modern Man is able to give.  Man is constituted as a knowing subject and 
agent within the Modern episteme and it is an effect of that knowledge and agency that allows Man to 
presume that Nature can be protected.  Within those environmental resistances Modern Man remained 
the subject who studies and Nature remained the object of study.  However, the distinction between 
Man and Nature, as Foucault has shown, is contingent upon the emergence of a particular set of 
anthropologized knowledges and correlative relations of power.  As a result of these power relations 
Man is simultaneously a natural being and the subject who studies Nature.  This tension, although it 
remained unnoticed, further implicates the inability of Modern notions of agency to account for ManÕs 
position within Nature.  In his early texts, Foucault did not explicitly intend to expose that knowledges 
are always embedded within relations of power, but the exclusionary practices of the Modern episteme 
illustrate that power functions to prevent the recognition of nonhuman agency.  In the next section I 
will address the relationship between power and knowledge in more detail.
An Exclusionary Agency: Power and Knowledge
 Although the category of Man purports to be a universal and unitary category, it has not 
historically included every single human being within its definitions.  Perhaps most obviously, the term 
ÔManÕ is a gendered one; it very evidently does not include women as members of the ÔhumanityÕ that it 
aims to describe.  Thus, the emergence of the category of Man has marked all female bodies as other 
than human through its discursive construction.  Likewise, though perhaps less obviously, the category 
of Man also does not include within its definitions particular humans who are not ethnically and 
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racially white, middle or upper class, heterosexual, educated or Western.  The repercussions that such a 
prejudiced and partial conception of Man has had is that certain human beings are actually denied 
inclusion within a unitary humanity.  Because agency is attributable as a characteristic of Man only, 
agency is likewise denied to those who do not conform to the concealed particulars of the Modern 
category of Man; Òonly certain individuals Ôhave agency,Õ while others have little or none.  Some 
historians, for example, locate agency solely in the power of individual ÔGreat MenÕÓ (Ahearn 2001: 
114).  Agency, according to Modern conceptions, is attributable only to a certain elite and ÔGreatÕ 
minority and thus excludes a majority of subjects from access to this agency.  Modern notions of 
agency are thus restricted notions of agency, they are not inclusive.
 The consequences that such a restricted notion of agency have are not merely discursive.  
Rather, the restriction of agency from certain individuals has very real effects.  Within the Òhumanist or 
individualistic model of the person, agency is, by definition, a feature of each sane, adult human being.  
Those who are generally not constituted as agentic, such as women, children, natives [...], and the 
insane are, by definition within that model, not fully humanÓ (Davies 2000: 55).  Those who are not 
considered fully human are correspondingly denied the capacity for changing their own lives.  Rather, 
such a definition of agency entails that certain individuals who do not qualify to be endowed with 
agency are constituted as passive.  Historically, those constituted as passive within the Modern 
episteme have been prevented from participating in activities that, by definition, are within the purview 
of Man.  The exclusion of certain human beings from agency denies them the full participation within 
Modern social systems; they are defined as less than human.  Therefore, the consequences of a Modern, 
exclusionary definition of agency are great.  The constitution of Man within a series of binary 
oppositions thus demonstrates the insufficiencies of Modern notions of agency.  Because certain 
individuals are constituted as passive, and by definition, are prevented from acquiring agency, such a 
notion of agency is only applicable to a limited number of humans.
 Although Foucault did not become interested in understanding power relations until his later, 
genealogical texts, the denial of agential capacities to certain human individuals, as well as nonhumans 
and environments, illustrates that knowledge functions as a practice of exclusion within the Modern 
episteme.  Despite the fact that Foucault was not explicitly concerned with relations of power in his 
early texts, they all Òaddress the practices of exclusion that constitute the discourse that will bear the 
honourific ÔscienceÕÓ (Flynn 2005: 32).  In the Modern episteme, Man was constituted as an agent with 
the capacity to understand ÔhimselfÕ as a natural being and with the ability to study the laws of Nature 
that confine ÔhimÕ.  Because Man was able to establish a series of knowledges that purportedly make 
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Nature intelligible and transparent, nonhumans were constituted as mere objects of study.  Thus, the 
category of Man serves to exclude nonhumans and environments ÐÐ and certain humans ÐÐ that do not 
fulfill the criteria, established by the human sciences, from being endowed with agential capacities.  It 
is in this sense that I argue, relations of power are embedded within the knowledges and systems of 
thought through which the Modern episteme emerged, as evidenced by the exclusionary practices of 
those knowledges.  
 In his later, genealogical texts, Foucault denoted the link between power and knowledge as 
power/knowledge.  In expressing this relationship by writing power slash knowledge, or power/
knowledge, Foucault highlighted the fact that knowledge and power mutually produce each other ÐÐ 
they cannot be unlinked.  Foucault (1997a) argued that:
No knowledge is formed without a system of communication, registration, accumulation, and 
displacement that is in itself a form of power.  No power, on the other hand, is exercised without 
the extraction, appropriation, distribution, or restraint of a knowledge.  At this level there is not 
knowledge [...] on the one side and society on the other, or science and the state, but the basic 
forms of Òpower-knowledgeÓ (17).
The expression power/knowledge indicates the connections that adhere between power and knowledge; 
knowledge does not exist without being embedded within relations of power and power is practiced 
through systems of knowledge.  Within the Modern episteme the human sciences are both formed 
within relations of power and are also implicated in the production of power relations.
 While the expression power/knowledge is characteristic of FoucaultÕs later texts, it is evident 
that his insight that power and knowledge are indistinguishable is indicative of the knowledge and 
relations of power that he described within his early examinations of the Modern episteme.  In fact, 
Foucault (2000b) retrospectively argued that in these early texts he Òhad been doing nothing except 
trying to retrace how a certain number of institutions, beginning to function on behalf of reason and 
normality, had brought their power to bear on groups of individuals, [É].  I had done nothing else, 
really, but a history of powerÓ (283).  If FoucaultÕs early texts trace the history of power throughout the 
Modern episteme, then what they have exposed is an exclusionary power relation that, through the 
human sciences, constituted Modern Man as a limited entity.  The consequences of the emergence of 
Man has been the organization of humans, nonhumans and environments within a series of binary 
oppositions that order individuals according to their ability to access the knowledges generated by the 
human sciences.  While Man was constituted as a subject with the ability to study the laws of Nature, 
those nonhumans, environments and other humans who serve as the object of study are constituted as 
being without agential capacities.
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 Foucault wanted to disprove the myth Òthat there is an antinomy between knowledge and power.  
If there is knowledge, it must renounce power.  Where knowledge and science are found in their pure 
truth, there can no longer be any political powerÓ (Foucault 2000d: 32).  Knowledge and power are 
supposed, by this myth, to be in conflict because true knowledge is alleged to occur only where it is 
free from the biased and dominating effects of power.  FoucaultÕs formulation of power/knowledge 
functions in direct opposition to conventional formulations of knowledge and power.  Power and 
knowledge are conventionally viewed as distinct because, were power to infiltrate knowledge, it would 
no longer be objective.  But Foucault disputes the myth that knowledge and power are antithetical.  
Power and knowledge are not distinct because they are part of the same processes.  As Foucault 
demonstrated, Man emerged as a result of Modern knowledges that also served to limit who was 
defined as fully human and who had access to those knowledges.  Thus, instead of separating power 
and knowledge, Foucault (1980c) argued that the Òpolitical question, [...] is truth itselfÓ (133).  Indeed, 
truth and knowledge ÐÐ because they are embedded within relations of power ÐÐ are important to the 
aims of this thesis.  In order to supersede the limitations that Modern notions of agency impose, it is 
necessary to recognize that those limits are a function of power relations.  Such a recognition is 
necessary because it acknowledges that the limits entailed within Modern notions of agency are not 
integral to agency itself, but are a function of its historical conditions of emergence.
 In The Archaeology of Knowledge, an early text, Foucault (1972) argued that; Òthe property of 
discourse ÐÐ in the sense of the right to speak, ability to understand, licit and immediate access to the 
corpus of already formulated statements, and the capacity to invest this discourse in decisions, 
institutions, or practices ÐÐ is in fact confined (sometimes with the addition of legal sanctions) to a 
particular group of individualsÓ (75-6).  A recognition of power and knowledge are evident in this 
characterization of discourse because, as Foucault makes explicit, discourse serves to limit an 
individualÕs ability to access knowledge.  This limitation is evidence of a power relation that is inherent 
within knowledge; power and knowledge structure the organization of individuals so that only certain 
individuals are given Òimmediate access to the corpus of already formulated statementsÓ.  In FoucaultÕs 
early, archaeological, texts, he took these ÔstatementsÕ to be the substance of his research.  What 
qualified as an object of study for Foucault were those statements issued by individuals who are 
authorized to speak.  Thus, statements exist within a series of power relations that either deny or allow 
individuals to access knowledge and, as a result, the ability to access knowledge serves to regulate 
whether or not an individual is endowed with agency.
Picard 33
 Redefining statements as Ôspeech actsÕ, Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1983) point out that 
Foucault was interested in Òserious speech actsÓ (48) and agree that he was Ònot concerned with 
everyday speech actsÓ (47).  Serious speech acts are thus those statements that Foucault identified as 
being issued by an individual who is authorized to speak.  However, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that: 
ÒAny speech act can be serious if one sets up the necessary validation procedures, community of 
experts and so onÓ (48).  In other words, the very ability to issue authoritative statements is contingent 
upon the power relations and knowledges that define it as such.  The significance of understanding that 
the authority to make statements within the Modern episteme is limited to certain individuals, is that it 
further elucidates the exclusionary practices enforced through Modern systems of power and 
knowledge.  If the ability to speak, and to be taken seriously, is equated with Modern notions of agency 
that view individuals as endowed (or not) with the capacity to act, then FoucaultÕs acknowledgement 
that not all individuals are granted the authority to make statements is indicative of the exclusionary 
practices characteristic of the Modern episteme.  Those individuals with access to the knowledges 
generated by the human sciences and granted with the authority to make statements, are those who are 
characterized as agents.  Any individual, whether human or nonhuman, excluded from systems of 
knowledge is not constituted as an agent.  
 Agency thus functions according to a series of binary oppositions within the Modern episteme.  
Those who know and speak can act, those who are studied and silent cannot.  In this sense, the 
distinction between subject and object is displayed as a fundamental distinction that functions within 
the Modern episteme.  A Modern notion of exclusionary agency is premised on this distinction because 
agents are considered as subjects whereas those who are excluded from agency are considered merely 
as objects.  However, this distinction between subject and object ÐÐ as I have already pointed out ÐÐ 
serves as the basis for FoucaultÕs critique of the Modern episteme.  FoucaultÕs argument is that this 
distinction between subject and object actually masks the fact that Man is both subject and object.  
Moreover, it is necessary for ManÕs emergence for Man to be constituted as both subject and object 
because the knowledges generated by the human sciences (which objectify humans) are the necessary 
precondition for Man being constituted as the subject who knows and studies.  In the following section, 
I will examine how Modern relations of power function to constitute humans as both subjects and 
objects in particular ways.  And that, in doing so, continue to problematize Modern notions of agency 
that are premised on the distinction between subjects and objects.
The Anthropological Gaze
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 Implicated in ManÕs position as both subject and object is a complex notion of observation.  In a 
way, this notion of observation epitomizes the means by which knowledge is acquired in the Modern 
episteme because it highlights the particular ways in which the relationships between subjects and 
objects are framed.  The gaze, as Foucault described it, serves to constitute Man as both subject and 
object because the ability to observe an object is the purview of Man-as-a-subject while such acts of 
observation simultaneously generate the anthropological knowledges that constitute Man-as-an-object.  
The relationship between subject and object characteristic of the anthropological gaz, is such that it is 
embedded within Modern relations of power.  These power relations, as I argued in the previous 
section, differentially constitute certain individuals as endowed with greater access to knowledge and 
endowed with more or less agency.  In this sense, the anthropological gaze reinforces the assumption 
that subjects and objects are distinct.  Such acts of observation situate knowledge within a series of 
power relations that determine, within the context of each particular situation who or what is 
objectified, and serve to underscore the dangers that are present within the Modern episteme.  
However, because Man is both subject and object means that such distinctions which reinforce Modern 
exclusionary power relations are more unstable than they might appear.  Thus, I will argue that it is 
possible to rethink Modern notions of agency given that the exclusionary function on which they are 
premised ÐÐ namely, the distinction between subjects and objects ÐÐ is not as unwavering as it seems.
 As I have already discussed, Modern medicine functioned as one of the anthropological 
knowledges that constituted Man as an object of knowledge.  In particular, a recognition of ManÕs 
finitude generated the need to understand human anatomy and physiology in order to confront the 
limitations of ManÕs position as a natural being.  Within Modern medicine, Man is observed and the 
human body is taken as an object of knowledge.  Through the clinical examination of corpses, Man is 
objectified as a material object through the process of an autopsy.   The corollary of ManÕs constitution 
as an object of medical knowledge is ManÕs position as the subject who gathers that knowledge.  
However, not all individuals are constituted as subjects within Modern medicine.  Rather, as a form of 
specialized knowledge, medicine is not meant to be accessible to those other than certified doctors.  
Foucault (1973) argued that obtaining knowledge within Òclinical medicine, does not mean placing the 
hidden or invisible within reach of those who have no direct access to them; what it means is to give 
speech to that which everyone sees without seeing ÐÐ a speech that can be understood only by those 
initiated into true speechÓ (141).  In other words, medical knowledges are created and maintained 
through the participation of learned professionals.  Within the medical profession there is an exclusion 
of the uninitiated from the medical knowledge that perpetuates the discipline.  The practice of 
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observing patients and medical symptoms is only permitted by qualified professionals.  While some 
individuals are constituted as subjects able to gaze upon objects and situate them within a system of 
knowledges, other individuals are objectified by those knowledges.  
 Medical discourses reveal that not all individuals are constituted as subjects within the 
knowledges of the Modern episteme.  Rather, the observation of patients by doctors indicates the 
constitution of fundamentally hierarchical relationships between individuals.  Furthermore, doctorsÕ 
authority and status reaches far beyond the bounds of physiological-clinical spaces and touches upon 
the social spaces in which we live.  The penetrating medical observations of doctors are not restricted 
to the act of seeing human bodies; Òmedical space can coincide with social space, or, rather, traverse it 
and penetrate it.  One began to conceive of a generalized presence of doctors whose intersecting gazes 
form a network and exercise at every point in space [...] a constant, mobile, differentiated 
supervisionÓ (Foucault 1973: 35).  The medical gaze inserts itself into social spaces so that it comes to 
supervise the health of entire populations.  Medical discourse came to intersect with entire populations 
because it was the duty of doctors to engineer the health of entire nations.  Medical knowledge 
concerning birth and death statistics, housing, and city planning came to play an increasing role in 
everyday life.  Thus, the implication of ManÕs simultaneous emergence as both subject and object is 
that the distribution of subjectivity and objectivity is constrained by Modern relations of power.  What 
is meant by this is that Modern systems of thought and relations of power rely on the assumed 
distinction between subjects and objects to deny certain individuals authority.
 Another example that details the hierarchical constitution of Man within Modern relations of 
power are those relationships that occur between psychiatrists and their ÔmadÕ patients.  In this 
particular example, the power relationships between psychiatrists and their patients are hierarchical 
because psychiatrists are positioned as the observers of madness.  The status of the psychiatrist who 
has access to knowledge, is fundamentally different to that of the patient; the psychiatrist Òbecomes the 
essential figure of the asylumÓ (Foucault 1965: 270).  By organizing subjects in such a way, practices 
concerning mental health create a set of hierarchical relationships that are reinforced through discursive 
practices and the distribution of knowledges.  Mad subjects are objects of themselves, gazing upon 
themselves vicariously with the aid of the psychologistÕs gaze, illustrating in horrendous detail the 
Modern predicament of being both subject and object of knowledge.  Madness Òbecame responsible for 
what it knew of its truth, it imprisoned itself in an infinitely self-referring observation; it was finally 
chained to the humiliation of being its own objectÓ (265).  Modern psychiatry, by ordering individuals 
hierarchically, demonstrates FoucaultÕs assertion that power and knowledge are fundamentally 
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inseparable.  Not all individuals have access to psychiatric knowledges and so those without access are 
constituted as without authority.  
 It is only through the doctorÕs authority that the mad are cured and able to gaze upon 
themselves, to objectify themselves, and in the process, to arrive at a positive knowledge of their own 
subjectivity.  Therefore, it is under the supervised observation of the psychiatrist that the mad constitute 
themselves as both subject and object.  While Modern medicine constituted Man as a subject through 
the observation of the human body as an object, psychiatry relies on the individual patient to occupy 
the positions of both subject and object.  According to Foucault (1965), Òthe madman became an object 
of punishment always vulnerable to himself and to the Other; and, from the acknowledgment of his 
status as object, from the awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to his awareness of himself 
as a free and responsible subject, and consequently to reasonÓ (247).  In other words, the knowledges 
of psychiatry force patients to recognize their own objectivity and, eventually, by conforming to 
psychiatric knowledges, to constitute themselves as sane and healthy subjects.  Thus, it is the patientÕs 
position as an object that leads to mad individual to constitute themselves as a subject.  In this sense, 
Modern exclusionary notions of agency are contested because the presence of both subjectivity and 
objectivity in the constitution of Man and of particular individual subjects demonstrates that it is 
impossible to separate the two aspects of ManÕs emergence.  Indeed, the fact that subjectivity and 
objectivity are coextensive means that agency must be conceived as something other than the attribute 
of human subjects.
 The doubling of ManÕs position as both subject and object allows us to reflect on ManÕs 
relationships to Nature.  The disciplines that are collected under the human sciences allow Man to 
understand the laws of those disciplines, including the Ôlaws of NatureÕ, while at the same time 
recognize that Man must submit to those laws.  The recognition that Man is both subject and object 
complicates the constitution of Nature as essentially non-agential.  Indeed, it is my argument that 
Modern notions of agency are inadequate to the task of theorizing agency within a world that includes 
a multiplicity of actors that are human, nonhuman and environmental.  Because Modern notions of 
agency are dependent upon a subject to which they are attached, when the very possibility of a pure 
and uncomplicated subjectivity is questioned, then Modern notions of agency likewise lose the subject 
to which they attach.  Because Modern notions of agency are contingent upon the existence of an 
entity, they utterly vanish when there is no entity that meets their qualifications of subjectivity.  Just as 
Modern notions of agency inadequately theorize the possibilities of agential nonhumans and 
environments, they are likewise unable to theorize human agency once Man is acknowledged to be 
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both subject and object.  Thus, new theorizations of agency are necessary.  Acknowledging FoucaultÕs 
recognition that no system of thought will ever last indefinitely, in the following section I examine 
FoucaultÕs notion of a nonlinear history in order to point out that new theorizations of agency are 
possible.
Nonlinear Epistemic Shifts
 Within the Modern episteme, history is viewed as linear and progressive.  The notion of a linear, 
teleological history is a necessary component of the emergence of the disciplines of biology and 
economics.  The recognition of humans as natural, finite beings plagued by death ushered in a concern 
with the progression of human history.  Foucault (1970b) argued that Òfrom the outset the living being 
is conceived of in terms of the conditions that enable it to have a historyÓ because history Òconstitutes a 
sort of fundamental mode of beingÓ (300).  Because Modern Man is constituted as a living being 
confronted with the prospect of death, Man acquired a historical, temporal dimension.  Faced with 
finitude, Modern anthropologized knowledges initiated a notion of history that constituted Man at the 
centre of all progress.  By holding out the possibility of continual progression and improvement, 
Modern knowledges constituted history as a response to death.  Thus, the notion that history is linear, 
progressive and continuous is an effect of the Modern disciplines out of which those very ideas arose.  
Locating the emergence of a linear history within contingent circumstances, Foucault exposed the 
notion of historical progress as contingent upon the emergence of the Modern episteme.
 Through his examination of epistemic shifts Foucault (1970b) wanted Òto bring to light [...] the 
epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, [É], grounds its positivity and thereby 
manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its preconditions of 
possibilityÓ (xxiii-xxiv).  In other words, FoucaultÕs early archaeological texts were explicitly designed 
to counter the Modern notion of history as linear.  FoucaultÕs aim was to analyze how systems of 
thought emerge, not according to a natural progression, but through the contingent circumstances out of 
which new knowledges can emerge.  According to Foucault, shifts between epistemes occur 
contingently, without teleology, and they occur jarringly, without progressing smoothly from one 
episteme to the next.  These epistemic shifts are not linear, they occur randomly and unexpectedly; 
Òthese changes should be examined more closely, without being reduced, in the name of continuity, in 
either abruptness or scopeÓ (xii).  In other words, history is not characterized by continuity.  Rather, 
historical shifts occur abruptly; history is nonlinear.
 History is not only nonlinear because it appears to shift abruptly, it is also nonlinear because at 
any given moment in time there are always multiple directions that it might take; any Òdiscursive 
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formation does not occupy therefore all the possible volume that is opened up to it [...]; it is essentially 
incomplete, owing to the system of formation of its strategic choices.  Hence the fact that, taken up 
again, placed and interpreted in a new constellation, a given discursive formation may reveal new 
possibilitiesÓ (Foucault 1972: 75).  The recognition that history is nonlinear means that there are 
always other possible directions available to be taken.  Any given system of thought is always partial 
because it never fulfills all the possible options.  Rather, the direction taken by any episteme represents 
only one plausible historical trajectory.  In other words, not only are epistemic shifts contingent upon 
the conditions of possibility that enable them, but no specific emergence is ever a necessary outcome of 
those conditions.  It is highly possible that, were the same conditions to arise again, an event other than 
the emergence of Man and Modernity would have occurred.    
 A nonlinear notion of history is not teleological because there are always a multiplicity of 
possible directions that history can take.  Because nonlinear notions of history can never determine at 
the outset what changes might occur, it means that it is inherently difficult to predict the scenario that 
will likely succeed.  Nonlinear epistemic shifts, however, do not mean that all change is infinitely 
possible.  Rather, as FoucaultÕs examinations of the Modern episteme make clear, possibilities are 
always embedded within systems of thought and power relations.  Epistemic shifts are always 
contingent upon the relations of power from which they emerge.  Foucault (1986c) argued that:
we live in a world in which things have been said.  These spoken words in reality are not, as 
people tend to think, a wind that passes without leaving a trace, but in fact, diverse as are the 
traces, they do remain.  [...].  Thus spoken language, as a language that is already present, in one 
way or another determines what can be said afterward either independent of or within the 
general framework of language (179).  
The possibilities for future epistemic shifts are constrained by the previous discourses, or systems of 
thought, that have come before.  Although nonlinear histories are decidedly not teleological, they are 
constrained within discourses that include Òframeworks of knowledge and power through which we 
comprehend (and constitute) the world around usÓ (Bleiker 2000: 11).  In other words, nonlinearity is 
not synonymous with the notion that anything is possible.  Rather, the recognition of nonlinearity is a 
recognition that the future is unpredictable.
  Because FoucaultÕs descriptions of nonlinear epistemic shifts recognize that systems of thought 
are constrained by relations of power and yet also happen unpredictably, Modern notions of agency are 
undermined.  Implicit within Modern notions of agency that take Man to be the central governing force 
of history, is that humans are necessarily the originators of any historical emergence.  For example, 
Òmodels of agency put forward by the civil rights, New Left, and womenÕs liberation movements of the 
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1960s expanded the humanist-Marxist notion of working-class agency in history.  These movements 
believed that they, too, could act as agents of history by making changeÓ (Messer-Davidow 1995: 28).  
However, Foucault refused to identify any particular human agent, or agents, as the cause of epistemic 
shifts.  Confronted with nonlinearity, Modern notions of agency have no response except to view 
agency within such systems as utterly absent.  But, Ònonlinear means that small changes in system 
variables can have disproportionate outcomes [...] interactions [...] produce the nonlinearities that make 
the social world a world of surprisesÓ (Eve et al. cited in Jenks and Smith 2006: 4-5).  In order to 
theorize agency within nonlinear systems it is necessary to account for ways in which tiny variables, 
constrained by relations of power, can generate disproportionate change.  Thus, change and agency are 
not absent within nonlinear systems of thought ÐÐ but they must be theorized as both constrained and 
unpredictable.
 The move from a linear history centred on the primacy of Man, to a nonlinear and unpredictable 
history constrained by relations of power, does not suggest that humans are denied the possibility of 
ever changing history.  Rather, Foucault (1972) himself was explicit about the possibility of change; he 
stated that ÒI have not denied ÐÐ far from it ÐÐ the possibility of changing discourse; I have deprived 
the sovereignty of the subject of the exclusive and instantaneous right to itÓ (230).  While Foucault 
does not deny the possibility of change, he does deny that Man is the central figure in instigating that 
change.  In short, FoucaultÕs recognition of nonlinear shifts explicitly critiques Modern notions of 
agency.  Because FoucaultÕs notion of nonlinear epistemic shifts denies that human subjects have the 
exclusive ability to generate change, Modern notions of human agency and subjectivity are 
problematized.  In this sense, agency can no longer be viewed as characteristic solely of subjects ÐÐ or 
humans.  By locating the emergence of Man within a particular historical framework, Foucault refused 
to identify Man as an ontological a priori, but argued that Man exists only within a set of contingent 
relations of power.  In other words, Modern Man is refigured as a relational being rather than as an 
autonomous being endowed with agential capacities.  Through FoucaultÕs epistemic investigations, the 
Òsovereignty of the subjectÓ to initiate change is challenged and is replaced, not with a determinism or 
a nihilism, but with an opportunity to destabilize the central position that Man has held within 
knowledge, power and agency throughout the Modern episteme.
 Robert Markley (1999) argues that the very recognition of nonlinear epistemic shifts leads to the 
possibility of destabilizing Modern thought.  For Markley, FoucaultÕs understanding that from within 
any episteme there emerges shifts in what is thinkable, Òdoes not lead to epistemic determinismÓ, but 
instead leads to the possibility of a radical critique of what has become accepted as thinkable (158).  By 
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recognizing that epistemes necessarily shift, Markley argues that FoucaultÕs analyses have opened up 
the space for other possibilities in what is thinkable.  In other words, by pointing out the contingency of 
the knowledges, discourses and relations of power that emerged within the Modern episteme, Foucault 
began to carve out spaces for possible future shifts.  By showing that history does not necessarily chart 
a path towards ÔprogressÕ, FoucaultÕs investigation of epistemic shifts Òradicalizes our sense of the 
contingency of our dearest biases and most accepted necessities, thereby opening up a space for 
changeÓ (Flynn 2005: 33).  The very practice of thinking through what is thinkable allows us to 
confront our epistemic limits and recognize within them a contingency that implies that they are 
necessarily unstable.  By acknowledging that Man is an arbitrary historical development, there are 
spaces opened up for possible redefinitions of Modern notions of agency that depend on ManÕs 
existence.
Emergent Notions of Agency
 Modern notions are not the only possibility for theorizing agency.  They are not transhistorical 
and are dependent upon a specific set of power relations associated with their historical emergence.  By 
describing the contingent emergence of Man, FoucaultÕs early texts contribute to dismantling 
historically and culturally specific notions of Modern agency.  Throughout this thesis I argue that 
Modern notions of agency are insufficient for dealing with the implications of the recognition that 
humans are natural beings situated within ecological, material realities.  Within the Modern episteme, 
the recognition that Man is a being within Nature merely served to reinforce a distinction between 
humans, nonhumans and environments.  Furthermore, Modern thought placed Man at the centre of all 
knowledges and constituted Man as the sole possessor of agency ÐÐ positioned in binary opposition to 
a Nature constituted as passive and, at best, in need of protection.  With the anthropologization of 
knowledge, Modern systems of thought replaced God with the new category of Man at the centre of all 
thought, history and agency.  A more properly secular notion of agency would, as Jenks and Smith 
(2006) point out, recognize that; ÒEven the most abstract human idea occurs in relation to terrestrial 
ecologyÓ (26).  To recognize that humans exist within material and discursive relationships with 
nonhumans and environments would be to remove Man (and by extension God) from a central 
theoretical position.
 If contemporary notions of agency are to become truly secularized, they must account for the 
embeddedness of humans not only within relations of power, but within material and ecological 
relationships as well.  Furthermore, such a notion of agency must reflect the agential capacities not 
only of humans, but of nonhumans and environments as well.  Throughout the remainder of this thesis 
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I will discuss the notion of a radical relational agency as an alternative notion of agency to that 
constituted within the Modern episteme.  I will argue that a radical relational agency accounts for the 
insufficiencies that are characteristic of Modern notions of agency because a radical relationality is 
contingent upon the recognition that humans exist within relations of power that are also ecologically 
constrained.  In doing so, I suggest that a radical relational agency should replace Modern definitions 
of agency within contemporary environmental resistances.  However, as the recognition of nonlinearity 
suggests, no specific change can ever be guaranteed ÐÐ including any that I suggest within this thesis.  
Thus, like Foucault (1970b), any hints that I provide of future changes Òare not affirmations; they are at 
most questions to which it is not possible to reply; they must be left in suspenseÓ (421). Unlike Modern 
notions of agency that predict a linear trajectory and predictable achievement, a radical relational 
agency, cognizant of nonlinear shifts, recognizes that any political goals are never guaranteed to 
succeed.
 Foucault (1970b) did argue that our ability to understand the episteme in which we exist 
(whether it be the Modern episteme or not) is compromised because we are limited to certain 
contingent possibilities in what is thinkable; Òbecause we are still caught inside it, [it] is largely beyond 
our comprehensionÓ (239).  But, although Foucault argued that we are currently existing within the 
Modern episteme, or that the Modern episteme lasted at least until the publication of his texts, it is my 
contention that the instability of Modern systems of thought necessarily contribute to the emergence of 
future epistemes.  Crucial to my argument is the recognition that Modern notions of thought will not 
last indefinitely, in part, because FoucaultÕs own examinations endeavoured to destabilize the centrality 
of Man within contemporary thought.6  Indeed, Foucault himself did not deny that Òwe [could] see the 
emergence of what may perhaps be the space of contemporary thoughtÓ (286).  However, where 
Foucault foresaw the death of Man prefigured in NietzscheÕs thought where it Òmarks the threshold 
beyond which contemporary philosophy can begin againÓ, I look forward to a radical relational agency 
that acknowledges the agential relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments (373).  I 
am not suggesting that a radical relational agency is a foregone conclusion, but that it exists as one 
potential emergence.  Throughout the remainder of this thesis I suggest that the break up of the Modern 
episteme is, nonetheless, signalled by a potential shift in which humans are recognized as being 
embedded within ecological relationships and ecological limits.
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6 In subsequent chapters I will discuss in greater detail the emergence of a radical relational agency as an 
alternative to Modern humanist thought.
 FoucaultÕs analyses of the Modern episteme provide the legitimation for a critique of Modern 
notions of agency because they demonstrate that such notions of agency are inadequate to situating 
humans within material, ecological relations and within relations of power.  However, FoucaultÕs own 
descriptions do not explicitly acknowledge that humans exist in power relations with nonhumans and 
environments.  The recognition that humans are embedded within material and ecological relations of 
power is not an effect of FoucaultÕs own analyses, but occurs because Foucault acknowledged that 
humans exist within a series of relations.  Foucault (1998a) argued that Òwe do not live in a kind of 
void within which individuals and things might be located [...], we live inside an ensemble of relations 
that define emplacements that are irreducible to each other and absolutely nonsuperposableÓ (178).  
Thus, FoucaultÕs recognition of a relationality implied that human isolation from nonhumans and 
environments is impossible.  Although Foucault was not explicitly interested in the environment, his 
analysis of the Modern episteme implies an awareness of the fact that humans are not isolated from the 
nonhuman spaces in which they live.
 The Modern episteme, however, obscures the relationality between humans, nonhumans and 
environments because Man was constituted as a binary category that was defined in direct opposition 
to Nature.  Recall that ManÕs emergence was defined in relation to a Nature that was viewed as both 
treacherous (because it meant that Man, as a natural being, was finite) and passive.  By defining Nature 
in this way, the Modern episteme facilitated the impression that humans are separate from nonhumans 
and the environment.  In doing so, the Modern episteme generated a series of knowledges that define 
the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  However, such understandings of 
Man and Nature are embedded within power relations.  The environment:
must not be understood as the naturally given sphere of ecological processes which human 
powers try to keep under control, nor should it be viewed as a mysterious domain of obscure 
terrestrial events which human knowledge works to explain.  Instead, it emerges as a historical 
artifact that is openly constructed, [...].  In this great network, the simulation of spaces, the 
intensification of resources, the incitement of discoveries, the formation of special knowledges, 
the strengthening of controls, and the provocation of resistances can all be linked to one another 
(Luke 1999: 67).
The possibility for rethinking the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments exists 
because such characterizations of Nature as passive are contingent upon the relations of power 
particular to the Modern episteme.  
 In rethinking the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments in terms of 
agential practices, a radical relational agency recognizes not only that humans are embedded within 
Picard 43
ecological materialities, but that humans necessarily participate in relations of power with nonhumans.  
Thus, a radical relational agency is contingent upon theorizations that situate humans within relational 
spaces and explicitly recognize the participation of nonhumans and environments.  The necessity of 
rethinking Modern notions of agency within a relational framework is, in part, to address the practices 
of exclusion that underscore Modern systems of thought.  Throughout the Modern episteme, Western 
thought constituted the relationship between Man and Nature as fundamentally antagonistic.  The effect 
that such antagonism had on Modern notions of agency is the denial of agency to nonhumans, 
environments and to those humans that were constituted as not fully capable of being included within 
the category of Man.  From this we can ascertain that there are exclusions, hierarchies and violence 
hidden within Modern definitions of agency.  A radical relational agency is not exclusionary precisely 
because it recognizes that humans exist in overlapping relationships with nonhumans and 
environments.
 In the next chapter I examine FoucaultÕs later, genealogical, texts in which he develops his 
notion of power.  Within these texts, FoucaultÕs Òobject of analysis is not power itself, but power 
relationsÓ (Bleiker 2000: 128).  FoucaultÕs insistence that power is a relation rather than a possession of 
individual entities serves as the basis for my insistence on theorizing a relational agency.  My argument 
is that, because power is a relation it generates a correlative notion of relational agency.  A relational 
notion of agency, derived from FoucaultÕs examination of power relations, because it argues that every 
relationship entails agential practices does not, however, ignore the correlative recognition that power 
is embedded within any relationship.  Indeed, FoucaultÕs insistence on the omnipresence of power 
relations recognizes that power often functions as a limitation on relationships.  Furthermore, within his 
genealogical texts Foucault describes the risks associated with the relations of power within the 
Modern episteme.  But, rather than characterizing the power relations of the Modern episteme as an 
insurmountable totality, I will argue that recognizing the dangers that they present is both inherent 
within a notion of radical relational agency and serves as a reminder to rethink the use of Modern, 
exclusionary notions of agency.
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CHAPTER TWO
Omnipresent Relations of Power and Agency
 In the previous chapter, I argued that Modern notions of agency are contingent on the 
emergence of Man as a living human being, constituted in opposition to a passive Nature.  I argued that 
Modern notions of agency are fundamentally binary and, because of their binary distribution, function 
to exclude certain humans, as well as nonhumans and environments, from possessing agential 
capacities.  Modern notions of agency are not only insufficient to the task of acknowledging that 
humans exist within material, ecological environments, but because their binary construction serves to 
limit access to agency, they also reinforce Modern power relations that have legitimized the 
discrimination of those who are constituted as non-agential.  Although Foucault was not explicitly 
interested in Modern notions of agency or the agency of nonhumans and environments, I argued that 
his critique of Man and the Modern episteme are useful for destabilizing Modern notions of agency and 
creating space for theorizing a radical relational agency.  While the previous chapter examined how 
binary notions of agency are contingent upon the knowledges of the Modern episteme, this chapter 
examines how FoucaultÕs notion of a constituted subjectivity functions as a critique of Modern a priori 
notions of agency.  This chapter also moves beyond a critique of Modern notions of agency and 
suggests that implicit within FoucaultÕs notion of power relations is a correlative notion of relational 
agency. 
 In the previous chapter I argued that the hierarchical distribution of the relationships between 
humans, nonhumans and environments indicates that power relations function through Modern 
knowledges and the human sciences.  Yet, Foucault did not develop an understanding of power until his 
later texts.  In these later, genealogical texts, Foucault explicitly argued that relations of power are 
omnipresent and all-encompassing ÐÐ to the extent that there is nowhere that is outside power relations.  
Indeed, as I have already pointed out, Foucault (1978) put it succinctly: ÒPower is everywhereÓ (93).  
One of the consequences of powerÕs omnipresence, and its particular relevance to definitions of 
agency, is the recognition that Modern individualized subjectivities and identities are constituted 
through relations of power.  The ramification of FoucaultÕs argument that the subject is constituted 
within power relations, is that it explicitly denies the possibility of an a priori agency.  Indeed, the 
constitutedness of subjectivity means that any characteristic of humans, or of individual humans, is 
necessarily an effect of the ways in which we have been constituted.  Which is to say that there are no a 
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priori characteristics, including no a priori agency.  Thus, the assumption that agency is embedded 
within individual subjects is itself a result of how Modern subjectivity is constituted.
 As well as arguing that humans are constituted as individuated subjects through Modern 
relations of power, Foucault also argued that the material functions of the human body are constituted 
within power relations.  In his genealogical texts, Foucault described a Modern notion of biopower that 
orders the material realities of human bodies to the extent that our physical existence is constituted in 
ways that are beneficial to capitalist states.  Thus, a biopolitics serves to produce subjects and 
materialities in ways that ensure the proper functioning of capitalist economic processes.  The 
importance of the recognition that material realities are constituted through power relations is that it 
applies not only to human bodies, but to the materiality of nonhumans and environments.  Indeed, 
Foucault argued that relations of power are implicated not only in the formation of knowledge and 
systems of thought, but also within architectural arrangements and spatial orderings.  In this sense, 
power functions within material objects.  As I have already suggested, Foucault  was not explicitly 
concerned within the constitution of nonhumans and environments, but I argue that he latently 
acknowledged that humans exist within ecological systems.
 FoucaultÕs notion of biopower, which signals the extension of his argument to include 
nonhumans and environments, will become increasingly important throughout this thesis because it 
signposts the spread of power relations beyond the purview of Modern anthropologized thought.  In 
this sense, biopolitical power relations function not only to constitute humans, but also nonhumans and 
environments as well.  This recognition is particularly significant for understanding contemporary 
environmental resistances because it places them at the juncture of power and knowledge, which 
includes the continued extension of human biopolitical production of nonhumans and environments.  
What is meant by this is, and as I will argue throughout this chapter, just as Modern knowledge and 
systems of thought were increasingly anthropologized contemporary systems of thought are also being 
environmentalized to the extent that nonhumans and environments are increasingly managed and order 
by contemporary discourses and power relations.  The recognition  that there is an increasing 
environmentalization of knowledge has two effects; first is the recognition that there are risks 
associated with contemporary environmental resistances that need to be addressed by environmental 
activists.  In terms of Modern notions of agency, the recognition that knowledge is no longer simply 
anthropological further destabilizes those notions of agency which are assumed to be only human and, 
as I shall argue, it opens up a space for redefining agency as relational.  In short, I will argue that the 
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move from an anthropologization of knowledge to an environmentalization of knowledge creates both 
opportunities and further risks.
 FoucaultÕs genealogical analyses of the constitutedness of subjects demonstrate that there is no 
escape from omnipresent relations of power and, therefore, they are often denounced as undeniably 
pessimistic.  In this sense, the recognition that power is all-encompassing seems to deny that there is 
any space left for agency.  However, Foucault did not explicitly deny the existence of agency.  Rather, 
he argued that the omnipresence of power entails profound risk because no action or resistance is ever 
guaranteed to succeed.  Because power relations can always be overturned, it is possible that any one 
action can have multiple effects ÐÐ both beneficial and detrimental.  Thus, recognizing that a relation of 
power can always be overturned again exposes both the limitations and the possibilities inherent to 
omnipresent power relations.  It is in this sense that I argue a relational power implies a correlative 
notion of relational agency.  Throughout this chapter I will argue that the relationality of power and its 
inherent changeability means that a relational agency is correspondingly omnipresent.  However, I 
argue that there are limitations within FoucaultÕs thought because, while his notion of relationality 
implies a radical relational agency, he does not explicitly acknowledge that nonhumans and 
environments are necessarily agents when viewed within a relational framework.
The Constitution of Subjects within Power Relations
 In his early texts, Foucault stressed that the notion of ÔManÕ, as a philosophical concept, is a 
historical emergence contingent upon the formation of the human sciences.  In his later, genealogical 
texts, Foucault examined how subjects are constituted through relations of power.  FoucaultÕs argument 
that subjects are constituted through power relations is explicitly positioned against the assumption that 
any putatively ÔhumanÕ characteristic exists as a result of an innate humanity.  Foucault (2000d) argued 
that such a belief:
exhibits a very serious defect ÐÐ basically, that of assuming that the human subject, the subject 
of knowledge, and forms of knowledge themselves are somehow given beforehand and 
definitively, and that economic, social, and political conditions of existence are merely laid or 
imprinted on this definitely given subject.  [FoucaultÕs] aim [was] to show [...] how social 
practices may engender domains of knowledge that not only bring new objects, new concepts, 
and new techniques to light, but also give rise to totally new forms of subjects and subjects of 
knowledge (1-2). 
Power relations therefore do not order and organize an already existing subject.  Rather, those acts of 
ordering and organizing create subjects.  In other words, the emergence of Man in the Modern 
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episteme not only engendered a new way of thinking about human beings, but its attendant forms of 
knowledge and relations of power produce human subjectivity in particular ways.
 Although power is often conceived as an undeniably oppressive force, Foucault (1983b) argued 
that there are actually two meanings of the word subject; Òsubject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.  Both meanings suggest a 
form of power which subjugates and makes subject toÓ (212).  These definitions of subjectivity both 
highlight the fact that power relations are integral to subjectivity.  It is the first meaning, however, that 
is most often designated as concerning relations of power; those who are subject to the control of 
others are easily identified as subjugated.  Foucault, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with how 
we are subject to our own identities.  Because humans are constituted as individual subjects within 
Modern relations of power, it is a form of subjugation that subjects us to our own identities.  In other 
words, Foucault argued that the constitution of subjects through relations of power is a form of 
subjection because it demands that subjects are constituted in particular, individual ways.  Yet, integral 
to this form of subjection, is that individuals constitute themselves as the particular kinds of individuals 
that are productive members of society.  This constitution of subjects as individuals with unique 
identities is, however, a form of subjugation that is peculiar to the Modern episteme.  
 Foucault (1983b) argued that Modern power relations are characterized by a Òmatrix of 
individualization, or a new form of pastoral powerÓ (215 emphasis mine).  Modern techniques of 
pastoral power individualize because they produce subjects that are arranged according to their 
individual characteristics and then organized hierarchically; such subjects are more easily governable.  
Although pastoral power is a pre-Modern technique of Christianity, it has Òspread out into the social 
bodyÓ and Òfound support in a multitude of institutionsÓ even as knowledge was increasingly 
secularized and anthropologized.  Because these techniques are dispersed throughout all social 
institutions they affect all individuals and they are successful precisely because they produce identities 
rather than overtly oppress individuals.  In this sense, recognizing that subjects are subjected through 
their own identities rather than subjected to an external power demonstrates our complicity within 
Modern power relations ÐÐ and likewise how dispersed those power relations really are.  Foucault 
(1983b) argued that power Òis individualizing [...]; it is coextensive and continuous with life; it is 
linked with a production of truth ÐÐ the truth of the individual himselfÓ (214).  Because an 
individualizing power exhorts us to produce our individual truths, it subjects us and ties us to our 
identities.  Thus, it is a power that works best at the individual level because ÐÐ at the individual level 
ÐÐ it functions to produce subjects that are beneficial to capitalist states.
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 The form of subjugation, peculiar to the Modern episteme ÐÐ that compels humans to constitute 
ourselves as individuals ÐÐ subjects us to our own identities because it means that we must behave in 
accordance with the ÔtruthÕ of who we are as individuals.  In this sense, Foucault (1978) identified 
sexuality as the ultimate truth of individuality in the Modern episteme because, at the end of the 
eighteenth century, sexuality Òbecame the stamp of individualityÓ (146).  In the Modern episteme, 
power relations compel us to ÔconfessÕ the truths of our identities.  A once religious imperative, now 
adopted by a secularized pastoral power, we no longer confess to priests but we nonetheless ÔconfessÕ 
our truths because those confessions produce our identities.  Confessions speak the truth of individual 
sexualities; Òit is up to sex to tell us our truth, since sex is what holds it in darknessÓ (77).  Sex is a 
secret that sustains individual identities, hidden from view until confession exposes it.  By confessing 
our deepest sexual truths, we produce ourselves and subject ourselves to our own individual identities.  
Thus, within the Modern episteme, subjects are governed by producing discursive ÔtruthsÕ rather than 
by direct domination.  By producing our own truths, we are subject to our own self-knowledge.  
Because Modern power relations function through our own individual truths, Foucault effectively 
situates human subjects within a seemingly inescapable situation.  If the truth of who we really are is 
produced within relations of power, then power is truly inescapable.    
 Individual identities are not produced without a whole series of attendant knowledges that 
necessarily limit and constrain those identities.  Foucault (1978) argued that Òone does not confess 
without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the 
authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, 
punish, forgive, console, and reconcileÓ (61-62).  A judge must complete the confession and determine 
whether a subject conforms to the norms of identity set out by Modern scientific knowledges.  Foucault 
argued that this Òhermeneutic functionÓ is necessary because individual truths must be interpreted 
through the knowledges generated by the human sciences (67).  Individual truths must be filtered 
through scientific knowledges because it is, precisely, an expert judgement that determines how 
subjects are ranked.  According to Foucault, there is Òa latency essential to sexuality [that] made it 
possible to link the forcing of a difficult confession to a scientific practiceÓ (66).  The linking of 
sexuality to the truth of human identity precipitated the emergence of entire scientific disciplines 
dedicated to its study.  Sexuality became congruous with, and impossible without, the expert discourse 
of doctors, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts to interpret its ÔscientificÕ meaning.
 Subjects are constituted as individuals within the Modern episteme because it is a subjection 
that allows humans to be individually ordered, arranged and classified hierarchically.  Individuality is 
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important because it differentiates and then ranks subjects because, through the scientific examination 
of sexuality, individuals are hierarchically arranged according to how closely they match up with 
identified norms.  Thus, the human sciences determine whether an individual is ÔnaturalÕ or normal:
what came under scrutiny was the sexuality of children, mad men and women, and criminals; 
the sensuality of those who did not like the opposite sex [...].  It was time for all these figures, 
scarcely noticed in the past, to step forward and speak, to make the difficult confession of what 
they were [...].  Whence the setting apart of the ÒunnaturalÓ as a specific dimension in the field 
of sexuality (Foucault 1978: 38-39).
The emergence of scientific knowledges that rank and order individual subjects is therefore a necessary 
component of the production of individualized subjects.  The scientific knowledges, because they 
generate statistics and information, are required to set apart ÔunnaturalÕ identities and sexualities.  It is 
precisely a scientific definition of ÔunnaturalnessÕ that individualizes subjects because it demands that 
subjects be differentiated by their failures to comply with scientific norms.
 FoucaultÕs examination of Modern relations of power reveals that those power relations compel 
us to constitute ourselves as individuals ÐÐ tied to our own (sexual) truths ÐÐ in conformity with 
scientific knowledges that then rank us according to how well our identities comply with those 
knowledges.  Thus, Foucault argued that the particular aim of Modern power relations is to constitute 
us as individuals who are subjected to our own identities.  Individualized identities are a means of 
subjection employed by the Modern episteme that entails a certain amount of conformity.  The 
constitution of individualized identities makes us subject to those identities, in part, because they 
appear to emanate from within ourselves.  The success of such subjectifying practices is that they also 
entail a series of scientific knowledges that arrange subjects in accordance with how well they conform 
to a predetermined set of characteristics and thus demonstrating FoucaultÕs argument that power and 
knowledge are indivisible.  Indeed, as Foucault has illustrated, the indivisibility of power and 
knowledge is essential to the production of individualized identities.  As he argued, the truth of who we 
are is, in the Modern episteme, associated with a sexuality that is compelled to function in accordance 
with a scientific norm.
 Studying the constitutedness of Modern subjectivity, FoucaultÕs (1998b) intent was to Òreverse 
the philosophical aim of proceeding upward to the constituent subjectÓ and instead Ò[proceed] back 
down to the concrete practices by which the subject is constituted in a domain of knowledgeÓ (462).  
Instead of discovering the characteristics of subjects prior to their entrance into relations of power, 
Foucault argued that Modern relations of power constitute individualized subjects with particular 
characteristics.  As Foucault demonstrated, subjects are constituted by their practices, by knowledge; 
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subjects are constituted by what they do.  Defining subjectivity, for Foucault, cannot entail that subjects 
exist prior to their entrance into power relations because subjectivity is only ever the result of multiple 
and diverse sets of relations and practices.  This observation has a number of implications for my 
investigation of Modern notions of agency.  First, FoucaultÕs insistence on the constitution of individual 
subjects implies that any characteristic of humans is generated through relations of power and therefore 
demonstrates that Modern a priori notions of agency are necessarily an effect of the constitutedness of 
Modern, individualized subjects.  Second, the hierarchical constitution of subjects according to 
scientific norms again illustrates that limits are placed on the kinds of individuals that can be 
constituted as agents.
 Because Modern power relations function to produce subjects as individuals, their 
constitutedness serves to underscore a critique of Modern notions of agency.  In the previous chapter, I 
argued that Modern notions of agency are contingent upon the emergence of Man as an epistemological 
category.  Likewise, Modern notions of agency are dependent upon the constitution of subjects as 
individuals.  While ManÕs emergence underscores the binary construction of Modern notions of agency, 
an individualized subjectivity highlights the Modern assumption that agency is an a priori 
characteristic of individual human subjects.  Because FoucaultÕs investigations of Modern power 
relations revealed that the notion of individualized, autonomous subjects is an effect of those relations 
of power, it serves as a critique of Modern conceptions of individualized agency.  In other words, the 
very notion of an individual, autonomous agency is dependent upon the corresponding production of 
individualized subjects.  Modern formulations of agency define it as a possession of autonomous 
subjects, but ÐÐ as Foucault has illustrated ÐÐ subjects cannot ÔpossessÕ anything because subjects are, 
themselves, the effects of a multiplicity of changing power relations.  Subjects do not ÔpossessÕ power 
not only because power is not available to possess ÐÐ it is, explicitly, a relation ÐÐ but because subjects 
themselves are continually being constituted and re-constituted as an effect of those relations.  Thus, if 
subjects seem to ÔpossessÕ agency, it is only an effect of the ways in which subjects have been 
constituted.  However, as I have already suggested, because a relational agency is not a possession, it 
does not require a particular kind of subject to which it attaches.  Rather, a relational agency is 
generated through the relationships between various individuals.  Throughout the remainder of this 
chapter I will examine how this agency is generated.  In the next section, I argue that FoucaultÕs 
genealogical analyses of the constitution of materiality implies that nonhumans and environments are 
likewise participants within power relations.  And, therefore, I argue that their participation within 
power relations similarly implies their participation within a relational agency.
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The Constitution of Materialities
 In his later texts, Foucault employed a genealogical analysis which aimed to examine the 
historical specificities of how power relations constitute individual subjects and their material realities.  
In order to understand a genealogical history, Foucault (1980c) argued that:
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, [...], to arrive at 
an analysis that can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework.  
And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of history that can account for the 
constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, and so on (117). 
Genealogy requires a historical approach that includes examinations of knowledges, subjects and 
power as well as objects and materialities.  Though this approach is not dissimilar to the archaeological 
methodologies Foucault used in his early texts, it explicitly makes a link between knowledge, power 
and materiality.  FoucaultÕs genealogical texts inaugurate a more discernible interest in materiality 
because they recognize that the effects of power constitute not only individual subjectivities and 
identities but also physical bodies and objects.  FoucaultÕs genealogical interest in materiality is 
important not only because it acknowledges the material realities of human subjects, but because it 
implicitly recognizes the constitution of nonhuman and environmental materialities.  It is in this sense 
that I argue his genealogical texts imply that nonhumans and environments are likewise participants 
within power relations.
 Genealogy views history as a series of Òdiscursive eventsÓ that are both immaterial and 
material:
it is always at the level of the material that it takes effect, [...].  It is not the act or the property 
of a body; it is produced as an effect of, and within, a dispersion of matter.  Let us say that the 
philosophy of the event should move in the at first sight paradoxical direction of a materialism 
of the incorporealÓ (Foucault 1998e: 69).
Discourse is always implicated within the production of material realities because it organizes and 
orders materialities through relations of power.  This recognition is paradoxical to Foucault because it 
means, in a sense, that discourse itself is actually material; which is to say that discourse and 
materiality are inseparable.  Discourse is material according to Foucault because it always entails a 
system of thought and a series of knowledges that constitute material realities within relations of 
power.  Thus, for example, the human sciences that constituted Man as a philosophical reality and as 
the subject of a whole series of anthropologized knowledges, also enacted particular orderings of the 
human body.  Such a recognition is important because it underscores FoucaultÕs argument that power 
and knowledge are inseparable.  Foucault (1970a) argued that discourse entails Òa violence which we 
do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose upon themÓ (67).  That power/knowledge 
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violently affects materiality indicates that such effects are not limited to the constitution of humans in 
particular but are spread throughout all relationships.  And so, by pointing out the material effects of 
power and knowledge, FoucaultÕs genealogical texts implicitly acknowledge the manifold effects that 
systems of thought have on nonhumans and environments.
 Within the Modern episteme, human bodies are ordered and arranged through the biological, 
physiological and anatomical knowledges of the human sciences.  In the previous chapter, I examined 
how knowledge of Man as a natural living being emerged within the Modern episteme as a result of the 
anthropologization of knowledge.  This is important because, whereas the systems of thought within 
previous epistemes controlled subjects through the threat of death, the Modern episteme is concerned 
primarily with human life.  This is significant because it underscores the means by which power 
relations and scientific knowledges are increasingly extending their reach beyond humans.  In this 
sense, the concern for life signifies all life, not just human.  In terms of humans in particular, sexuality 
remains crucial to the constitution of bodies because it provides the link between the discursive truths 
of individualized subjects and the utility of human populations.  Interest in the productive and 
reproductive capacities of populations signals the accumulation of knowledges centred around the 
recognition that humans are a living species; Òat the juncture of the ÔbodyÕ and the Ôpopulation,Õ sex 
became a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of 
deathÓ (Foucault 1978: 147).  Instead of threatening subjects with death, biological reproduction, health 
and utility are now managed through the human sciences because such management makes populations 
more productive.  Thus, the threat of death is no longer necessary to engender a productive citizenry.  
Rather, the knowledges generated by the human sciences serve to manage the productivity of 
individuals and populations. 
 With this Òentry of life into historyÓ, the Modern episteme could organize and classify both 
individual subjects and entire populations (141).  In this sense, a biopolitics is central to generating 
economic productivity.  To manage the biological and anatomical reproduction of humans as a species 
and as an entire population, the human sciences accumulated knowledges centred around the 
functioning of the human body and through the collection of statistical information by way of census 
data and other means.  By collecting statistics and accumulating knowledge of a population, biopolitics 
creates a norm to which human bodies must comply; ÒA normalizing society is the historical outcome 
of a technology of power centred on lifeÓ (Foucault 1978: 144).  Again, scientific knowledges 
generated by a biopolitical concern for life necessarily create a series of norms which produce bodies in 
particular ways.  Because such knowledge is statistical, there will inevitably be those bodies and 
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populations that do not comply with biopolitical norms.  By ordering bodies and populations according 
to their compliance with biopolitical norms, a means of ordering materialities hierarchically is 
established; Foucault argued that Modern biopolitical relations of power undoubtedly Òacted as factors 
of segregation and social hierarchization, [...], guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of 
hegemonyÓ (141).  The hierarchical organization of bodies and populations according to biopolitical 
norms ensures that those segments of the population that are least productive are either returned to 
efficient production or excluded from economic production altogether.
 The Modern stateÕs concern for disease, population, reproduction, sexuality, life and death 
considers the human body Òa machineÓ that is also representative of Òthe species body, the body 
imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processesÓ (Foucault 1978: 
139).  This mechanistic species body concerns governments because it underlies the economic 
implications of a useful population.  Biopolitical concern for population demographics, a healthy 
workforce and the productivity of citizens helps states maintain the labour power necessary for their 
continuation.  Foucault (1978) argued that capitalism would not have been possible had biopolitics not 
enabled Òthe controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and adjustment of the 
phenomena of population to economic processesÓ (141).  Thus, biopolitics not only reorganized 
discourses concerning life, it also facilitated the emergence of our current economic system.  
Capitalism is successful, in part, because the human sciences were able to successfully organize 
healthy and efficient bodies into a productive arrangement; Òbiological traits of a population become 
relevant factors for economic management, and it becomes necessary to organize around them an 
apparatus which will ensure not only their subjection but the constant increase of their 
utilityÓ (Foucault 1980b: 172).  By producing human bodies in ways that constitute them as 
economically useful, biopolitical relations of power ensure the continued functioning of capitalist 
economic relations.
 As I have already argued, Modern relations of power rely on individual subjects to produce 
themselves, and the constitution of materialities is no different.  Because biopolitical relations of power 
exhort individuals to produce themselves in conformity with the norms suitable to an efficient and 
productive population, Foucault argued that systems of judgement and observation are established to 
apply those norms throughout society.  In the previous chapter, I analyzed FoucaultÕs notion of an 
anthropological gaze which constituted individuals as both subject and object.  Likewise, FoucaultÕs 
descriptions of a biopolitical observation in his genealogical texts highlight the means by which 
observation and judgement exhort subjects to constitute themselves.  For Foucault, the principal 
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example of observation and judgement is Jeremy BenthamÕs panopticon.  Organized around a central 
observation tower, the panopticon is a prison that arranges human bodies in individual cells.  From the 
central observation tower a guard gazes onto the prisoners, but is unseen by the inmates imprisoned 
within their individual cells.  There are individualizing effects of the panoptic observation because the 
guard observes each prisoner individually and, in doing so, serves a function that makes it possible to 
enforce scientific norms and establish judgements; Òsurveillance makes it possible to qualify, to 
classify, and to punishÓ (Foucault 1977b: 184).  A panoptic form of observation, above all, 
individualizes and organizes subjects according to their particular adherence to specific scientific 
norms. 
 The panopticon is the representative architecture of Modern forms of observation because its 
technologies of individualization, its creation of norms and systems of judgement have been dispersed 
throughout all of society.  Foucault (1977b) argued that panopticism was Òdestined to spread 
throughout the social body; its vocation was to become a generalized functionÓ (207).  The reason that 
Modern relations of power are so effective at producing material subjects who are beneficial to 
capitalist societies is that such relations of power are not an overt form of physical domination.  
Biopolitical power relations function so effectively because they are invisible.  This invisibility is made 
explicit by considering the design of the panopticon; within a panopticon it is impossible to know 
when, or by whom, the central observation tower is occupied because its inner room is invisible to the 
prisoners each within their own individual cells.  Because prisoners are potentially observed at any 
given moment, they must constantly behave as if they are being observed.  Such power relations are 
invisible because they have the effect that individuals are self-policing and judge themselves according 
to norms, while constituting their own subjectivities in accordance with those norms.  Because 
individuals produce themselves, such a power is not oppressive in a straightforward top-down manner; 
it is not a power which Òsays Ôyou must notÕÓ (Foucault 2007: 154).  It is, precisely, productive.  
Biopower is, therefore, an invisible and productive power that exhorts individuals to police themselves 
and constitute their identities in accordance with scientific norms.
 The forms of surveillance and judgement that exhort subjects to produce themselves are never 
confined to one particular location.  According to Foucault, these power relations are always dispersed.  
Because power is not oppressive, but functions through the constitution of individual identities and 
materialities, it is not concentrated within any one individual or institution, but has spread throughout 
society.  Foucault (1977b) argued that in our society, Òjudges of normality are everywhere.  We are the 
society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the Ôsocial workerÕ-judgeÓ (304).  
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While the prison is the most obvious example of a space in which forms of observation and judgement 
are put to work, it is not the only example.  Hospitals, asylums, schools and other institutions are 
dispersed junctures of power/knowledge that likewise spread the norms and systems of judgement 
according to which individuals produce themselves.  For example, as I pointed out in the previous 
chapter, Foucault argued that medical knowledge was spread out into the social body.  A Òsurplus of 
powerÓ was bestowed upon doctors because the knowledges generated by Modern medicine facilitated 
the management of healthy and productive populations (Foucault 1980b: 177).  By observing 
populations and thereby generating statistical norms, biopolitical power relations are dispersed 
throughout society.  Because the judges of biopolitical norms are everywhere, individual subjects are 
continually confronted with pressures to produce themselves in accordance with those norms.
 The dispersal of biopolitical power relations means that, because they have spread out into the 
social body, they not only constitute human materialities, but nonhuman and environmental spatialities 
as well.  The city, according to Foucault (1980b) Òwith its principal spatial variables appears as a 
medicalizable objectÓ (175).  This noso-political organization of space functions as both population 
control and urban planning.  To maintain the continued health of the labour force, a form of biopolitical 
observation arranges both bodies and nonhuman spaces.  The actual physical spaces of the urban 
landscape, including hospitals, schools, prisons and other institutions, are arranged according to those 
norms that generate productive and useful individuals and populations.  In order to maintain the 
economic productivity and utility of entire populations, city spaces are organized to create the most 
efficient functions.  As Edward Soja (1989) argues: ÒIn Foucauldian terms, cities are the convergent 
sites of (social) space, knowledge, and power, the headquarters of societal modes of regulationÓ (235).  
In other words, just as the architecture of the panopticon entails a certain series of material 
relationships, so the spatiality of entire cities are embroiled within power relations.  All of this is to say 
that biopolitical power relations not only produce human identities and materialities, but are implicated 
in the production of the very material spaces in which we live.  Such a recognition is significant 
because it underscores the means by which biopolitical power relations are dispersed throughout all 
relationships between humans as well as nonhumans and environments.
 The importance of linking biopolitical power relations, and the knowledges produced by the 
human sciences, with their material effects is that it establishes a relationship between power, 
knowledge and materiality.  This linkage underscores the omnipresence of power relations; human 
bodies and populations as well as architecture and spatialities are constituted within relations of power.  
The norms and statistics generated by the biopolitics endemic within the human sciences have meant 
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that individuals are exhorted to produce themselves as productive bodies useful to capitalist economies.  
Such a relationship, between power, knowledge and materiality, thus demonstrates that the theorization 
of power/knowledge, discussed in the previous chapter, means that these discursive knowledges 
necessarily come to bear upon material realities.  Foucault (1980a) argued that when biopolitics Òtakes 
hold on the body, this isnÕt through its having first to be interiorized in peopleÕs 
consciousnessesÓ (186).  Biopolitical relations of power do not simply interpret bodies and spaces, but 
arrange the materialities themselves.  In this sense, power and knowledge are coextensive with 
materiality, so that FoucaultÕs arguments could be expanded and understood as power/knowledge/
materiality.  
 As I suggested at the beginning of this section, FoucaultÕs notion of biopolitics implies that 
contemporary power relations and systems of thought have become increasingly concerned not only 
with humans, but with the management of nonhumans and environments as well.  It is in this sense that 
I argue there is an increasing environmentalization of thought that extends ÐÐ or perhaps eclipses ÐÐ 
the anthropologization of knowledge.  Indeed, as FoucaultÕs genealogical texts suggest, nonhumans and 
environments are likewise produced within relations of power.    Although Foucault did not explicitly 
acknowledge that nonhumans and environments are participants within relations of power, his 
recognition that nonhumans, spaces and environments are produced within biopolitical power relations 
demonstrates a latent validation that humans participate in relationships with nonhumans and 
environments.  This recognition signals not only the dispersal of biopolitical power relations to include 
the production of nonhumans and environments, but a concomitant destabilization of Modern notions 
of agency which are premised on the constitution of nonhumans and environments as passive objects of 
study.  In this sense, the implication that nonhumans and environments are participants within relations 
of power challenges the Modern assumption that nonhumans and environments are passive.
 I argue that Modern notions of agency are destabilized not only by FoucaultÕs insistence that 
human identities and materialities are produced within omnipresent power relations ÐÐ and hence 
destabilize the notion that agency is an a priori characteristic ÐÐ but are also destabilized by the 
implication that nonhumans and environments are embedded within biopolitical power relations.  By 
recognizing the power relations between humans, nonhumans and environments, the centrality of 
Modern Man is contested.  If nonhumans and environments are constituted as participants within 
power relations, rather than as a passive Nature that is distinct from Man, then the Modern assumption 
that agency is necessarily a possession of human subjects begins to falter.  Thus, the implication that 
humans, nonhumans and environments exist as participants within power relations denies the Modern 
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assumption that only human subjects can be active agents.  In the following section I will discuss in 
greater detail how nonhumans and environments are produced within biopolitical relations of power, 
with the intent of drawing out the tacit recognition that nonhumans and environments are participants 
within power relations.
The Biopolitical Production of Nonhumans and Environments
 As I argued in the previous section, FoucaultÕs recognition that materialities and urban spaces 
are constituted through Modern relations of power implies that nonhumans and environments are 
likewise constituted within power relations.  Indeed, as the management of life, health, utility, economy 
and population, FoucaultÕs notion of biopolitics also implicitly describes the management of nonhuman 
environments and natural resources.  Environments are managed through biopolitical power relations, 
in part, because they are explicitly viewed as resources for economic gain.  Just as capitalism 
constitutes human bodies as productive, nonhumans and environments are constituted as useful within 
capitalist relations of power.  For example, the use and manipulation of resources including land, water, 
oil, timber, agriculture, shipping and transportation could be viewed as biopolitical interventions.  
While Foucault associates biopolitics with an extension of medical knowledges that concern the human 
body, biopolitics is also an extension of the scientific investigations of life that aims to increase the 
economic productivity of individuals and populations.  The outcome of expanding such analyses is that 
any intervention at a biological level which aims to increase the economic efficiency and productivity 
is recognized as biopolitical.  From the arrangement of farms to increase crop yields, to forest 
management, to the re-routing of waterways, to the development of oil rig technology, any involvement 
with life or environments are biopolitical practices that strive to increase the efficiency of capitalist 
production.
 The consequence of acknowledging that nonhumans and environments are constituted within 
modern relations of power is that any intervention that involves life can be interpreted as biopolitical.  
Thus, the biopolitical concern for human life has become increasingly environmentalized and is now 
concerned with the productivity of nonhuman and environmental life.  It is not only the capitalist 
concern for increasing the economic productivity of nonhumans and environments that is implicated in 
the spread of biopower, but also environmental assertions of sustainability.  Timothy Luke (1995) 
argues that; ÒSustainability, like sexuality, becomes a discourse about exerting power over lifeÓ (76).  
These biopolitical aspects of sustainability are evidenced when environmentalists aim to create the 
most efficient systems of farming, energy use, water conservation, methods of transportation, 
architecture and waste management.  Creating efficient, sustainable ways of interacting with the 
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planetÕs resources are important to environmentalists because these resources are seen as scarce.  In 
order to make best use of these scarce resources, some environmentalists look for practices that are 
able to sustain our present way of life.  By identifying those discourses and practices that lead to the 
most sustainable use of resources, economic utility is supported by environmentalism and the effects of 
biopolitics are exerted over ever-widening areas of life.  For Luke, sustainability Òcan represent an 
effort to reinforce the prevailing order of capitalistic development by transforming sustainability into 
an economic projectÓ (75).  It is in this sense that biopolitics produces nonhumans and environments as 
productive participants within society and, at the same time, capitalism is reinforced.  Sustainability 
serves to enhance the economic utility of any intervention of biological or environmental systems by 
making economic processes more efficient.
 The recognition that nonhumans and environments are inserted within contemporary biopolitical 
power relations is most explicit where population is concerned.  Some environmentalists argue that 
human population should be limited to the amount that the worldÕs biological and environmental 
resources can support.  This notion is straightforwardly biopolitical because it endeavours to manage 
human populations by maintaining reproductive limits in line with the availability of scarce resources.  
It is in this sense that biopolitics underscores an environmentalization of thought because it 
demonstrates an intersection between humans, nonhumans and environments.  By acknowledging that 
humans are embedded within ecological limits, biopower implicitly recognizes that humans, 
nonhumans and environments are all participants within power relations.  Furthermore, in attempting to 
limit the worldÕs population, Òenvironmentalist discourse often works to amplify both the normativity 
and the discrimination, by emphasizing the Ônatural requirementÕ of population limitation ÐÐ the 
Ônatural requirementÕ of the subordination of human needs to an abstract notion of Ôcarrying capacityÕ 
that passes as an ecological common goodÓ (Sandilands 1999: 87).  Environmentalism links humans, 
nonhumans and environments because it aims to limit human reproduction to ÔnaturalÕ ecological 
levels.  As a result certain kinds of environmental politics ÐÐ those that set up norms of ÔsustainabilityÕ 
and abstract requirements of Ôcarrying capacity ÐÐ reinforce existing biopolitical power relations that 
govern reproduction, economic utility and population.
 Environmentalism also generates a series of environmental knowledges that aim to produce 
humans, nonhumans and environments in accordance with environmental norms.  The creation of 
norms, as I have already demonstrated, function as a measure against which all behaviour is judged.  In 
this sense, environmental norms function as an additional system of judgement according to which 
individual subjects must produce themselves.  Through the establishment of normalized environmental 
Picard 59
behaviour, Òthe world will come under watch, and the global watch will police its human charges to 
dispose of their things and arrange their ends ÐÐ in reengineered spaces using new energies at new jobs 
and leisures ÐÐ around these environing agendasÓ (Luke 1995: 75).  This example demonstrates that the 
environmentalization of thought observes how humans, in particular, produce themselves in relation to 
the conservation of nonhumans and environments.  Luke (1995), however, goes so far as to suggest that 
certain environmental organizations are already attempting to create a Ògreen panopticon, enclosing 
nature in rings of centred normalizing super-vision where an eco-knowledge system identifies Nature 
as Ôthe environmentÕÓ (77).  A Ôgreen panopticonÕ not only watches over humans, but also serves to 
produce nonhumans and environments in particular ways.  
 The contemporary environmentalization of knowledge underscores the transformation of Nature 
into Ôthe environmentÕ.  Prior to the emergence of a notion of Ôthe environmentÕ it was impossible to 
group together the multiple knowledges that it variously concerns and generates: human behaviour, 
biology, ecology, materiality and spatiality.  Such knowledges identify a particular thing as Ôthe 
environmentÕ and establish a particular set of practices in relation to Ôthe environmentÕ.  Before 1965, 
terms such as Ôthe environmentÕ or ÔenvironmentalismÕ did not exist as the widely identifiable topics 
that they are today (Luke 1995: 59).  In this sense, a notion of Ôthe environmentÕ is not the same as the 
notions of Nature that emerged in the Modern episteme because it encompasses markedly different 
instantiations of power and knowledge.  While Nature was defined as distinct from Man, the 
environment is conceived as a kind of space in which humans are inextricably embedded.  Whereas 
Nature serves as a passive object of study, the environment is precisely that which can be managed 
through various systems of knowledge and scientific investigation.  Thus, the notion of Ôthe 
environmentÕ is implicated in an environmentalization of knowledge and power relations that have 
spread from the biopolitical management of human life and productivity ÐÐ and the Modern 
anthropologization of knowledge ÐÐ to encompass the economic productivity of nonhumans and 
environments as well.
 A notion of Ôthe environmentÕ makes it possible to describe the relationships between humans, 
nonhumans, spaces and resources by generating a correlative series of knowledges, regulations and 
prohibitions.  With the emergence of the environment and environmentalism through a series of 
ÔenvironmentalizedÕ knowledges, such environmental norms have come to bear on contemporary 
relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Furthermore, that the very notion of Ôthe 
environmentÕ is an effect of biopolitics and can be interpreted an extension of FoucaultÕs descriptions 
of how contemporary power relations produce identities and materialities, and manage life, 
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demonstrates that those relations of power constitute contemporary relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments in ways that aim to make those relationships more productive.  As has 
already been acknowledged, the assertion of environmental practices, which aim to generate 
sustainable relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments, is symptomatic of the 
environmentalization of knowledge and biopolitical power relations because it contributes to the 
generation of environmental knowledges, norms and regulations.  Therefore, a notion of Ôthe 
environmentÕ underscores a shift that makes it possible to locate humans within an ecology and, in 
doing so, to manage the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  In this sense, 
the consequence of defining Ôthe environmentÕ as a source of economic wealth is that it engendered a 
subsequent series of biopolitical power relations, environmental norms and systems of observation that 
endeavour to manage the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.
 The importance of recognizing the shift from the constitution of Nature to the production of Ôthe 
environmentÕ is not only to acknowledge the fact that biopolitical power relations have spread beyond 
the management of human life, but to recognize that the emphases change once it is made explicit that 
humans are embedded within ecological materialities.  As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, 
the environmentalization of power relations and systems of thought presents both risks and 
possibilities.  While it is clear from this section that the environmentalization of thought comes with 
concomitant dangers and risks, such as the increasing spread of biopolitical norms and regulations, this 
environmentalization of thought also signals a new configuration of thought and power relations that 
threatens to destabilize Modern notions of agency.  Because Modern notions of agency theorize a 
distinction between Man and Nature, nonhumans and environments are unable to legitimately 
participate within power relations because they are always constituted as not-Man.  However, the 
increasing environmentalization of knowledge and biopolitics suggests that such definitions of agency 
are becoming progressively more untenable.  Once humans are recognized as being embedded within a 
nonhuman ÔenvironmentÕ, the distinction between Man and Nature that underpins Modern notions of 
agency is destabilized.
 The increasing environmentalization of knowledge has a particular relevance to my argument in 
a number of ways.  First, as I have argued throughout this section, the spread of biopolitical power 
relations to include the management of nonhumans and environments is explicitly associated with the 
continued efficiency and dispersal of contemporary capitalism.  It is also in this sense that 
contemporary environmental resistances, which aim for increased sustainability, are implicated in the 
increasing biopolitical management of life and utility.  Thus, in order to generate an environmentalism 
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that is not environmentalizing, it is necessary to recognize that practices of sustainability are informed 
by a biopolitical management of life.  Second, I argue that the implication that nonhumans and 
environments are participants within power relations serves to destabilize Modern notions of agency 
which exclude them from being constituted with agential capacities.  Because environmentalization 
reveals that humans are embedded within nonhuman environments, the Modern distinction between 
Man and Nature is contested.  Lastly, the implication of such an environmentalization is that it may 
signal the break up of the Modern episteme because it surpasses the anthropological focus of all 
knowledge.  In part, the environmentalization of knowledge is still consistent with the Modern 
episteme, because nonhumans and environments are constituted simply as economic resources.  
Nonetheless, this de-centring of Man is important because it underscores FoucaultÕs observation that 
Modern systems of thought will one day be eclipsed.
Governmentality: Environmentality
 Foucault (1983b) defined the tendency for capitalist states to manage power relations as a 
ÔgovernmentalityÕ that aims to control the circulation of power relations.  He argued that Òpower 
relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and 
centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutionsÓ (224).  As this chapter has 
outlined, governmentality attempts to manage the circulation of power relations not through overt 
oppression, but by producing individuals who are organized according to the efficient principles of 
capitalism.  Furthermore, it is possible to argue, as Luke (1995, 1999) does, that an ÒenvironmentalityÓ 
increasingly functions as an extension of that governmentality.  This recognition of an 
ÔenvironmentalityÕ is important because it specifically identifies the dangers associated with the 
increasing environmentalization of knowledge:
Foucault does not explicitly define these spaces, methods and knowledges as ÔenvironmentalÕ, 
[yet] these enviro-disciplinary maneuvers are the origin of many aspects of 
environmentalization.  As biological life is refracted through economic, political and 
technological existence, Ôthe facts of lifeÕ pass into fields of control for any discipline of eco-
knowledge and spheres of intervention for the management of geo-power (Luke 1999: 143).
Environmentalities further the notion of governmentality by pushing it to its necessary conclusion.  In 
other words, although Foucault failed to identify it himself, environmentalities are an extension of the 
governmentalizing power relations that he examined.  While Foucault was unwilling to examine the 
relationships between human beings, ecologies and nonhumans, the drive towards environmentality to 
manage all life is consistent with his description of a how a governmentality manages power relations.
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 As I argued in the previous section, environmentalists invariably insert themselves into existing 
power relations, and through the environmental knowledges that are created, they assert their own 
disciplinary and biopolitical management of contemporary life.  Thus, environmentality expresses the 
ways in which environmentalism attempts to manage power relations between humans, nonhumans, 
materialities, spaces, bodies and environments.  Like governmentalities, environmentalities are 
productive of both knowledges and materialities and, though environmental knowledges might not be 
institutionalized within governments, such knowledges nonetheless establish certain subjects as more 
authoritative than others.   For example, Luke (1995) argued that to be ÒÔan environmentalistÕ quickly 
becomes a power expression of the eco-knowledge formations of environmentality in which the geo-
powers of the global ecosystem can be mobilized through the disciplinary codes of green operational 
planningÓ (74).  In this sense, environmentalists become the arbiters of environmental knowledge and 
emerge as the subject from whom judgement emanates.  By creating systems of knowledge and the 
attendant authorization structures, environmentalities have facilitated the dispersal of biopolitical 
power relations to an even greater variety of bodies, spaces and materialities.  An environmentality 
interlinks scientific knowledges, materialities and ecologies by attempting to manage all power 
relations that occur between humans, nonhumans and environments.
 As I have already discussed, the development that makes an environmentalization of thought 
and biopolitical power relations possible, is the transformation of Nature into Ôthe environmentÕ.  In 
this sense, an environmentality is prefigured by the emergence of a notion of Ôthe environmentÕ.  By 
recognizing that environmentalities exist as attempts to manage not only the relations of power 
between humans, but those between all species, objects, biological processes and, indeed, all 
environments on the planet, this predictable outcome of Modern governmentality appears 
overwhelmingly, impossibly insurmountable.  Reframing FoucaultÕs genealogical analyses of material 
realities in terms of their effects on nonhumans and environments also reinforces the recognition that 
environmentalism is implicated in the spread of biopolitical power relations.  The pessimism of such a 
notion of power is the recognition that even those actions that are defined as resistances are themselves 
embedded within power relations.  As is demonstrated by those environmental resistances that have the 
environmentalizing effects of spreading biopolitical relations to nonhumans and environments, any 
form of resistance can spread the very relations of power that they ostensibly resist.  In this sense, the 
destabilization of the distinction between Man and Nature does not suggest that emergent systems of 
thought are any less constraining than Modern systems of thought.  On the surface of it, the 
Picard 63
omnipresence and dispersal of governmentalizing and environmentalizing power relations seems to 
negate the possibility of any agency.  
 Governmentalized and environmentalized relations of power seem to indicate that agency does 
not exist and thus generates criticism for failing to account for any autonomous agency free from 
relations of power.  One such criticism is repeated by Sheldon S. Wolin (1988) who argues that 
Foucault Òoffers no hope of escape.  [...].  There is no exit because Foucault has closed off any 
possibility of a privileged theoretical vantage point that would not be infected by the power/knowledge 
syndromeÓ (186).  Because FoucaultÕs recognition that power is omnipresent means, precisely, that 
there is no outside position from which agents can oppose power relations it is argued that there is no 
agency at all within such a theorization of power.  Because notions of agency are often premised on the 
assumption that agents have a status that distinctly separates them from the contaminating effects of 
power, such notions of agency require the existence of spaces that are not embedded within relations of 
power.  However, FoucaultÕs notion of power is necessarily positioned in opposition to those 
definitions of power which see it as an oppressive force that extinguishes all agential possibilities.  
Because Foucault does not define power as an oppressive possession of individuals or governments, 
the argument that the omnipresence of power negates all agency can be contested.  Indeed, FoucaultÕs 
assertion that power is relational serves as the basis for my argument that power and agency are not 
antithetical.
 FoucaultÕs notions of governmentality (and by extension environmentality) are important in this 
sense because they destabilize definitions of power that define nation states as the sole possessors of 
power.  Indeed, according to Foucault (1983b), governmentality strives Òto structure the possible field 
of action upon othersÓ (221).  Hence, governmentality is a means of describing how a non-ontological 
relational power is structured by governments and institutions rather than possessed as an oppressive 
force.  Indeed, the view that power is a possession only of nation states, is an effect of 
governmentalization because governments try to constitute themselves as though they manage all 
power relations; Ògovernmentality, which is at once internal and external to the state [...] is the tactics 
of government that make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the 
competence of the state and what is notÓ (Foucault 1991a: 221).  One of the explicit tactics of 
governmentality is to perpetuate the belief that power is not everywhere, but is instead a possession 
exclusive to states and their institutions.  By making it seem as though power is available only Òwithin 
the competence of the stateÓ, this tactic of governmentality is meant to repudiate the fact that power 
relations occur within all relationships.  Thus, governmentality and environmentality aim to constrain 
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the circulation of power relations by ceaselessly defining and redefining particular arenas of power as 
within the jurisdiction of state or institutional authority.
 What governmentalizing and environmentalizing power relations mask are technologies that 
produce individuals; Òpower produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth.  The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
productionÓ (Foucault 1977b: 194).  Subjectivities, identities and materialities are the direct outcome of 
biopolitical power relations because, as Foucault has argued, such identities and materialities are 
produced ÐÐ power relations work through the production of individuals and knowledges rather than 
through a forceful oppression.  As Foucault argued, such a power is a Òrelational power that sustains 
itself by its own mechanismÓ (177).  The mechanism of governmentalizing and environmentalizing 
power relations that guarantees their continued effectiveness are their productive capabilities.  But, the 
recognition that power relations are productive serves as a direct critique of Modern definitions of 
power which view it as inherently oppressive.  Indeed, that these relations of power are productive 
rather than oppressive suggests that it is possible to re-produce produced identities and materialities in 
ways other than those sanctioned by capitalist relations of power.
 FoucaultÕs (2007) description of a relational power that produces subjects was developed in 
opposition to Western notions of power which define power as a force that Òsays Ôyou must notÕÓ (154).  
According to Foucault, the notion that power is negative and oppressive is Òa totally insufficient 
conception of power, a juridical conception, a formal conception of powerÓ (154).  The notion that 
power is an oppressive force which restricts individuals is therefore a particular conception of power 
that is peculiar to Modern systems of thought.  Such a juridical conception of power is concerned with 
Òwhere power is, who holds power, what the rules are that govern power, what the system of laws is 
that power established over the social bodyÓ (154).  Thus, it is according to Modern juridical notions of 
power that agency cannot exist where power exists.  According to a juridical notion of power, 
FoucaultÕs insistence on the omnipresence of power relations does limit human agency because, 
conceived in such a way, power is necessarily antithetical to human action.  However, a concept of 
relational power renders such questions incomprehensible because ÐÐ as a relation ÐÐ power cannot be 
possessed.  Rather than oppressing individuals through rules, restrictions and prohibitions, power 
relations are productive and creative because they generate subjectivities, identities and materialities.  
Because a relational power is productive rather than oppressive, the opposition between power and 
agency can be re-conceived.
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 Foucault (1983b) argued that; Òpower relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not 
reconstituted ÔaboveÕ society as a supplementary structure whose radical effacement one could perhaps 
dream of.  In any case, to live in society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is 
possible ÐÐ and in fact ongoingÓ (222).  Because Foucault recognized that power is a relation and is, 
explicitly, not a possession of governments, it cannot be erased.  While, initially, an inability to efface 
governmentalizing power relations appears to remove agential capacities forever, the fact that power 
exists throughout all relationships suggests that power can never be possessed exclusively by 
governments.  Because ÒPower [É] does not existÓ, power cannot be possessed and, hence, power is 
not a positivity (219).  Relations of power are, instead, practices or actions carried out in all 
relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Foucault defined power relations, not as 
an entirely one-sided relationship between a state and its citizens, but as the prerequisite of all 
relationships.  Because power exists in every relationship, and because relations of power are 
productive, it does not make sense to define power and agency in opposition to each other.  Rather, the 
omnipresence of power means that agency exists as an aspect of those omnipresent power relations.
 The recognition that power is dispersed throughout every relationship does not mean that any 
existing power relations Òare necessary, or in any case, that power constitutes a fatality at the heart of 
societies, such that it cannot be underminedÓ (Foucault 1983b: 223).  Rather than an inescapable 
oppressive force, an omnipresent and dispersed relation of power means that the possibility, and 
likelihood, of changing any power relation is increased.  For Foucault (1983b), power relations are not 
static, but are about Òreciprocal incitation and struggleÓ (222).  Relations of power are not merely 
metaphorical, but are relationships in the very literal sense of the word.  Regarding power as relational 
does not merely serve as an alternate theory of power because the view that power is relational negates 
the possibility that power is a thing.  Rather, because power is only ever a relation it is thus, by 
definition, an action; it is not a noun, it is a verb.  For Foucault; ÒPower is a strategic action, far too 
complex and idiosyncratic to be assessed through a grand theoryÓ (Bleiker 2000: 130).  Because power 
is a relation, the multiplicity of actions that it entails cannot be expressed through one particular theory.  
Therefore, the recognition that power is a relation, that it is reversible, productive, and active means 
that agency need not be extinguished by an omnipresent power.  Redefined as a relation, power is no 
longer that which agential practices oppose; the implication is that ÐÐ because power relations are 
productive and subject to continual change ÐÐ power and agency exist simultaneously within the same 
relationships.
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 Foucault (1986b) argued that: ÒWe evolve in a world of perpetual strategic relations.  All power 
relations are not bad in and of themselves, but it is a fact that they always entail certain risksÓ (373).  
The risk that power relations pose is precisely that the outcome to any action can never be guaranteed 
including those actions, as Foucault has argued, that are resistances which aim to overturn Modern 
relations of power.  Such a recognition entails a certain vigilance because the lack of guarantees means 
that we must pay attention to all possible risks.  Indeed, this is FoucaultÕs (1983a) point.  He argued 
that the Òpoint is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the 
same as bad.  If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do.  So my position leads 
not to apathy but to a hyper ÐÐ and pessimistic activismÓ (231-32).  Rather than reading the 
omnipresence of power as a limit to agency, Foucault argued that the risks of an omnipresent power 
necessitate that there will always be something to do because the stability of any one power relation 
can never be guaranteed.  The vigilance that a relational agency demands is that we be constantly 
aware of our actions.  FoucaultÕs notion of relational power does not extinguish agency; an omnipresent 
relational power means that we can never stop changing and doing things.
 Despite the increasing environmentalization of all power relations between humans, nonhumans 
and environments, the implication that no power relation is ever stable means that such a process is 
neither inevitable nor guaranteed to succeed.  Indeed, as has already been discussed, 
environmentalizing power relations are not oppressive, but are productive in their attempts to manage 
relations of power.  Foucault (1978) emphatically insisted that ÒWhere there is power, there is 
resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation 
to powerÓ (95).   The omnipresence of resistance, and hence the possibility that power relations can be 
overturned, in fact exposes why governmentalizing and environmentalizing power relations must work 
to constantly produce individuals and materialities; they are always under attack.  Although resistance 
is not synonymous with a notion of agency, FoucaultÕs assertion that power and resistance are 
inseparable is relevant to my argument that power and agency are both omnipresent.  If power relations 
can always be overturned ÐÐ by any action, intentional or otherwise ÐÐ it suggests that an ability to act 
is implicated within the very omnipresence of power.  Thus, instead of encountering an absence of 
agency in FoucaultÕs texts, we find an overabundance of agency.
Agency is Embedded within Relations of Power
 The recognition that power relations are omnipresent does not, as I have argued, mean that 
agency is extinguished.  Rather, I argue that agency is embedded within relations of power because 
those power relations can always be overturned.  Implicated in this recognition is FoucaultÕs assertion 
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that it is always possible to rework existing relations of power.  Using an example from 
environmentalism, Foucault (1989b) pointed out that:
there has been a whole so-called ecological movement ÐÐ a very ancient one, [...] that was often 
in opposition, as it were, to a science or, at least, to a technology  underwritten by claims to 
truth.  But this same ecology articulated its own discourse of truth: criticism was authorized in 
the name of a knowledge [connaissance] of nature, the balance of life processes, and so on.  
Thus, one escaped from a domination of truth not by playing a game that was totally different 
from the game of truth but by playing the same game differently  (295).
Because environmentalists make the argument that the planetÕs resources are finite, they do so in 
adherence with the same scientific knowledges generated by the Modern sciences.  In this sense, they 
are constrained by contemporary power relations.  However, Foucault argued that environmentalists are 
able to use scientific knowledges to their advantage by Òplaying the same game differentlyÓ.  It is 
impossible to escape power relations, but it is possible to rework those power relations and make them 
do something different.  The corollary, implicit within any such reworking of power, is that no such a 
reworking is guaranteed to succeed.  But it is this lack of guarantees that makes a relational agency 
possible.
 Throughout this chapter, I have argued that a relational agency is implicit within FoucaultÕs 
notion of power relations for a number of reasons.  I examined FoucaultÕs notion of relational power as 
both a critique of Modern notions of agency and as the inspiration for a complete redefinition of 
agency.  First, I argued that FoucaultÕs genealogical texts critique Modern notions of agency because 
his argument that power relations produce identities and materialities problematizes Modern assertions 
that agency is an a priori characteristic of humans.  In this sense, agency cannot be an innate 
characteristic of individuals because power relations exhort individuals to produce themselves as 
agents.  Secondly, I argued that the increasing environmentalization of biopolitical production, because 
it has spread to manage the economic utility of nonhumans and environments, destabilizes Modern 
anthropologized knowledges.  Because Modern systems of thought take Man to be the central figure, 
an environmentalization which acknowledges that humans are inextricably connected to nonhumans 
and environments undermines the assumption that Man and Nature are distinct.  Lastly, I argued that 
critics of Foucault who castigate him for the apparent lack of agency in his description of an 
omnipresent power, expose an assumption that power and agency are incommensurable.  Instead, I 
argued that a relational power actually generates a relational agency to the extent that power and 
agency are coextensive.  Because power relations are omnipresent does not mean that agency is 
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impossible. Indeed, as Foucault made clear, the very fact that power relations are subject to reversal 
means that continual action is required.
 Although Foucault did not explicitly recognize that nonhumans and environments are 
participants within an omnipresent relation of power, I have argued that the increasing 
environmentalization of biopolitics belies the recognition that nonhumans and environments are, 
indeed, participants.  Furthermore, because agency is precisely a relation rather than a possession of 
individuals, it undermines Modern notions of agency that define it only as a characteristic of human 
subjects.  In this sense, an inevitable outcome of a relational notion of power is that, because power is 
not a possession, it cannot be confined only to humans.  Hence, FoucaultÕs notion of power relations 
implies a more radical notion of power which acknowledges that humans are embedded within 
ecological materialities.  This recognition indicates that FoucaultÕs analyses of power relations are 
incomplete.  That nonhumans and environments are constituted by the very relations of power that 
Foucault described, reveals a profound omission within his notion of relationality.  Thus, I argue that 
FoucaultÕs notion of a relationality is, in fact, more radically all-encompassing than even he 
acknowledged; FoucaultÕs thought actually generates a radical relational agency despite his omission of 
nonhuman and environmental agents.  Acknowledging that nonhumans are participants within relations 
of power is another step towards defining a radical relational agency.  
  Because power is omnipresent, a relational agency does not aim to erase relations of power and 
it cannot legitimize any resistance that has a pretense of overturning Modern power relations.  A 
relational agency cannot nullify power relations because such a task is impossible.  Yet, my argument 
that a relational agency is the outcome of biopolitical power relations does not therefore suggest that an 
environmentality is necessary in order for a relational agency to exist.  Rather, I argue that a 
redefinition of Modern notions of an autonomous agency, possessed by individuals, into a notion of 
radical relational agency is, in fact, a precondition for contemporary environmental resistances if they 
do not wish to reinforce environmentalizing power relations.  If environmental resistances do not 
intend to perpetuate an environmentalizing biopower, then they must recognize the dangers inherent 
within an omnipresent power.  Throughout the remainder of this thesis, I will argue that a radical 
relational agency best serves contemporary environmental resistances because it recognizes that, since 
no action is ever guaranteed to succeed, risk is a feature of every relationship between humans, 
nonhumans and environments. 
 In the following chapter, I will critique FoucaultÕs latent anthropocentrism and endeavour to fill 
in his omissions in order to define a more radical notion of relational agency which accounts for the 
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relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  In particular, I examine FoucaultÕs final 
texts as his most explicit response to the constitutedness of subjects and to the omnipresence of power 
relations.  These texts express a notion of relational agency that makes FoucaultÕs anthropocentrism all 
too apparent.  By illustrating an individualized and, specifically, human response to the omnipresence 
of power, I will argue that FoucaultÕs thought remains too attached to the anthropologized systems of 
thought that he aimed to critique.  As I have argued in this chapter, an explicitly relational notion of 
agency always tends towards acknowledging the agency of nonhumans and environments because, as a 
relation, it cannot be defined as an exclusively human characteristic.  In this sense, FoucaultÕs thought 
is inadequate to the task of defining the nonhuman agency that it simultaneously implies.  To define a 
radical relational agency, it will be necessary to go beyond the thought of Foucault and, as such, I turn 




Defining a Relational Agency within Ecological Limits
 To define a radical relational agency, it is necessary to account for the fact that humans are 
embedded not only within relations of power, but also within material ecologies.  In the previous 
chapter, I argued that FoucaultÕs notion of a relational power implied a more radical notion of 
relationality than Foucault himself acknowledged.  Because FoucaultÕs notion of power is explicitly 
relational, and because it denies the notion of an a priori agency, there is no particular reason to 
characterize agency as peculiarly human.  Rather, the notion of a relational agency should open up 
definitions of agency to include not only humans but also nonhumans and environments as well.  
Furthermore, I argued that an increasing environmentalization of power relations has destabilized the 
centrality of humans.  In this sense, I argued that the implication of such an environmentalization is that 
nonhumans and environments are participants within power relations.  The recognition that 
nonhumans and environments are participants within relations of power is important because it 
suggests that they are agents in their own right.  The implication of the agential capacities of 
nonhumans is, however, ignored by Foucault.  This omission demonstrates that Foucault did not fully 
reject the anthropologized thought that he critiqued.  FoucaultÕs inability to account for the agential 
capacities of nonhumans thus exposes a latent anthropocentrism in his thought.
 Throughout this chapter I will argue that FoucaultÕs omission of nonhumans and environments 
as participants within relations of power is a contradictory flaw in his notion of relational power.  On 
the one hand, as I have argued, FoucaultÕs notion of a relational power does not necessarily require a 
human subject because it is no longer viewed as a possession of particular individuals.  Unlike Modern 
notions of agency, a relational agency is not constituted as hierarchical or exclusionary.  Thus, a 
relational agency always seems to imply, and lead to, a more radical inclusion of nonhumans and 
environments.  On the other hand, Foucault did not acknowledge this implication of a relational power 
or the increasing environmentalization of biopower and, therefore, neglected to recognize that 
nonhumans and environments are participants within power relations.  In this sense, FoucaultÕs 
omission of nonhumans and environments is contradictory because his relational notion of power 
necessarily implies that nonhumans and environments be included.  The purpose of this chapter is thus 
to augment FoucaultÕs thought and to investigate how a radical relational agency can be expanded upon 
by those theorists who do recognize the agential capacities of nonhumans and environments.
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 To begin, I will examine FoucaultÕs notion of self-fashioning as his response to the ways in 
which individuals are constituted within Modern power relations.  As I argued in the previous chapter, 
the omnipresence of power does not foreclose the possibility of an agency altogether.  Although 
FoucaultÕs genealogical texts are critiqued for their seeming erasure of agency, I argued that the 
relationality of power implies a correlative notion of relational agency.  In this sense, I argued that a 
relational agency is embedded within relations of power.  While I argued that a relational agency is 
inherent within FoucaultÕs genealogical texts, it is his final texts that are most often taken to reveal a 
Foucauldian notion of agency.  FoucaultÕs description of self-fashioning is presented as a means by 
which to rework those identities constituted within Modern power relations and this notion of self-
fashioning often serves as FoucaultÕs most explicit intimation of agency.  However, I will argue that, 
because self-fashioning takes place on an individual level, it ignores the radical relationality that is 
implied by a notion of relational power.  As I will argue, a relationality suggests a less isolated practice 
than self-fashioning entails.  At the same time, nonetheless, there are theorists and environmental 
activists who are influenced by self-fashioning and point out that the consequences of fashioning oneÕs 
identity are such that it may be possible to fashion identities which reflect the embeddedness of humans 
within ecological materialities.  Although self-fashioning does not fulfill the radical relationality of 
power relations, I will argue that its emphasis on invention and creativity is nonetheless vital.
 Beyond Foucault, there are those theorists who have been influenced by his thought and his 
notion of a relational power.  In this chapter I will examine the thought of those theorists who expand 
upon his notion of a relational power and push it in the direction of a more radical conception of 
relational power.  Such theorists, more than Foucault himself, recognize that we live a world populated 
by more than just humans.  The importance of recognizing that humans exist in relationships with 
nonhumans and environments is that it extends a relational agency to include not only the limits 
imposed by power relations, but also recognizes that there are material, ecological limits on human 
power relations.  While Modern systems of thought are characterized by the recognition that Man is a 
natural being, such systems of thought nonetheless constitute human beings as superior to Nature and, 
hence, as distinct from Nature.  In this sense, the emergence of Man did not include a recognition that 
humans are bound by ecological limits.  Later in the twentieth century, the emergence of a notion of 
Ôthe environmentÕ made it possible to locate human beings as part of a larger ecological system.  
However, as I argued in the previous chapter, an increasing environmentalization of power relations is 
also associated with a correlative biopower that aims to manage the productivity of all humans, 
nonhumans and environments.  It is important to recognize that humans live within the material 
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constraints of a finite planet because, just as power relations limit action, so do ecologies.  Because of 
human embeddedness within ecological limits it is important to turn to those theorists who explicitly 
recognize nonhumans and environments as active participants within both ecological relations and 
relations of power.
 One of the arguments that is implicit within contemporary environmental actions is that humans 
are necessarily limited by finite resources.  While Modern capitalist power relations treat the planet as 
infinitely renewable and innately stable, contemporary environmental resistances argue that such 
limitless extraction should be curtailed in favour of more regulated practices.  An examination of 
Modern thought reveals that such relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments are, in 
part, the outcome of a hierarchical ordering that constitutes humans, through the means of Modern 
knowledges, as scientifically presiding over the biological and ecological functions of life on the 
planet.  Although Modern thought presumed that humans can overcome any limit imposed by Nature, 
environmentalists argue that humans are constrained by the ecological limits of the world.  The 
transformation of Nature into Ôthe environmentÕ has involved a corollary emergence of 
environmentalizing processes which aim to increase the efficiency and sustainability of human 
interaction with nonhumans and environments (in the form of natural resources or other commodities).  
In this sense, complexity theory is important because it explicitly acknowledges that humans have 
relationships with nonhumans and environments, and likewise acknowledges that humans are subject 
to the limits imposed by complex ecologies.
 The use of complexity theory to extend FoucaultÕs notion of a relational power, and an implied 
relational agency, is not only a simple correlative extension of his notion of agency because FoucaultÕs 
thought is similar to complexity theory in other ways.  For example, the amalgamation of FoucaultÕs 
thought with complexity theory can occur, in part, because both view history and change as inherently 
nonlinear.  As I argued in the first chapter, FoucaultÕs notion of epistemic shifts acknowledges that such 
events are unpredictable.  Correspondingly, complexity theory argues that changes within complex 
systems happen unpredictably.  Additionally, in the previous chapter, FoucaultÕs notion of a relational 
power described power relations as inherently dispersed.  Likewise, complex systems are 
interconnected and interrelated to the extent that contemporary social and ecological systems consist of 
relationships that span the whole planet.  Where Foucault and complexity theory part ways occurs 
precisely because complexity theory stresses the ecological limits of systems and the relationships that 
they entail, while Foucault stressed relations of power which he nevertheless did not acknowledge as 
inclusive of nonhumans and environments.
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 By combining FoucaultÕs thought with complexity theory, throughout this chapter, I will argue 
that a radical relational agency must include more than just humans.  To do this, I will begin with a 
critique of FoucaultÕs notion of self-fashioning.  In this sense, FoucaultÕs thought remains more tied to 
Modern thought than he recognized.  I will examine theorists influenced by Foucault who explicitly 
argue for a recognition of nonhuman agency.  In order to arrive at a such definition of nonhuman 
agency, I will examine a variety of theorists who postulate the notion of nonhuman agency in 
sometimes contradictory ways.  In particular, I will argue that a radical relational agency requires that 
nonhumans be recognized as agents with diverse identities because the erasure of disparate identities is 
incompatible with a recognition of relationality.  Just as I argued in the previous chapter that a notion of 
relational power implies that a multiplicity of agents are participants, I argue that it likewise implies 
that those agents have diverse ontologies.
Self-Fashioning and the Environment
 In the previous chapter, I examined FoucaultÕs notion of relational power as described within his 
genealogical texts and argued that a notion of relational agency is implicit within his descriptions.  In 
particular, I argued that a relational agency exists because no power relation is ever guaranteed to 
remain the same.  Although a notion of relational agency is implicit within FoucaultÕs genealogical 
texts, in his final texts a notion of agency is made more explicit.  Within his genealogical texts, agency 
is precisely relational and cannot be possessed by subjects.  I argued that this relational agency exists as 
a result of the relationships that occur between individuals and, as such, implies that those individuals 
need not be human.  Self-fashioning, however, reveals an agency that is something more akin to an 
individualized human agency.  FoucaultÕs notion of self-fashioning is important because it explicitly 
acknowledges that, even though power exhorts us to produce ourselves in particular ways, it is possible 
to produce ourselves in other ways.  In this sense, a notion of self-fashioning makes explicit that not 
only are relations of power subject to reversal, but that the production of identities and materialities is 
never complete.  However, the implication that self-fashioning is an individual process ignores the 
related implication that any fashioning is always the result of multiple relationships.
 In his final texts, FoucaultÕs interest shifted away from genealogical analyses of power relations 
to histories of what he referred to as Ôtechnologies of the selfÕ.  Examining technologies of the self 
represents an alternative means of looking at the constitutedness of subjectivity than that found in 
FoucaultÕs genealogical texts because they are explicitly concerned with determining how it might be 
possible for subjects to re-constitute their own identities.  Foucault (1997d) argued that:
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The history of the ÒcareÓ and the ÒtechniquesÓ of the self would thus be a way of doing the 
history of subjectivity; no longer, however, through the divisions between the mad and the 
nonmad, the sick and the nonsick, delinquents and nondelinquents, nor through the constitution 
of fields of scientific objectivity giving a place to the living, speaking, labouring subject; but, 
rather, through the putting in place, and the transformations in our culture of Òrelations with 
oneself,Ó with their technical armature and their knowledge effects (88).
Technologies of the self are thus concerned explicitly with how we relate to ourselves rather than to 
others.  A history of technologies of the self is presented as a means of understanding how subjectivity 
is constituted in different ways throughout history.  Because these Ôrelations with oneselfÕ that Foucault 
described are implicated in oneÕs ability to produce oneself in different ways than those presented by 
biopolitical power relations, I contend that FoucaultÕs examination of these technologies serves as a 
way of uncovering the agential capacities of individual human subjects.  
 Technologies of the self do not remain the same historically and culturally.  Foucault (1988c) 
endeavoured to examine the Òsense of strangenessÓ regarding relations to the self in antiquity (258).  In 
The History of Sexuality: Volume II, Foucault (1985) examined Òhow, in classical antiquity, sexual 
activity and sexual pleasures were problematized through practices of the self, bringing into play the 
criteria of an Ôaesthetics of existenceÕÓ (12).  By contrasting an aesthetic of existence in antiquity to the 
production of subjectivity in Modernity, Foucault (1997e) argued that, instead of an aesthetics of 
existence, Modern technologies of the self have increasingly tended towards knowing the self; ÒÔKnow 
thyselfÕ has obscured ÔTake care of yourselfÕÓ (228).  As FoucaultÕs genealogical texts make clear, the 
constitution of individualized subjectivities has eclipsed the care of the self.  Foucault (1983a) argued 
that the care of the self in antiquity is Òdiametrically opposedÓ to Òthe Californian cult of the self [...] 
which is supposed to tell you what your true self isÓ (362).  While biopolitical power compels humans 
to constitute ourselves as individuals, in antiquity the rules governing care of the self did not form an 
imperative.  Greek Òpractices of the selfÓ did not form an Òequivalent to an obligation for the subject to 
speak truthfully concerning himself; it never opened up the soul as a domain of potential 
knowledgeÓ (Foucault 1985: 89).  Only within the Modern episteme does speaking the truths of our 
identities become the primary mode in which we relate to ourselves.  By examining different 
technologies of the self, Foucault gathered inspiration for how it may be possible to relate to ourselves 
in other ways and, hence, how it is possible to re-constitute ourselves.
 Self-fashioning is a way of relating to the self which accepts that subjects are produced within 
relations of power.  Foucault (1989b) stressed that Òthe subject constitutes itself in an active fashion 
through practices of the selfÓ which Òare nevertheless not something invented by the individual 
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himself.  They are models he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his 
culture, his society, and his social groupÓ (291).  In this sense, agency becomes synonymous with an 
ability to actively fashion oneself within the constraints of power relations because, as Foucault 
explicitly argued, re-fashioning identities even within those constrained limits is possible.  Instead of 
accepting that those normalized and hierarchized identities which encompass Modern subjectivities are 
the final possible option, Foucault argued that those models nevertheless supply individuals with 
enough material to act in other ways.  Although there are no new subjectivities, only new combinations 
of those that have already been given, a recognition that fashioning of the self is possible acknowledges 
that, though subjects are produced within relations of power, action and agency are not extinguished.  
Rather than proclaiming that subjects are constituted permanently without the potentiality of change, 
self-fashioning recognizes that it is possible to re-constitute ourselves.  Practices of self-fashioning are 
thus, always, a re-fashioning.  
 Since Modern power relations constitute subjects as individuals, in a way it makes sense to 
respond to those power relations at the level of the individual subject.  Yet, FoucaultÕs own notion of a 
relational power presupposes that individuals cannot be isolated.  Although self-fashioning 
acknowledges that it is possible to re-fashion identities within Modern power relations, these relations 
are relations only to oneself.  Thus, I argue that Foucault prioritized an individualized human self.  
Indeed, James Bernauer (1988) argues that, ÒFoucaultÕs employment of aesthetic terms points to the 
power which this agonism has for ecstatic art, for leaving itself behind in transgressing the prisons of a 
particular historical determination and for creating a new relation to event and, thus, selfÓ (71).  
FoucaultÕs self-fashioning, as an aesthetic practice, argues that in fashioning the self as a work of art, it 
is possible to transgress or transform those particular and individualized identities that have been 
constituted within Modern relations of power and create a new relation to the self.  However, at the 
heart of such practices, there still remains an individualized self.  In the sense that self-fashioning 
responds to the constitution of an individualized subject, it likewise continues to be centred on 
individual human subjects.  To take the re-constitution of Modern individualized identities as a political 
aim, is to likewise attribute priority to an individualized subjectivity.  By taking the individualized 
identity that has been constituted through Modern relations of power and transgressing it, that 
individualized subject still remains the central notion against which all agential practices must respond.
 Although FoucaultÕs notion of self-fashioning describes how individuals can re-fashion 
themselves as a kind of agential practice, it does not amount to a radical relational agency.  Self-
fashioning is, by FoucaultÕs own admission, characterized by care of the self.  Moreover, in the sense 
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that self-fashioning is closest to a notion of an individualized agency, because it endeavours to explain 
how individual human action is possible, it places humans at the centre of all action.  As such, self-
fashioning is an implicitly anthropocentric notion of agency.  What remains unacknowledged within a 
notion of self-fashioning are the consequences of a specifically relational power that implies there are 
other participants with whom we relate.  As I argued in the previous chapter, a relational notion of 
power requires that subjects are embedded within a series of relationships with other agents.  While 
self-fashioning offers the possibility of an agency, in that the re-constitution of identities is an agential 
practice, it is not a radical relational agency because it does not recognize that relationality entails 
relationships to others ÐÐ there is no possibility for re-constitution without these relationships.
 What remains useful within FoucaultÕs notion of self-fashioning is an explicit acknowledgement 
that subjects are not constituted once and for all.  Indeed, the process of creative re-fashioning is a 
theme that I will return to later in this thesis.  Such a notion of creativity and innovation can be helpful 
for formulating environmental resistances.  For example, an agential practice of self-fashioning points 
out the necessity of questioning the ÔnaturalnessÕ of human relationships and interpretations of nature 
and the environment.  ric Darier (1999b) argued that Òmost environmental ethicists rarely question 
their underpinning naturalist/essentialist assumptions and even more rarely examine their own 
discourses strategicallyÓ (228).  By applying notions of self-fashioning to the problem, Darier suggests 
that environmental activists could question this seeming naturalness, experiment with their identities 
and creatively re-fashion human relationships with nonhumans and the environment.  An 
environmental practice of self-fashioning, although it specifically focusses on individual identities, 
would necessarily affect others with whom we relate.  Indeed, it would affect others precisely because 
isolation is impossible.  In this sense, even a practice of self-fashioning ÐÐ because it must take place 
within relations of power ÐÐ implies that, in fact, such a practice can never be individual because its 
effects cannot be contained.
 Another example of how self-fashioning has effects beyond the individual, is the practice of 
writing about nature because it is an act that intentionally locates humans within actual material 
environments.  While Foucault (1997c) argued that Òwriting constitutes an essential stage in the process 
to which the whole askesis leads: namely, the fashioning of accepted discourses, recognized as true, 
into rational principles of actionÓ, Sylvia Bowerbank (1999) argues that nature writing serves to 
fashion discourses which describe the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments 
(209).  Bowerbank argues that when we write about nature rather than ourselves, Òthe care of the self is 
reconfigured to make care of place essential to its meaning.  The abstract principle of caring for the 
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earth is localized and distributed among manageable projects undertaken in specific, meaningful 
placesÓ (171).  In this sense, nature writing is a practice that proceeds beyond the individual in an 
attempt to re-fashion the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments; those who 
engage in Nature writing do so to situate themselves within a personally locatable place.  And, although 
Nature writing is carried out in private, such Òwritings create a new cultural repertoire of appropriate 
emotions and habits, articulated in light of the ecological knowledge that only now is being constructed 
at the material and social levelsÓ (172).  Thus, writing about nature serves to construct the environment 
in ways that place individuals within ecological limits.  While self-fashioning is directed towards 
individual re-fashioning, Bowerbank makes it clear that fashioning oneself often affects the fashioning 
of others.
 These examples of how a Foucauldian re-fashioning can be developed as an environmental 
practice implicitly reveal that it is impossible to retain the effects of any fashioning at the individual 
level.  Because individuals are necessarily embedded within a series of power relations, isolation is 
impossible.  However, these examples of environmental self-fashioning, because they are still attempts 
to re-fashion individual human identities, still take humans to be the central agents.  In this sense, they 
only focus on human practices and therefore deny the potential for an explicit recognition of nonhuman 
and environmental agency.  When theorists recognize that humans are always situated within particular 
environments, but do not recognize that nonhumans and environments are active participants within 
omnipresent power relations, a more radical notion of relationality is denied.  As I have argued 
throughout this section, a practice of self-fashioning, because it always takes place within the 
constraints of power relations, will necessarily have effects on those with whom we relate.  Yet, such a 
practice does not explicitly recognize that isolation is impossible.
Performativity and Nonhuman Agency
 Unlike Foucault, who does not specifically discuss notions of agency, Judith Butler (1992) 
explicitly argues that relations of power do not negate a notion of agency; Òto claim that the subject is 
constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject 
is the very precondition of its agencyÓ (12).  According to Butler, agency is only possible because 
subjects are constituted within power relations.  Like FoucaultÕs argument that re-fashioning is always 
possible, Butler argues that because subjects are produced by power, they must be continually 
produced:
For if the subject is constituted by power, that power does not cease at the moment the subject is 
constituted, but is subjected and produced time and again.  That subject is neither a ground nor a 
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product, but the permanent possibility of a certain resignifying process, one which gets detoured 
and stalled through other mechanisms of power, but which is powerÕs own possibility of being 
reworked (13).
Because subjects do not exist prior to their constitution within power relations their constitutedness 
guarantees the repeated and continual production of those subjectivities.  ButlerÕs argument is thus an 
explicit illustration of the agential capacities inherent within constituted subjectivities.  While agency 
was only implied by FoucaultÕs notion of self-fashioning, Butler explicitly argues that the re-
constitution of subjects is, in fact, an agential process.
 ButlerÕs notion of performativity expands on self-fashioning as an agential process, and explains 
more precisely how agency is acquired.  Her notion of performativity refigures the recognition that 
subjects are constituted through relations of power by pointing out that the discursive performance of 
identities can mask the fact that subjects are constituted; Òidentity is performatively constituted by the 
very ÔexpressionsÕ that are said to be its resultsÓ (Butler 1990: 33).  In this sense, Butler acknowledges 
that, although subjects are constituted within power relations, identities are instead viewed as natural 
and essential characteristics of individuals; the fact that individualized identities are produced within 
power relations is obscured through the seemingly ÔnaturalÕ performance of identities that conform to 
discursive norms.  The importance of recognizing this disconnect between the constitutedness of 
subjects and an illusory naturalness is that the ways in which this tension is exposed can destabilize 
seemingly natural characteristics.  To maintain the appearance of natural and essentialized identities, a 
performance of identity must be constantly re-performed.  All performance Òis repeated.  This 
repetition is at once a reenactment and a reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially 
established; and it is the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimationÓ (178).  By repeating 
performances, subjects enact a sameness that gives the impression of a unitary and a priori identity.  In 
this sense, there is an imperative to repeat socially coherent identities so as not to expose those 
identities as performances. 
 Mis-performances which do not adhere to seemingly natural and essential categories, expose 
those discursive categories as the Òregulatory fictionsÓ that they are (Butler 1992: 32).  Because it is 
possible to reveal the illusory quality of Modern individualized identities, to do so serves as a way of 
undermining the power relations through which those identities are constituted.  Because identities are 
not essential, and must continually be performed, the opportunity for mis-performance is constant.  
Butler (1990) argues that any Òinjunction to be a given [subjectivity] produces necessary 
failuresÓ (185).  In other words, the fact that subjectivities are performed means that any attempt to 
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create a unified category of subjects will necessarily reveal that there will always be subjects unable to 
perform their identities accurately.  Thus, what Butler argues is that, to mis-perform an identity is to 
expose that all ÔnaturalÕ identities are contingent, historical and arbitrary.  As such, it is also an act that 
explicitly denies the naturalness of given identities because any failure to comply can be reconstrued as 
a possible act of subversion.  By demonstrating that constituted, or performed, identities are inherently 
unstable, Butler argues that agency is a process of redefinition, or resignification.  In this sense, the 
agential practices that Butler describes are primarily viewed as discursive.  Indeed, for Butler, agency is 
almost entirely discursive.  She argues that Òthe question of agency is reformulated as a question of 
how signification and resignification workÓ (1990: 184).  Thus, through the performance of identities, 
identities are resignified; performance is a discursive agential practice that demonstrates that power is 
always embedded within knowledge and discourse.
 Like Foucault, Butler also argues that materiality does not remain untouched by discourse.  She 
argues that bodies are discursively signified through a form of Òmaterial violenceÓ that acts upon 
subjects; for example, Òthe category of sex imposes a duality and a uniformity on bodies in order to 
maintain sexuality as a compulsive orderÓ (1992: 17).  Although ButlerÕs example specifically pertains 
to gendered identities, the argument is that any discursively performed identity orders and arranges the 
very materiality of human bodies.  Her point is that because performed, or constituted, identities must 
adhere to those particular identities that are generated through normative knowledges and omnipresent 
relations of power, they amount to a material violence that is inflicted upon human bodies.  This 
material violence orders bodies in specific ways that, for example, constitute subjects either as female 
or male.  Thus, even before sexual identities emerge, bodies are violently marked by discourses of 
gender.  According to Butler, ÒÔsexÕ works its silent ÔviolenceÕ in regulating what is and is not 
designatableÓ (19).  Given the physical violence that is imposed by signification, Butler is clear that 
discourse effects not only discursive identities, but actually structures material bodies.  In this sense, 
the discursivity central to ButlerÕs notion of agency-as-resignification does not take place entirely on a 
discursive level.  However, her descriptions of performance and resignification omit an 
acknowledgement that the identities of nonhumans and environments are likewise performed.  
Although Butler recognizes that performativity has material effects on bodies and that systems of 
thought do have a noticeable effect on material realities, she nevertheless does not acknowledge the 
agency of nonhumans.
 Like Butler, Bronislaw Szerszynski et al. (2003) view performativity as a process of 
signification and resignification.  However, they explicitly advocate that the identities of nonhumans 
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and environments are similarly performed.  In this sense, by acknowledging that the identities of 
nonhumans and environments are no more ÔnaturalÕ than those of humans, they suggest that 
performativity can provide a creative, innovative and inventive approach to viewing relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments.  They argue that performance Òis a means by which 
we may come to know, and as something which necessitates a different way of thinking about 
knowledge ÐÐ not as static or passive, but as active, distinctly relational, forming distinctive events and 
experiences by which it is possible to know moreÓ (4).  Performances actually produce new 
knowledges through which humans frame their relationships to their environment.  This more profound 
relationality recognizes not only human knowledges, but includes nonhumans and environments as 
well, a possibility that leads beyond ButlerÕs notion of performativity.  By acknowledging that the 
identity of nonhumans and environments are likewise performed, Szerszynski et al. argue that this 
more inclusive notion of Òperformance is pushing accepted conventions and idioms towards liminal 
spaces where new meanings might be createdÓ (12).  Such a recognition implies not only that 
nonhumans and environments are constituted within relations of power, but also that these 
performances are actively performed by nonhuman and environmental agents.
 Performed environments are composed of intersecting knowledges that are sometimes 
biopolitical, academic, scientific, personal, anecdotal, literary, mythological or mundane.  This 
intersection of knowledges makes the performance of nonhuman and environmental identities complex 
and varied; there is no one performance because there are multiple and often conflicting performances.  
Indeed, the transformation of Nature into a notion of Ôthe environmentÕ implies such multiplicity and 
divergence.  Stephen Healy (2003) argues that: ÒUnderstanding the world as something performed in 
relationships underlines the flexibility and impermanence of any state of reality, and how work over 
time and space is necessary to maintain itÓ (98).  Any example of performed identity, including those of 
nonhumans and environments, is subject to change and must be re-performed in order to be 
perpetuated.  Although identities necessitate repeated performances in order to be sustained, such 
repetition does not mean that ÒRealityÓ is Òin our heads but is a rather complex, many-layered 
performance, constituted by the multiple performances of the relationships between both people and 
the things that go to make it upÓ (98).  In other words, by extending the notion of performativity to 
include nonhumans and environments, a reasonable recognition is that nonhuman and environmental 
performances are not merely the result of human signification.  Healy stresses that the performance of 
environments Òis one in which [it is recognized that] humans are intimately embedded rather than 
detached fromÓ a surrounding environment (106).  Environmental performativity recognizes that there 
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are active relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments; social significations are not 
simply mapped onto passive environments.
 A more radical notion of a relational agency necessitates that nonhuman objects, spaces and 
practices are no longer viewed as static receptacles for discursive constructions, but must be recognized 
as participants within power relations.  Descriptions of performed environments acknowledge that 
material relationships between humans and nonhumans are complex, and that humans are necessarily 
embedded within material spaces and environments.  Thus, the notion of performativity highlights the 
locatedness of those performances; humans relate not only to fellow human beings but to spaces, 
landscapes, wilderness, environments and other nonhumans.  More importantly, notions of 
environmental performativity explicitly recognize the agency of nonhuman participants.  Such a 
recognition is necessary in order to develop a more radical notion of relationality that acknowledges 
nonhumans and environments as participants within power relations.  But it is equally important to 
unambiguously acknowledge that embracing a multiplicity of nonhuman participants within 
performativity does not suggest a return to biological determinism, nor does it mark the absorption of 
the ÔnaturalÕ into the social.  According to a more inclusive notion of performativity, a radical relational 
agency is extended to nonhumans out of necessity and in order to make it internally coherent.  By 
ignoring nonhuman participants within the radical relationality that both self-fashioning and 
performativity imply, is also to silence pockets of nonhuman and environmental agency that inevitably 
emerge.  
 Recognizing that humans are embedded within ecological systems, Nigel Clark (2003) 
unequivocally asserts that nonhumans and environments are indisputable participants within performed 
identities and, hence, power relations.  Clark contends that we must:
extend [performativity] radically, beyond the scope of the social, the cultural, or the linguistic 
that conventionally delineates the social sciences and humanities.  Once we acknowledge a 
differentiating force, a ÔliteracyÕ or a communicative competence implicit in living matter, then 
nature and culture cease to appear as self-enclosed spheres, and at least the hint of a mutual 
intelligibility opens up.  In this way, just as it is possible to identify a whole range of social 
constructions and conditionings of the natural world, so too, is it conceivable that biophysical 
forces never cease to animate and articulate the socio-cultural domain (169).
Once it is recognized that there are communicative capacities involved in the relationships between 
humans, nonhumans and environments, the inability for a notion of performativity to account for the 
agential capacities of nonhumans and environments is questioned.  If there is mutual intelligibility 
between humans, nonhumans and environments, the assumption that nonhumans and environments do 
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not perform their own identities is problematized.  Indeed, as Clark explicitly argues, to assume that 
nonhumans and environments are passive, is to foreclose the recognition that they contribute to both 
ecological and social processes.
 That there are possibilities of communication, or at least mutual intelligibility, between humans, 
nonhumans and environments suggests that it is necessary to rethink the practice of signification as a 
wholly human process.  Rather, the implication of recognizing nonhumans and environments as 
contributors within social and relational processes that always include a multiplicity of agents ÐÐ 
human, nonhuman and environmental ÐÐ is that performed identities are no longer viewed as simply 
another aspect of human signification.  In this sense, the focus on signification becomes one of 
communication.  The shift from an emphasis on signification to an emphasis on communication is 
important because it firmly situates nonhumans and environments as participants within a larger series 
of relationships.  In short, they can no longer be viewed simply as passive recipients of human 
signification.  This shift therefore destabilizes Modern notions of agency by acknowledging not only 
that humans have relationships with nonhumans and environments, but that those nonhumans and 
environments are agents in their own right.  Thus, I argue that anthropocentric examples of self-
fashioning and performativity needlessly ignore and silence the contributions of nonhuman 
participants.  By acknowledging the participatory and communicative agency of nonhumans and 
environments, a more radical notion of agency is starting to develop.
A Nonhuman (Cyborg) Agency
 Donna Haraway, like Judith Butler, is influenced by Foucault.  However, Haraway expands on 
FoucaultÕs thought in order to explicitly develop a notion of nonhuman agency.  Unlike Butler, 
Haraway gains her inspiration from FoucaultÕs notion of biopower rather than his notion of self-
fashioning.  In the previous chapter, I argued that biopolitical power relations are becoming 
increasingly environmentalized and now manage the efficiency and productivity of nonhumans and 
environments.  Similarly, Haraway argues that her notion of a Ôcyborg politicsÕ is an extension of 
biopolitics because it describes how humans, nonhumans, animals, machines, environments and 
technologies are all produced within contemporary power relations.  Haraway (1991) admits that 
ÒMichel FoucaultÕs biopolitics is a flaccid premonition of cyborg politics, a very open fieldÓ (150).  
This biopolitical production of nonhumans, environments, animals and machines generates a notion of 
nonhuman agency, in part, because ÐÐ as Haraway argues ÐÐ the boundaries between humans and all 
sorts of nonhumans are blurred.  Haraway asks: ÒWhy should our bodies end at the skin, or include at 
best other beings encapsulated by skin?Ó (178).  In this sense, Haraway asserts that biopolitical power 
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relations are increasingly extended beyond what is human precisely because it is impossible to 
determine what is human and what is not.  HarawayÕs notion of a nonhuman agency is thus actively 
derived from a synthesis between human and nonhuman, nature and culture, human and animal, 
organism and machine that is contesting their boundaries.  
 The importance of recognizing that the boundaries between humans and nonhumans are being 
blurred is that it destabilizes Modern distinctions between Man and Nature as well as the assumption 
that agency is attributable only to humans.  Because of this broad coalescence between humans, 
nonhumans and environments, it is no longer possible to make a distinction between which particular 
participant is endowed with agency and which is not.  Rather, agency is distributed among a wide 
variety of participants; humans, nonhumans, animals, objects, spaces, machines, environments, plants, 
technologies and communications devices are all participants within power relations.  According to 
HarawayÕs argument, nonhuman agency exists because differences are indeterminable.  Haraway 
(1991) argues that within contemporary power relations, ÒIt is not clear who makes and who is made in 
the relation between human and machineÓ (177).  The erasure of the distinction between who acts/
makes and who is passive/made has the effect of effacing the difference between those who have 
agency and those who do not because it disrupts the Modern dualism between subjects who study and 
objects that are studied.  This means that the distinctions between ÒNature and culture are reworked; 
one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the otherÓ (151).  That the 
distinction between who makes and who is made, or who studies and who is studied, is no longer 
apparent means that those notions of agency that are contingent upon such a distinction are inevitably 
destabilized.  The recognition that the boundaries between humans, nonhumans and environments are 
necessarily indistinct therefore means that any characteristics attached to those distinctions, such as 
agency, are no longer tenable.
 Haraway overtly embraces the implications of a radical relationality and delights in the 
recognition that there are no longer any characteristics that are purely human.  By exposing the 
slipperiness of boundaries Haraway contends that we are no longer able to determine where ourselves, 
bodies, biologies, organisms stop and where the spaces, machines, technologies, environments around 
us begin.  Thus, Haraway argues for a Ôcyborg politicsÕ which ÐÐ because cyborgs are hybrids of 
humans, nonhumans and machines ÐÐ engender a world Òin which people are not afraid of their joint 
kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory 
standpointsÓ (154).  A cyborg politics unambiguously denies the distinction between self and the wider 
community made up of humans, animals, organisms, machines, technologies, environments and 
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numerous other participants.  Questioning the enacted boundaries that purportedly separate humans 
from the world around us allows us to see ourselves as embedded within nonhuman and environmental 
realities.  Haraway argues that cyborg politics are Òa kind of disassembled and reassembled, 
postmodern collective and personal selfÓ (163).  As a result of this radical blurring of boundaries, 
HarawayÕs notion of a cyborg politics implies a definition of agency that necessarily includes all 
manner of diverse agents.  Because it is no longer possible to determine the boundaries that make 
humans and nonhumans distinct, the characteristics that belonged exclusively to humans, such as 
agency, are now dispersed across these blurred categories.
 Because agency is no longer a characteristic of a distinct category of humans, it  is recognized 
that agency is dispersed throughout all relationships.  HarawayÕs notion of a cyborg politics is thus an 
important expansion of FoucaultÕs notion of biopower because she argues that a political figure ÐÐ that 
of the cyborg ÐÐ which blurs the boundaries between humans, nonhumans and environments is the 
necessary outcome of the biopolitical production of all forms of life.  Because the former distinction 
between humans, nonhumans and environments that is so central to Modern systems of thought has 
collapsed, HarawayÕs argument describes one way in which nonhumans and environments have 
acquired agency.  According to HarawayÕs argument there is a conflation of nonhumans and humans 
and because nonhumans are no long distinct from humans, characteristics such as agency can no longer 
be said to belong only to humans.  This conflation between humans and nonhumans is significant 
because it underscores the arbitrariness of the Modern distinction between the two and, in doing so, 
destabilizes the seeming naturalness of constituting nonhumans and environments as non-agential.  
However, this blurring of boundaries between humans and nonhumans, despite its recognition of 
nonhuman agency, can efface the radical differences that exist between humans, nonhumans and 
environments.  This erasure of differences is dangerous because it indicates an anthropocentrism of 
sorts.  Because nonhuman agency is recognized as a result of the blurring of boundaries, there is an 
implication that nonhumans have simply been absorbed into the category of ÔhumanÕ and, hence, this 
granting of agency can be interpreted as anthropomorphic.  A radical relational agency must recognize 
that there can be radical differences which exist between humans, nonhumans and environments; to 
flatten all differences is to ignore the implication that nonhumans have identities which are distinct 
from purely anthropomorphic characteristics.  In the following section I will examine how different 
theorists conceive of the ways in which multiple agents, including humans, nonhumans and 
environments, interact in networks and assemblages.
Acting Together: Networks and Assemblages
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 Following from FoucaultÕs recognition that power is both relational and productive, actor-
network theory aims to describe how all humans, nonhumans and environments are produced within 
those relations of power.  In this sense, actor-network theory acknowledges the implication that power 
relations include nonhuman and environmental participants.  Moreover, actor-network theory explicitly 
recognizes what FoucaultÕs investigations merely implied ÐÐ that all participants within power relations 
are agents.  John Law (1999) argues that:
actor-network theory may be understood as a semiotics of materiality.  It takes the semiotic 
insight, that of the relationality of entities, the notion that they are produced in relations, and 
applies this ruthlessly to all materials ÐÐ and not simply those that are linguistic.  This suggests: 
first that it shares something important with Michel FoucaultÕs work; second that it may be 
usefully distinguished from those versions of post-structuralism that attend to language and 
language alone; and third [É] that it expresses the ruthlessness that has often been associated 
with the march of modernity (4).
The consequence of actor-network theory being influenced by FoucaultÕs thought is that it views actors 
as primarily constituted within a relational space.  Actor-network theory proceeds from FoucaultÕs 
understanding of a relational power and recognizes that relationality explicitly entails the production of 
all nonhuman and environmental materialities.  Furthermore, it acknowledges that those nonhumans 
and environments play a role within those relationships that exposes their agential capacities.
 Extending the recognition that all actors ÐÐ whether human or nonhuman ÐÐ are produced 
within a relational space, actor-network theory explicitly defines every participant within power 
relations as an agent.  Latour (2005) argues that what matters within actor-network theory Òis the 
precise role granted to non-humans.  They have to be actors [...] and not simply the hapless bearers of 
symbolic projectionÓ (10).  In this sense, unlike HarawayÕs cyborg agency, actor-network theory 
explicitly destabilizes the Modern distinction between humans and nonhumans without suggesting that 
the two categories are becoming blurred.  Indeed, the recognition that nonhumans and environments 
are not Òthe hapless bearers of symbolic projectionÓ implies that they maintain their own distinct 
identities within relational spaces.  Thus, actor-network theory acknowledges that nonhumans are 
actors in their own right; not by consequence of becoming bound to humans, but because of the places 
that they hold within relational networks.  Actor-network theory is important because it very explicitly 
extends agency to nonhuman actors without effacing the differences that exist between various humans, 
nonhumans and environments.  By recognizing the agency of nonhumans, actor-network theory 
destabilizes the constitution of nonhumans as passive objects of scientific observation.  Indeed, actor-
network theory explicitly describes the ways in which scientific knowledges are generated not by 
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scientists as individuals, but instead demonstrates that knowledge is generated as a result of scientistsÕ 
embeddedness in relational power networks which include the nonhumans that they study.  As Latour 
argues, because nonhumans are not simply the products of human signification and are instead agents 
within relational networks, their contributions to knowledge and science must be recognized.
 In the sense that actor-network theory recognizes that nonhumans are participants within power 
relations, it also suggests that nonhumans are actively involved in the production of scientific 
knowledges.  Jonathan Murdoch (2006) argues that Latour, in particular, with his interest in the 
accumulation of scientific knowledges:
adopts a Foucauldian perspective on the ÔmicrophysicsÕ of power in science, and shows how the 
generation of scientific knowledge relies upon the construction of complex alliances or 
networks.  Importantly, power is seen to lie not in the properties or abilities of the scientists 
themselves but in the very relationships they manage to establish between actors and entities of 
various kinds (62).
LatourÕs adoption of a relational notion of power thus demonstrates that nonhumans are not granted 
agency because they have become a sort of agent that is simply augmented by a human agency that has 
become attached to them, but because those nonhumans actually establish their own kinds of 
relationships.  The consequence of LatourÕs recognition that nonhumans participate within the 
constitution of scientific knowledges is that the Modern construction of humans as subjects who study, 
and nonhumans as passive objects of study, is thoroughly destabilized.  By acknowledging that 
nonhumans are actors, as humans, we must give up our authority as ÔexpertsÕ who make silenced 
objects speak.  Rather than viewing nonhumans as merely a linguistic or social representation, it is 
necessary to grant them full status as participants and agents.  In undoing the notion that agency is 
attached to humans by virtue of their ability to know ÐÐ as is assumed by Modern systems of thought 
ÐÐ actor-network theory is able to move beyond the anthropocentrism latent in FoucaultÕs account of 
relational power.   
 According to actor-network theory, both humans and nonhumans have agential capacities 
because they are constituted relationally within a power ÔnetworkÕ.  The actor-network Òview of agency 
begins not with fully formed agents but with an already constituted social space (the network) and 
shows how agents (both human and non-human) emerge from a series of trials in which they are 
continually striving to become actors with powersÓ (Murdoch 2006: 68).  Thus, as has already been 
discussed, the actor-network notion of nonhuman agency follows directly from FoucaultÕs insistence 
that any characteristic of an individual is necessarily produced through relations of power.  Indeed, just 
as FoucaultÕs notion of power was precisely relational instead of ontological, actor-network theory 
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explicitly acknowledges that agency is likewise non-ontological.  Indeed, ÒANT is based on no theory 
of the stable actor; rather it assumes the radical indeterminacy of the actorÓ (Callon 1999: 181).  In a 
sense, this argument not only suggests that agency is non-ontological, but that agents themselves do not 
have an ontological existence.  Although it is consistent with a radical relational agency that agents are 
constituted differentially within power relations, if what is meant by the radical indeterminacy of 
agents within actor-networks is that agents are so indeterminate as to be interchangeable, then this has 
the same effect of flattening out the radical differences between agents as does HarawayÕs blurring of 
boundaries.  Indeed, to fail to recognize the ontological and radical differences that exist between 
agents is, as I have already argued in the previous section, to erase the distinctness between agents and, 
in doing so, to remove a crucial component of radical relationality.
 The problem with the assumption that agents do not exist is that such an assumption extends the 
characteristics of a non-ontological agency onto the agents themselves and has the potential to erase the 
radical differences that exist between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Because networks are a 
sort of frame that actor-network theory gives to relationships between humans, nonhumans and things, 
and out of which a relational agency is produced, these networks can be seen as a kind of object from 
which agency flows.  In other words, while agents are radically indeterminable and therefore non-
ontological, networks start to seem more like structures that generate agency instead of the agents 
themselves.  By arguing that agents, because they are non-ontological, do not matter in their own 
particular specificities, actor-network theory runs the risk of neglecting to account for the radical 
differences between actors.  As Lee and Stenner (1999) argue; Òas we break ontological boundaries and 
render everything ÔnetworkyÕ, we will become insensitive to complexity and heterogeneityÓ (110).  
Because actor-networks have a tendency to erase differences, actor-network theoryÕs characterization of 
nonhuman agency is not suitable to a radical relational agency, because explicit to such a notion of 
agency is that ÐÐ though both humans and nonhumans have agential capacities ÐÐ there are still 
profound differences between them.
 To understand how it might be possible to recognize the agency of nonhumans and 
environments without erasing the radical differences between them, I point to Manuel DeLandaÕs 
(2006) description of assemblages.  In A New Philosophy of Society, he outlines a notion of assemblage 
that he has fashioned from the Òrelatively few pages dedicated to assemblage theory in the work of 
DeleuzeÓ (3).  According to DeLanda, assemblages are made up of many interrelated parts that are not 
just human parts and, as such, consist of relationships between a multiplicity of agents without effacing 
their complexity and heterogeneity.  DeLanda argues that:
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assemblages, being wholes whose properties emerge from the interactions between parts, can be 
used to model any of these intermediate entities: interpersonal networks and institutional 
organizations are assemblages of people; social justice movements are assemblages of several 
networked communities; central governments are assemblages of several organizations; cities 
are assemblages of people, networks, organizations as well as a variety of infrastructural 
components, from buildings and streets to conduits for matter and energy flows; nation-states 
are assemblages of cities, the geographical regions organized by cities, and the provinces that 
several such regions form (5-6).  
Assemblages, then, are made up of many different components and even other assemblages.  
Assemblages are made up not only of individual humans, nonhumans and spaces, but also consist of 
groups of humans and other assemblages.
 Importantly, each assemblage, or component of an assemblage, according to DeLanda, is not the 
same as the whole because different parts are not interchangeable.  Each agent still retains a discrete 
identity that is not able to impose itself onto any other agent and is not substitutable with any other 
agent.  As DeLanda makes clear, assemblage theory is an ontology.  Assemblage theory does not 
neglect the radical differences between agents because it recognizes that each individual participant is 
granted its own ontological status.  DeLanda (2006) argues that: ÒThe ontological status of any 
assemblage, inorganic, organic or social, is that of a unique, singular, historically contingent individual.  
Although the term ÔindividualÕ has come to refer to individual persons, in its ontological sense it cannot 
be limited to that scale of realityÓ (40).  The argument that DeLanda makes here is of exceptional 
importance to a radical relational agency because he recognizes an ontology without reverting to an 
essentialized identity.  DeLanda argues that, because of each agentÕs historical contingency, a unique 
identity is produced.  He does not return to a Modern notion of human individuality, but acknowledges 
that agents include a vast and differentiated multiplicity of humans, nonhumans and environments.  
Individuals are not simply characterized as human individuals because such an ontology includes 
nonhumans, environments or even assembled groups of human, nonhuman and environments.  As 
DeLanda argues, his definition of ontology escapes essentialism; Òindividual organisms are the 
component parts of a larger individual whole, not the particular members of a general category or 
natural kindÓ (27).  Essentialism is avoided because DeLanda conceives of individuals as members of a 
larger assemblage instead of the representative examples as defined by the Modern episteme.  
Moreover, as DeLanda makes clear, these are not essentialized categories because each individual and 
assemblage is necessarily developed through particular historical contingencies.
 Assemblages are the result of co-constructions of identities that change over time and occur 
within the context of specific variables that are locatable only in relation to a particular assemblage; 
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Òdespite the tight integration between its component[s] [É], the relations between them are not 
logically necessary but only contingently obligatory: a historical result of coevolutionÓ (DeLanda 2006: 
12).  This notion of co-evolution highlights the contingencies from which assemblages arise and, 
because a process of evolution indicates change throughout time, that identities are not static.  Because 
assemblages are not essentialized group identities, but are contingent upon historical co-constructions, 
DeLandaÕs ontology is also relational.  For DeLanda, the relationships between the whole assemblage 
to its individual parts replaces the notion of essential and individualized identities.  Because what this 
part to whole relationship describes is, in fact, a set of relations, there are no essences to assemblages 
or their individual components.  They have ontological status because of their ability to relate to, 
interact with and affect each other.  DeLanda (2006) argues that: Òsocial assemblages larger than 
individual persons have an objective existence because they can causally affect the people that are their 
component parts, limiting them and enabling them, and because they can causally affect assemblages at 
their own scaleÓ (38).  DeLandaÕs notion of assemblage theory does not negate differences between 
individuals because the ontological status of individuals (or groups of individuals) is derived, in part, 
through their very ability to relate to each other.  Thus, unlike actor-network theory, DeLandaÕs notion 
of relationality does not deny the ontological differences between agents.  Indeed, DeLandaÕs relational 
ontology explicitly acknowledges that agents maintain their own unique identities.
 DeLandaÕs ontology, while recognizing the material existence of individual elements, resists 
essentialism by demonstrating that identities are contingent and relational.  Yet, the contingent and 
relational production of identities does not efface identities because ontological differences are a 
necessary prerequisite for that relationality.  Just as Foucault questioned the notion of the agential 
subject as an individual entity made up of essentialized and static elements, so does DeLandaÕs 
relational ontology.  However, DeLanda explicitly argued that there is an ontological existence to 
differences between individuals and assemblages.  Indeed, a notion of relationality requires things with 
which to relate; identities cannot be effaced because were no differences to exist it would mean that, by 
definition, relationships would no longer be possible.  In this sense, the result of a relational ontology is 
the implication of a more radical relational agency in which humans, nonhumans and environments 
interact while nevertheless maintaining their own differences.  A radical relational agency means that 
humans (or other individuals) cannot exist in isolation because, without other individuals with whom to 
relate, the creation of any relational identity would be impossible.  To deny the ontological and material 
existence of agents would thus be to inadvertently erase the differences necessary to a radical relational 
agency.
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  To combine the theoretical implications of the nonhuman notions of agency that I have 
described throughout this chapter, is to arrive at a possible description of a radical relational agency.  
As I have already argued, the primary assumption of this notion of agency is that all agents ÐÐ human, 
nonhuman and environmental ÐÐ are all produced within the limits of omnipresent relations of power.  
Because this power is explicitly relational, any instantiation of power is capable of being overturned.  
In the previous chapter, I argued that it is precisely because of this lack of guarantees that a relational 
agency is generated.  By examining the work of theorists who explicitly acknowledge that nonhumans 
and environments are participants within relations of power, I have argued that there are no limitations 
to these relationships which make them purely human.  Indeed, a radical relational agency is generated, 
in part, because the Modern distinctions between humans, nonhumans and environments has been 
breaking down.  However, I have also argued that a radical relationality entails the existence of radical 
differences between agents that cannot be effaced.  Without such differences, a relationality would be 
impossible.  Thus, a radical relational agency is generated as a result of relationships between different 
kinds of individuals. 
Contemporary Environmental Resistances, Complexity Theory and Ecology
 The notion of ÔecologyÕ, like the notion of Ôthe environmentÕ, is a very recent invention.  The 
emergence of a full-fledged environmental movement in the 1960s is characterized, in part, by the fact 
that; ÒÔEcologyÕ became a word known to (if rarely understood by) the average citizenÓ (Sale 1993: 
23).  Prior to the widespread influence of the contemporary environmental movement words, such as 
ÔecologyÕ, were not part of an everyday vocabulary.  This recognition is important because of what the 
term ecology denotes; ÒÔecologyÕ is not the same thing as ÔenvironmentÕ: the environment is what is out 
there; ecology is how we study it, specifically the relation of species to each other and to their 
environmentÓ (Sale 1993: 23).  The science of ecology, unlike the Modern human sciences, begins with 
the premise that humans, nonhumans and environments necessarily interact.   As Hawken (2007) 
argues, the Òfirst principle of ecology 101: [is] namely, that everything is connectedÓ (58).  While 
Nature was constituted by Modern scientific knowledges as fundamentally separate from Man, the 
scientific practice of ecology proceeds from a different assumption.  In short, the ecological assumption 
that everything is interconnected is radically different from the Modern notion that Man and Nature are 
distinct.  The recognition that humans are embedded within ecological relationships is important 
because it underscores the transformation of Nature into Ôthe environmentÕ.  Moreover, I will argue that 
it is consistent with a fundamental recognition of a radical relational agency ÐÐ that agents are limited 
by ecological relations as well as relations of power.
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 A radical relational agency acknowledges that not only do relations of power limit human 
behaviour, but that humans are likewise limited by ecological constraints.  This means that there are 
neither any purely human, nor any purely nonhuman, interactions or relationships.  As Jenks and Smith 
(2005) argue:
Human construction is subject to ecological constraint: it does not and cannot take place in the 
special world of ÔhumanismÕ [...].  And if human constructions take place in real time and space, 
i.e. in terrestrial ecology, two things follow: they are likely to be co-influential; they cannot be 
said to take place within human minds, cultures, custom, language or whatever else is proposed 
to stand as boundaries.  This ÔwithinÕ and the dichotomy of internal/external are a particularly 
entrenched topology amongst ancient and modern thought which must be resisted (26).  
By recognizing ecological limits, it is acknowledged that humans are firmly attached to and situated 
within an environment, a space and an ecological topography; the formation of human subjects 
intersected, cross-hatched and marked by the wide variety of nonhuman participants with whom we 
interact.  Thus, a radical relational agency is radical because it recognizes that nonhuman, 
environmental and ecological relations of power place constraints on humans.
 I have chosen to examine ecology and environmental actions as exemplars of a radical relational 
agency they explicitly seek to rethink the relationships that occur between humans, nonhumans and 
environments.  As Murdoch (2006) points out, Òthe ecological approach shades neatly into the 
relational approach, that is, it emphasizes how heterogeneous relations link social actors into particular 
spatial domainsÓ (3).  In this sense, ecologies are an explicit mapping of the diverse relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments.  The similarities are observable between a 
relationality and an ecology because, as I have argued throughout this thesis, a radical relational agency 
itself approaches the ecological recognition that everything is interconnected because, it asserts that 
relationships necessarily occur between humans, nonhuman and environments ÐÐ and that it is 
impossible to escape these relationships.  The corollary of this recognition is that, not only is 
everything interconnected, but those interconnections that occur between various agents impose limits 
on possible actions.  Foucault has made it clear that power relations can constitute limits, but he did not 
acknowledge that nonhuman material ecologies can inflict limits on possible actions.  The recognition 
that material ecologies pose limits on the actions and relations between nonhumans, humans and 
environments is also central to a radical relational agency because, inherent to the notion of radical 
relationality that I describe, is an understanding that relationships are always constrained in some way.  
Without the recognition of such limits, a relational agency might have a tendency to preference the 
human and the social.
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 Complexity theory asserts that there are complex relationships that occur between humans, 
nonhumans and environments.  Furthermore, complexity theory asserts that these relationships are 
necessarily constrained by material limits.  As I have already argued, the notion that there are limits 
constraining possible actions is necessary to understanding a radical relational agency.  In the previous 
chapter, I examined how power relations place limits on relationships.  However, a Foucauldian notion 
of power relations does not recognize that there are material and ecological limits which likewise 
constrain relationships.  Complexity theory is significant in this respect because it points out that, 
because the systems in which we live are so complex, there are necessarily events and limits that are 
beyond human control.  In this sense, the recognition that humans are located within complex systems 
means that there are certain ecological or material limits that constrain relationships and actions.  And 
this is also what contemporary environmentalism argues ÐÐ that human systems are bound by finite 
ecological limits.
 Complexity theory points out that complex systems are necessarily constrained by their own 
Ôpath dependenciesÕ, which means that complex systems are always, in fact, limited by contingencies 
particular to each system.  Thus, there are necessarily limits that are significant to the continuation of 
any complex system which are not synonymous with the power relations discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The notion of path dependence shows that Òcausation can flow from contingent events to 
general processes, from small causes to large system effects, from historically or geographically remote 
locations to the general.  Path dependence shows that the ordering of events or processes through time 
very significantly influences the non-linear ways in which they eventually turn outÓ (Urry 2005b: 6).  
In short, path dependence means that complex systems are always dependent upon historical 
contingencies; there are always historical dimensions that limit the relationships within complex 
systems.  This recognition of historical specificity resembles FoucaultÕs (1970b) insistence that any 
discourse, or system of thought, reflects the Òpreconditions of possibilityÓ that characterize its history 
(xxiii-xxiv).  But, whereas Foucault argued that limits are a function of power relations, complexity 
theory argues that limits are a function of a multiplicity of various interactions, materialities and 
ecologies.  While FoucaultÕs thought demonstrated that systems of thought are contingent upon 
relations of power, complexity theory acknowledges that humans exist within ecological constraints.
 Although complexity theory recognizes that humans are constrained by ecological limits, it does 
not herald a return to environmental determinism.  Rather, like FoucaultÕs nonlinear notion of history, 
complexity theory likewise suggests that path dependencies do not necessitate linear changes; ÒThe 
path concretizes a history and the space of a present.  Only from the point of view of linear 
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determination based on minimal or trivial interactions is a future determinedÓ (Jenks and Smith 2006: 
249).  The notion of path dependence recognizes that there are constraints placed on complex systems, 
but such constraints do not mean that history is determined.  Instead, like Foucault, complexity theory 
explicitly acknowledges that history is nonlinear.  The recognition that complex systems are nonlinear 
suggests also that human systems have necessarily evolved within the material and ecological limits of 
those systems.  This notion of evolution (or, more precisely, co-evolution) is important because, as 
Jenks and Smith (2006) point out, Òto suggest that human culture evolved is to suggest constraintÓ (26).  
The nonlinear evolution of complex systems, including the human cultures embedded within those 
systems, means that humans are limited by the evolutionary histories of those systems both in terms of 
historical contingencies and in terms of the material limits that they impose.  Thus, because human 
cultures ÐÐ and systems of thought ÐÐ evolved within material ecologies; both ecological relations and 
relations of power have necessarily limited human interactions.
 The recognition that complex systems have evolved (or rather, co-evolved) thus highlights both 
the constraints and possibilities associated with complexity.  Like the relations of power that entail both 
possibilities and constraints, complexity theory acknowledges that there are both limitations and 
potentialities within complex systems.  Indeed, by acknowledging that history and change are 
nonlinear, complexity theory highlights the unpredictability of complex processes:
Complexity though is not the same as simply complicated.  Complex systems analyses 
investigate the very many systems that have the ability to adapt and co-evolve as they organize 
through time.  Such complex social interactions are likened to walking through a maze whose 
walls rearrange themselves as one walks through; new footsteps have to be taken in order to 
adjust to the walls of the maze that are adapting to each movement made through the maze.  
Complexity investigates emergent, dynamic and self-organizing systems that interact in ways 
that heavily influence the probabilities of later events.  Systems are irreducible to elementary 
laws or simple processes (Urry 2005b: 3). 
The importance of recognizing that there are unpredictable potentialities within complex systems is to 
not only illustrate its differences from a biological or ecological determinism, but to suggest that there 
are always possibilities that such systems can behave in different ways.  Complexity theory, because it 
recognizes that systems are nonlinear and not simply deterministic, holds out the possibility that 
unpredictable changes can occur.  In this sense, like a Foucauldian notion of power relations, 
complexity theory underscores the dynamism and unpredictability that is a result of a vast number of 
interconnected agents ÐÐ human, nonhuman and environmental ÐÐ interacting, adapting and changing.
 The importance of turning to complexity theory is not only to outline the implications that 
human systems are constrained by ecological limits, but also because it shares something with a radical 
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relational agency in that it acknowledges that different kinds of relating and organizing are always 
possible.  Clark (2005) argues that complexity theory Òenables theorists to acknowledge the 
unmanageability of the contemporary world while also holding open the possibility that novel forms of 
organization or structuring might emerge spontaneously out of a sea of dense and disorderly 
interactionÓ (166).  Complexity theory is relevant, then, to understanding how a multiplicity of different 
agents can generate change.  It is in this sense that complexity theory is similar to a Foucauldian notion 
of power relations because it suggests that to act in other ways is always possible.  However, where 
complexity theory and a Foucauldian notion of relational power differ, is that complexity theory 
acknowledges that there are many different kinds of agents that are decidedly nonhuman.  As I have 
argued throughout this chapter, this diversity of agents is necessary in order for a radical relational 
agency to exist.  Complexity theory ÐÐ as the name suggests ÐÐ is necessarily concerned with the 
complex qualities of nonlinear systems.  In this sense, complexity theory also stresses the diversity, 
heterogeneity and complexity of agents within those systems.  
 The argument that I have made throughout this chapter is that a radical relational agency 
explicitly recognizes that isolation is impossible; there is agency only because we cannot exist in 
isolation.  Moreover, the heterogeneity of each agent means that each agent is not reducible to any 
other agent.  In this sense, there are ecological limits, in part, because each agent retains its own 
identity.  Understanding that there is a diversity of heterogeneous agents also points to the recognition 
that humans exist within material ecological limits; Òdiversity is a fundamentally ecological concept: it 
refers to a differentiated field and, especially in the case of the living, it refers to adaptation, to an 
environment that is differentiated and potentially contains other life formsÓ (Jenks and Smith 2006: 
97).  The diversity of possible agents generates a radical relational agency because it means that 
adaptive actions are always carried out as a response to the limits imposed by differentiated agents.  
Thus, a radical relational agency acknowledges that isolation is impossible because, although identity 
is derived relationally, it cannot be effaced.  As I indicated in the first chapter, Modern thought is not 
completely secular because it prioritizes the centrality of the human mind and its autonomy.  A radical 
relational agency, by definition, cannot prioritize human thought or autonomy.  Rather, it points out that 
human thought can only take place within the ecologically constrained limits of complex systems and 
diverse assemblages.  A radical relational agency does not view agency as an innate characteristic of 
human beings, but as a result of the relationships that occur between humans and many, many 
nonhumans; a radical relational agency proliferates because it is relational.
A Radical Relational Agency
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 As I have argued throughout this chapter, the usefulness of applying complexity theory to a 
radical relational agency is that it makes explicit the ways in which human systems are constrained by 
material environments and ecosystems, and are situated within relations of power that necessarily 
include nonhuman agents.  The adoption of complexity theory has occurred relatively recently, it was 
Òin the late 1990s that the social sciences begin to go complexÓ, and hence there remains much work to 
be done in situating it (Urry 2005b: 2).  Throughout this chapter I have suggested that it is possible to 
situate complexity theory within a larger discussion about a radical relational agency that includes 
Foucault and environmentalism as well as theorists influenced by a Foucauldian notion of power 
relations.  In terms of the relationship between FoucaultÕs thought and complexity theory, I have argued 
that there are both similarities and differences.  While both Foucault and complexity theory 
acknowledge that history is nonlinear, unpredictable and necessarily open to change, the move to 
complexity theory is necessary because it acknowledges that humans are constrained by ecological 
limits.  In this sense, complexity theory serves to explicitly acknowledge the implications of a 
relational power by demonstrating that humans, nonhumans and environments are interconnected 
within vastly complex systems.  Complexity theory is thus important to understanding a radical 
relational agency because of the similarities that it shares with FoucaultÕs thought and because it 
functions as a corrective to FoucaultÕs omissions.
 Although complexity theory emerged within scientific disciplines, it is applicable to a notion of 
radical relational agency because it recognizes that complex systems are necessarily social and 
ecological.  Complexity theory is Òa subject thatÕs still so new and so wide-ranging that nobody knows 
quite how to define it, or even where its boundaries lieÓ (Waldrop 1992: 9).  Because the boundaries of 
complexity theory are still being defined, its application to a radical relational agency is not a 
foreclosed option.  Indeed, I argue that complexity theory serves a vital function in defining a radical 
relational agency because it facilitates the transformation of a recognition of limits to explicitly include 
ecological limits.  By applying the insights of complexity theory to notions of a radical relational 
agency, it is possible to broaden an understanding of both ecological limits and the constraints imposed 
by power relations.  On the other hand, there is no specific account of power within complexity theory 
and so it is necessary to reflect a notion of power back onto an understanding of complex systems.  As I 
argued in the previous chapter, all relations are relations of power, including those circumscribed 
within ecological constraints.  In this sense, complexity theory benefits from an integration with a 
radical relational notion of agency because understanding how agency is generated within complex 
systems allows its insights to be applied to political actions.
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 In the following chapter, I will examine in greater detail the implications of what it means to 
exist within complex and interconnected systems.  In particular, I will argue that the interconnections 
between humans, nonhumans and environments ÐÐ generated in part through the globalizing processes 
legitimized by biopolitical production ÐÐ are becoming increasingly complex and, hence, increasingly 
unpredictable.  I argue that the increasing complexity and interconnectivity of contemporary globalized 
systems mean that they are becoming increasingly destabilized.  Given that contemporary globalized 
systems generate relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments that span across the 
globe, I argue that such globalization is indicative of environmentalistsÕ arguments that planetary 
systems are becoming destabilized.  Given that this is the case, I argue that the unpredictability of 
destabilized systems has consequences for how environmental resistances are to proceed.  Indeed, it 
indicates the importance of understanding a radical relational agency because, as I have already 
suggested, such an agency is generated because the outcome of action is never guaranteed.  
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CHAPTER FOUR
Food, Farming and Fossil Fuels: Globalized Complexity and Instability
 Following the development in the previous chapter, from FoucaultÕs notion of self-fashioning to 
a radical relational agency, this chapter proceeds from the acknowledgement that humans, nonhumans 
and environments are radically interconnected.  Indeed, one of the key insights of complexity theory 
that contributes to a radical relational agency is that complex systems are neither purely human nor 
purely ecological.  Rather, humans, nonhumans and environments are part of the same complex 
systems.  As David Salt and Brian Walker (2006) argue: ÒWe exist in linked social and ecological 
systems [É] the social-ecological system that we are all part of [is] one interlinked systemÓ (32).  
Thus, to reflect this interconnectivity, I use the borrowed terminology Òsocial-ecological systemÓ to 
denote the recognition that humans, nonhumans and environments cannot be conceived as existing 
within separate systems.  In the previous chapter, I argued that FoucaultÕs thought implies a more 
radical relational agency than he acknowledged.  By examining theorists influenced by FoucaultÕs 
recognition of an omnipresent power, I argued that a radical relational agency recognizes the diversity 
of different agents without effacing that diversity.  In this chapter, I expand on the notion of a radical 
relational agency by exploring the profound interconnectivity that is characteristic of globalized, 
complex social-ecological systems.
 The recognition that contemporary social-ecological systems are necessarily globalized is 
important for a number of reasons.  First, a recognition of globalization demonstrates a point of 
connection between FoucaultÕs notion of dispersed power relations and the assertion by complexity 
theory that all systems are interconnected.  This similarity may appear superficial, however it illustrates 
a radical relationality that extends all around the planet and, in doing so, indicates that contemporary 
systems are becoming increasingly complex and interconnected.  Second, because globalization 
emerges in part due to the governmentalizing and environmentalizing power relations that aim to 
generate efficient capitalist production, it indicates that contemporary biopolitical power relations have 
a destabilizing effect on complex social-ecological systems.  In this sense, complexity theory does not 
recognize that every relationship is a power relation, and so FoucaultÕs thought remains essential to the 
discussion of contemporary complex systems.  Finally, because globalization is characterized by an 
increasing complexity and interconnectedness, I will argue that it is likewise an increasingly 
destabilizing process.  Because complexity theory argues that destabilized systems are necessarily 
prone to unexpected shifts, the consequence of this instability is a greater likelihood that contemporary 
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complex systems could generate unforeseeable emergent phenomena.  Thus, throughout this chapter, a 
radical relational agency will be examined in the context of contemporary processes of globalization.
 As I argued in the previous chapter, the nonlinearity of FoucaultÕs notion of history and the 
nonlinear evolution of complex systems both suggest that change is unpredictable.  Furthermore, the 
possibility that power relations can always be overturned reveals that there is always an unpredictable 
element to relations of power.  In this sense, the increasing instability of contemporary globalized 
social-ecological systems is significant because it, in fact, suggests that unpredictability is becoming 
increasingly pronounced; as systems destabilize, they are more susceptible to unforeseen shifts.  In 
order to examine how the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of contemporary social-
ecological systems increases the possibility that an unpredictable shift will occur, I will use examples 
pertaining to food, farming and fossil fuels.  At the most intimate level, issues of food, farming and 
fossil fuels indicate the basic interconnectivity of humans, nonhumans and environments.  HumansÕ 
embeddedness with soil, industrial agriculture, petrochemical fertilizers and pesticides, farm labourers, 
oil rigs, nutrients and minerals, seasons, climates, rainfall, and all the other apparatuses of food, fuel 
and farming demonstrate the mundane ways in which humans, nonhumans and environments interact 
on a daily basis.  In part because these issues are mundane, they immediately and directly connect 
humans to the complex social-ecological systems in which we exist.  For example, eating food 
physically and materially demonstrates the interconnections between humans, nonhumans and 
environments; ingesting an item grown in the ground literally demonstrates an interdependence.  Thus, 
the increasing complexity of these global interconnections confirm that there would be profound 
implications were our contemporary social-ecological systems to become destabilized and shift into an 
alternate state. 
 I choose to examine issues concerning food, fuel and farming because their globalized ÐÐ and 
increasingly unstable ÐÐ characteristics are problems against which contemporary environmental 
resistances frequently protest.  Because a recognition that the world is finite is integral to the ecological 
thinking characteristic of contemporary environmentalism, many protests and actions are focussed on 
the unsustainability of globalized systems of food, fuel and farming.  Issues concerning the politics of 
consumption, industrial food production, use of petrochemical fertilizers and pesticides, the treatment 
of farm labourers, economic subsidies, genetic modification, food miles, chemical additives, 
packaging, and contamination all occur as the topics of environmental campaigns.  Indeed, the 
recognition that issues of food, farming and fossil fuels are integral to human well-being indicates that 
contemporary environmental resistances share some of the same understanding of vast 
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interconnectedness as does complexity theory.  In this sense, environmental resistances concerning 
food, fuel and farming serve as an appropriate example for the globalized social-ecological systems I 
will discuss.  However, some of the contemporary environmental actions against the perceived 
shortcomings of these globalized systems do not account for the extreme unpredictability and 
interconnectedness that complexity theory demonstrates.  By failing to recognize the unforeseen 
consequences of their desired ÔsustainableÕ practices of eating, agriculture and the production of energy, 
contemporary environmental action sometimes neglect one of the main competencies of a radical 
relational agency.  Thus, I will argue that the current environmental practices often do not recognize the 
unpredictability that is inherent to complex systems and the generation of radical relational agency.
 Unpredictability is important to a radical relational agency because, implicit within a 
recognition of unpredictability, is an understanding that the outcome to any action is never guaranteed.  
Indeed, as I have already argued, this lack of guarantees is precisely what generates a radical relational 
agency because it means that there is always something to do.  But, because the result of any action or 
resistance is unpredictable, a radical relational agency requires a different way of conceiving the means 
by which it is possible to effect change.  In a sense, the unpredictability of complex systems seems to 
negate the possibility of changing current systems in any particular way.  However, the notion of self-
organized emergences, as described by complexity theory, illustrates some of the possible ways in 
which collective phenomena can manifest themselves.  While Foucault was unable to explain the 
mechanism by which abrupt shifts can happen, complexity theory, on the other hand, explains how 
self-organized systems (such as complex systems) can develop emergent properties that are both 
collective and decentralized.  The notion of self-organization as a collective and decentralized process 
helps to develop a notion of radical relational agency because it emphasizes the interconnectedness of 
humans, nonhumans and environments without denying each their own ontological status.
 The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the interconnectedness, unpredictability and 
globalization of contemporary social-ecological systems.  Our contemporary social-ecological systems 
are inherently unstable due to their extreme complexity, their interconnectedness and the ways in which 
relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments span across the globe.  I argue that the 
instability of the current arrangements in our social-ecological systems means that, in part, 
environmental activists have correctly perceived the need to alter those current arrangements.  But, 
using food, farming and fossil fuels as examples of highly complex, interconnected and unstable 
arrangements, I will argue that some responses that contemporary environmental resistances have 
theorized actually exacerbate the problems that they have identified.  I will also point to the relations of 
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power that are immanent within these arrangements because complexity theory often omits power as a 
contributing factor to the complexity of globalized systems.  Therefore, the insights gathered from 
complexity theory do not completely replace the relationality implied by Foucault.  Rather, FoucaultÕs 
thought is still needed to remind us of the dangers inherent within relations of power.  Thus, in order to 
respond to the instability of globalized social-ecological systems and the dangers associated with 
increasing environmentalities, I will suggest that understanding a radical relational agency is necessary 
precisely because it is generated through the very interconnectedness, unpredictability and instability 
characteristic of contemporary globalized systems. 
Industrialized and Globalized Agriculture
 In order to examine how relations of power can reinforce the instability of contemporary social-
ecological systems, I have chosen to develop examples pertaining to food, farming and fossil fuels.  In 
particular, I argue that the power relations and systems of thought examined throughout the previous 
chapters have contributed to the contemporary rise of a globalized and industrialized agriculture.  I 
argue that an environmentalizing biopolitical management of productivity has reinforced the spread of 
globalizing power relations because it is symptomatic of the increasing attempt to make all participants 
throughout the globe (whether nonhuman or human) more economically useful.  More specifically, the 
spread of biopower encourages the spread of globalizing power relations because it produces all 
constituent elements within the system as economic resources to be used without consequence.  The 
importance of recognizing the ways in which biopolitical power relations reinforce globalizing 
processes is twofold: in the first instance, it demonstrates that complex systems are not purely 
ecological; in the second instance, it demonstrates a recognition central to complexity theory ÐÐ that 
highly complex and interconnected systems are susceptible to destabilizing fluctuations.  In the 
discussion that follows, I will argue that both finite ecological limits and the constraints imposed by 
power relations destabilize globalized social-ecological systems.
 After the Second World War, agriculture adopted industrial practices which had not previously 
been experienced.  This ÔGreen RevolutionÕ, as it is labelled, signifies the beginning of intensive inputs 
of mechanized labour and the use of petrochemical pesticides and fertilizers.  Prior to the Green 
Revolution, farming had yet to be mechanized.  After the Green Revolution, farming was practiced in a 
highly industrialized manner:
farm inputs such as labour, fertilizers, seeds, water, and others that were previously produced on 
the farm were replaced by inputs that had to be purchased off the farm.  Fossil-fuel-driven 
machines were manufactured, which replaced human labour and enabled larger tracts of land to 
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be farmed.  Commercial Ôhigh yieldÕ hybrid seeds were developed, along with the chemicals and 
pesticides that were a prerequisite in order for these seeds to produce any bud of food.  Such 
seeds also required huge amounts of water, and, [É], great feats of engineering enabled large 
dams to be built and rivers to be rerouted/diverted, allowing water to be delivered to formerly 
arid lands (Barker 2002: 251).
The Green Revolution demonstrates that the industrialization of farmlands occurred in much the same 
way as cities were industrialized a century and a half earlier during the Industrial Revolution.  Thus, I 
argue that industrialized agriculture, because it requires a high degree of chemical input, organization 
and distribution of resources, and globalized trade, demonstrates one manifestation of the increasing 
complexity of contemporary social-ecological systems.
 As well as the industrial agricultural inputs developed during the Green Revolution, 
contemporary globalized food production also relies on vast systems of transportation, trade and the 
existence of globalized economies.  In order to ship produce, grains and other edibles from one side of 
the world to another, globalized food production indicates a high degree of complexity, because such 
dispersed and profoundly interconnected relationships necessarily require a profound degree of global 
management and interaction.  Because of the complexity, interconnectedness and globalized nature of 
contemporary industrialized food production, agricultural relationships can now span thousands of 
kilometres.  Therefore, environmentalists point out that there is a disconnect between the excessive 
consumption of Western nations and the impact on ecosystems in the less developed Southern 
hemisphere.  Because globalization makes it possible to extend relationships across the globe; Òmost 
manufactured goods and agricultural products consumed in richer countries are produced in the South.  
Global corporations benefit from raw materials and cheap labour to be found thereÓ (Norberg-Hodge 
2008: 14).  Thus, the degradation of land in developing nations is ÐÐ because social-ecological 
relationships span the globe ÐÐ related to patterns of consumption in Westernized nations.  With the 
advent of globalized consumer capitalism and industrialization, the contemporary social-ecological 
systems on this planet have become progressively more intertwined.
 The vast interconnections and linkages required of globalized industrial agriculture ensure that 
changes made in one part of the planet will necessarily have an impact on elements of a system that 
could be separated by vast geographic differences.  It is for this reason that consumption patterns in 
industrialized nations can have adverse effects on environments and ecosystems on the other side of the 
planet.  Complexity theory elucidates this profound spatial and ecological interconnectivity by 
acknowledging that: ÒAll over the world there are countless examples of how economic globalization is 
worsening environmental destructionÓ (Capra 2002: 147).  In this sense, both complexity theory and 
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environmental resistances recognize that the increasing complexity and interconnectivity of 
contemporary social-ecological systems means that they are subject to destabilization.  Central to 
contemporary environmental action is criticism of industrial agricultural methods; from pesticide run-
off to seed ownership to farm animal wastes to rights of access to human survival, industrial agriculture 
serves as a rallying point.  As environmental resistances point out, the over consumption of food in the 
Western world has had direct consequences on agricultural systems on the other side of the globe.  
 Social-ecological systems are linked both globally and locally, and ÐÐ increasingly ÐÐ across 
vast geographies.  This interconnection of systems spans the largest to the smallest scales.  For 
example, Graham Harvey (2008) examines the complex social-ecological systems that entail 
relationships which interlink the most minute soil systems with international trade.  He illustrates a 
linkage of systems and scales between industrial agriculture, chemical fertilizers, consumer capitalism, 
the biological processes of decomposition and mineral profiles of soil.  Harvey points out that Òwhen 
you kick over a clod of earth, itÕs hard to grasp the complexity of itÓ, and so the amount of organisms, 
minerals and processes performed by soil can be hidden beneath the seeming simplicity of its existence 
under our feet (37).  Complex systems within dirt regulate its nutrient profile, its ability to produce 
nutritious food, its ability to hold water and its ability to resist soil erosion which means that any 
changes made within these interlinked systems can have effects on such abilities.  Moreover, the 
minerals and nutrients in our food have a direct link to the health of the soil in which it is grown.  In 
this sense, the complex systems within topsoil are linked to globalizing processes because, as 
industrialized farming methods increase and as trade continues between disparate geographies, the 
preference of Western palates will directly determine what is grown in the soil of far-flung trading 
partners, how it is grown and how much of it is grown.
 Through the interrelatedness of systems at different scales, soil affects ecosystems, human 
health, crop quantities, local and global economies, food preferences, and many other innumerable 
relationships.  Because of the intensive farming methods used by industrialized and globalized 
agriculture, soil has become increasingly unable to produce nutritious food.  If soil has been made 
unhealthy by mechanized farm labour and liberal use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, then there 
is an accompanying drop in the nutritional value of food that is harvested.  This relationship between 
human input and the soilÕs output is a consequence of the interconnections between complex systems at 
varying scales.  Harvey (2008) argues that Òthe farming methods of industrial countries seem designed 
to wreck this ordered complexityÓ (40).  The interconnectedness of social-ecological systems across 
different scales, from global economies to soil nutrient profiles, means that it is impossible to see 
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globalized industrial agriculture (or any other system) as entirely isolated.  Indeed, the outcome of this 
tight interconnection between systems has meant that; Òsoil degradation has already reduced global 
agricultural productivity by around 15 percent in the last fifty yearsÓ (Salt and Walker 2006: 2).  The 
increasingly complex and globalized relationships that characterize Modern industrial agriculture mean 
that the consequences of diminishing soil quality and food productivity will be felt at all scales and in 
all corners of the globe.  Indeed, the complex interconnections facilitated by globalization have the 
effect of ever-tightening the relationships between dispersed systems.
 Although a profound interconnectivity is characteristic of the worldÕs increasingly complex and 
globalized food and farming systems, this interconnectivity is often ignored or remains unrecognized in 
analyses of the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Salt and Walker (2006) 
point out that; Òoften people concentrate solely on the scale of direct interest to them (their farm, their 
company, their catchment, or their country), but the structure and the dynamics at that scale, and how 
the system can and will respond at that scale, strongly depends on the states and dynamics of the 
system at the scales above and belowÓ (Salt and Walker 2006: 90-91).  The repercussions of ignoring 
this interconnectivity ÐÐ this profoundly radical relationality ÐÐ that links all scales of social ecological 
systems are particularly enhanced by the processes of globalization.  Because globalization makes 
relationships and interconnections stretch across the globe, it becomes increasingly difficult to monitor 
the outcome of local actions.  It is for this reason that changes in soil quality or other social-ecological 
aspects essential to the worldÕs food production can go unnoticed; ÒUrbanization and many aspects of 
globalization that tighten intersystem linkages, hierarchies, interdependencies between local resource 
users and the wider society [É], tend to distance users from their dependence on life-support 
ecosystems, disconnect the production from consumption, and disconnect the production of knowledge 
from its applicationÓ (Yorque et al 2002: 432).  In other words, the increasing interconnections that are 
characteristic of globalizing processes, in fact, de-link humans from experiencing the direct 
consequences of their actions.  Because such consequences are experienced, not in their own localities, 
but on the other side of the globe.
 According to complexity theory, complex social-ecological systems are always changing and 
adapting in response to feedback that is either positive or negative ÐÐ with the difference between the 
two determining the stability of a system.  Whereas negative feedback is associated with system 
stability, positive feedback can instigate massive shifts in complex systems.  Negative feedback is 
regulating and equalizing while positive feedback amplifies the conditions of a system.  To understand 
this in more concrete terms, one example that is often given of negative feedback is that of thermostatic 
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controls; a thermostat regulates a room or a buildingÕs temperature and keeps it within a relatively 
comfortable state.  To imagine a positive feedback mechanism used in place of a thermostat, when 
evaluating the temperature of a room and noticing a drop in temperature Òit would start pumping hotter 
air, causing the room to grow even warmer, causing the device to pump hotter air.  Next thing you 
know the goldfish bowl is boilingÓ (Johnson 2001: 138).  What happens through positive feedback 
loops is that the magnification of each response actually creates an increasingly greater response.  In 
terms of globalized agricultural systems, positive feedback would entail the accumulation of 
characteristics that further increase global links across various social-ecological systems.  Such 
examples might include the outsourcing of labour or the use of migrant labourers, development of 
transportation methods that increase shipping distances, loosening of trade restrictions, or anything else 
that generates the ability to establish complex interlinkages between disparate locales.  This notion of 
positive feedback is important because it highlights the intuition that globalizing practices reinforce the 
destabilization of contemporary social-ecological systems.
 Globalization amplifies and exacerbates its own effects by making it impossible to recognize the 
consequences of an action whose outcomes are felt on the other side of the globe.  This increased 
interconnectivity, and the simultaneous dispersal of those interconnections, means that it is often 
difficult for participants within complex social-ecological systems to modify their actions based on the 
feedback that they witness; Òtightening of processes of globalization weakens the tightening of societal 
feedback loops to ecosystem dynamics essential for sustaining and building adaptive capacity and for 
securing the flow of critical ecosystem servicesÓ (Yorque et al 2002: 432).  Processes of globalization 
make it hard for humans to measure the impacts that our interconnections with nonhumans and 
environments might have on local and global ecosystems.  The recognition that complex social-
ecological systems are susceptible to the amplifying effects of positive feedback and the correlative 
recognition that our ability to identify that feedback is diminishing, is an important recognition because 
it highlights the destabilizing effects of globalizing processes.  Thus, contemporary environmental 
resistances and complexity theory both similarly argue that the processes of globalization can have 
deleterious consequences for the worldÕs ecosystems.  And, more importantly, they both argue that 
those consequences are inherently destabilizing.
 Because contemporary globalizing processes are continually reinforcing the destabilization of 
planetary ecosystems, it means that there is an increasing possibility that contemporary social-
ecological systems could shift unpredictably.  Indeed, such an argument leads to the conclusion that 
Òunlimited expansions on a finite planet can only lead to catastropheÓ (Capra 2002: 146).  Both 
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complexity theory and environmentalism argue that there are ecological limits which, once they are 
crossed, can destabilize biological ecosystem functions around the world to the point that it will be 
impossible to re-stabilize them.  This recognition is significant because it demonstrates that the 
increased complexity and interconnectivity of contemporary globalized systems are precisely those 
processes that contribute to its instability.  However, this recognition of profound interconnectivity 
does not explicitly acknowledge that these social-ecological relationships are necessarily power 
relations.  As I argued at the beginning of this section, the very process of globalization is determined 
by a particular series of power relations that produce humans, nonhumans and environments as 
efficient contributors to the globalizing spread of capitalism.  Indeed, although it is unacknowledged, 
the very process of unlimited expansion belies a recognition that biopolitical relations of power 
underlie globalizing impulses.  In the following section I will examine in greater detail how relations of 
power contribute to, and reinforce, the geographically dispersed interconnections of contemporary 
globalized systems.
Complex Social-Ecological Relations are Power Relations
 In the previous chapters, I argued that, although Foucault developed a notion of relational 
power, he did not acknowledge the power relations that occur between humans, nonhumans and 
environments, nor did he acknowledge nonhumans as agents.  Therefore, I argued that to remedy this 
oversight it was necessary to incorporate more explicit theorizations of ecological interconnectedness 
with the implied radicalness of FoucaultÕs notion of power relations.  Thus, complexity theory provides 
the theoretical legitimation for the recognition that humans exist within ecological limits.  However, 
complexity theory suffers from its own omissions.  Although complexity theory acknowledges that 
systems are both social and ecological, it does not explicitly recognize that these systems are not only 
constrained by ecological limits, but by the limits of power relations as well.  By accepting that 
processes of globalization result in the increased complexity and interconnection of our current social-
ecological systems, complexity theory implies that systems are circumscribed by power relations 
without overtly acknowledging it.  As I argued in the previous chapter, a radical relational agency 
explicitly acknowledges that actions are always constrained by limits imposed by both power relations 
and ecological constraints.
 It is possible to argue that complex systems are affected by power relations simply by asserting 
FoucaultÕs argument that power is a relation.  If power is a relation, and complex systems are made up 
of a multiplicity of relationships, then it follows that these relationships are not devoid of power.  As 
Foucault argued, power relations are present within every relationship.  But, one of FoucaultÕs 
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arguments was that contemporary power relations are, in fact, characterized by their dispersal.  In this 
sense, the argument that contemporary social-ecological systems are embedded within relations of 
power is less simplistic than the mere assertion of powerÕs omnipresence.  Rather, my argument is, 
precisely, that power relations have reinforced the spread of complexity and interconnectivity 
characteristic of contemporary globalized systems.  As I argued in the first chapter, Modern scientific 
investigations constituted environments, landscapes and other spaces as infinitely usable resources; 
such a construction of environments as resources underscores the legitimation for a continual increase 
in extracting those ÔresourcesÕ.  In addition to the Modern constitution of Nature as a passive resource, 
a more recent environmentalization of knowledge has encouraged practices of globalization because it 
aims to make all humans, nonhumans and environments increasingly economically productive.  As 
resources at home are depleted, it is necessary to become more efficient at producing commodities 
from those resources and, often, it is necessary to search abroad for replacements.  In this sense, 
environmentalized production is spread throughout the globe. 
 The processes of globalization also highlight the uneven ways in which power relations occur in 
a global context.  In the first two chapters, I examined FoucaultÕs description of how 
governmentalizing and disciplining power relations produce individuals in hierarchical relation to each 
other.  In this sense, such a hierarchical production is necessarily played out across global relations of 
power.  For example, consider the different ways in which different locales respond to the globalization 
of food supplies; while in Western nations the impact of food and farming on human health is a 
concern, in those nations that feel the brunt of environmental degradation, food availability and 
survival are very real concerns.  Thus, ÒEl Salvador faces the highest level of environmental 
degradation in the Americas.  Of the natural vegetation [É], 80 percent has been eliminatedÓ and the 
costs of this loss are not merely environmental, for the human consequences are great; Òagricultural 
production has been halved in the last twenty five years, and one-fifth of the population does not have 
enough foodÓ (Lorentzen 1995: 57).  People who live in such places are forced to become 
environmentally aware in ways that we, in the Western world, are not.  Rather than concerning 
themselves with the intricacies of organic food regulation or the miles travelled by their dinner, they 
face the environmental consequences of our actions in the West.  Thus, globalization is an effect of the 
increasing environmentalization of power relations as Western systems of thought are spread 
throughout the globe and which, necessarily, reinforce hierarchical orderings because such orderings 
are geo-politically useful to manage the economic productivity of the entire planet.
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 The argument that biopolitical production is extended throughout all corners of the globe, is 
exactly a description of how globalization is increasingly environmentalizing.  Because 
environmentalizing biopolitical power relations serve not only to manage human identities, actions, 
bodies and materialities, but those of nonhumans and environments as well, such processes are able to 
bring the whole planet under economic production.  Globalization can be interpreted as an 
environmentalizing practice because, as both complexity theory and environmental resistances argue, 
globalization intensifies the extraction of resources, the movement of people and other biological 
organisms across vast geographic distances.  Furthermore, globalization can be read as an outcome of 
biopolitical environmentalities because the increased interconnectivity serves to reinforce the aims of 
governmentality to manage all relations of power.  An environmentalization will always tend towards 
globalization because it is the precise aim of such practices to manage all forms of life and productive 
capacities.  Thus, biopolitical power relations have reinforced the increased complexity and 
interconnectivity of contemporary social-ecological systems.  Biopolitical and environmentalizing 
power relations are so effective because they aim to manage the identities, relationships and material 
realities of all humans, nonhumans and environments.
 That an increasing environmentalization of power relations contributes to the processes of 
globalization is not something that either environmentalism or complexity theory would seem to 
disagree with.  However, within some descriptions of complex systems, there still remains a latent 
assumption that ecological relations are not power relations.  The reason that explicit analyses 
describing the effects of power on complex social-ecological systems might be absent is, perhaps, an 
effect of the Modern, juridical definitions of power that FoucaultÕs relational power refutes.  Consider, 
for example Fritjof CapraÕs (2002) argument that power is not a part of ecosystems:
Although it may seem that in an ecosystem some species are more powerful than others, the 
concept of power is not appropriate, because nonhuman species (with the exception of some 
primates) do not force individuals to act in accordance with preconceived goals.  There is 
dominance, but it is always acted out within a larger context of cooperation, even in predator-
prey relationships.  The manifold species in an ecosystem do not form hierarchies, but exist in 
networks within networks.  [É].  In an ecosystem, no being is excluded from the network (152).
According to Capra, power does not affect ecosystems because nonhumans do not dominate others in 
the ways that humans do.  However, this interpretation of power is precisely what a Foucauldian 
interpretation of power relations counters.  As we have discovered throughout the previous chapters, a 
relational power is always capable of being overturned and is, in fact, dispersed throughout every 
relationship ÐÐ it creates Ònetworks within networksÓ.  
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 CapraÕs claim that human societies are not ÔnetworkedÕ, whereas ecosystems are, ignores the 
relationality of power.  Indeed, the assumption that power is ÔdominatingÕ or oppressive is countered by 
FoucaultÕs description of power as productive.  As I have argued throughout this section, ecological 
relations are embedded within power relations precisely because an environmentalizing biopolitical 
power relation produces the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments in particular 
ways.  This means that contemporary power relations are not to be conceived as static ÐÐ as such a 
notion of oppressive power suggests ÐÐbut are successful at managing contemporary globalized 
structures because they are dynamic and dispersed throughout every relationship.  Capra (2002) 
himself does tacitly acknowledge the dispersal of contemporary power relations: ÒThe new economy 
consists of a global metanetwork of complex technological and human interactions, involving multiple 
feedback loopsÓ (140).  In this description Capra implicitly recognizes a more relational notion of 
power without explicitly acknowledging it.  He acknowledges the existence of an economy that 
stretches throughout the globe and that, at the same time, attempts to manage the relationships between 
humans and technologies dispersed around the planet.  However, he does not explicitly include other 
nonhumans, environments or ecosystems under the purview of these relationships.  Because he does 
not acknowledge that power is a productive, dynamic and variable relationship, he argues that such a 
term is not appropriate to nonhuman ecosystems.  In this sense, the assumption that power is merely a 
human characteristic reinstates a distinction between human relations of power and nonhuman 
ecological relations.
 To make a distinction between human power relations and nonhuman ecological relations is to 
deny the implications of both complexity theory and a Foucauldian notion of power relations.  As I 
have already argued, implied within FoucaultÕs notion of power relations is an acknowledgement that 
such relations include humans, nonhumans and environments.  If all relations are relations of power, 
then those including nonhumans and environments are likewise power relations.  Thus, to exclude 
nonhumans and environments from those relationships is to tacitly reinstate a distinction between what 
is human and what is not.  Indeed, complexity theory does acknowledge that humans, nonhumans and 
environments are radically interconnected by diverse relationships.  The argument that complex 
systems are social and ecological suggests that to abstract certain kinds of relationships from within 
these interconnected systems is not consistent with the recognition that such systems are complex, 
diverse and interconnected.  The argument that relations which include nonhumans are not relations of 
power is, as I have already argued, to reinstate a division between human (power) relations and 
nonhuman (ecological) relations.  Instead, it would be beneficial to reframe these relations as precisely 
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relations that are always both ecological and power relations.  In this sense, a notion of dispersed eco/
power relations more accurately reflects the embeddedness and interconnectedness of complex social-
ecological systems.
 Describing the embeddedness of environmental resistances within globalizing and 
environmentalizing power relations does not, however, deny the possibility of changing those relations.  
Indeed, the embeddedness of social-ecological systems within eco/power relations is consistent with 
FoucaultÕs argument that power relations can always be overturned.  As I have already argued, the 
possibility that power relations can be overturned is essential to an understanding of a radical relational 
agency because such changeability is precisely how a radical relational agency is generated.  
Acknowledging that humans, nonhumans and environments are inextricably interconnected and, 
therefore, all embedded within ecological and power relations underscores a definition of radical 
relational agency.  A radical relational agency is contingent upon both the diversity of participants 
within power relations and the inevitability that those diverse relations of power are always capable of 
being overturned.  Without a notion of power, a notion of radical relational agency is likewise 
impossible.  As I have already argued, agency exists because power relations are omnipresent; without 
acknowledging the omnipresence of power relations, complexity theory not only omits the ways in 
which contemporary power relations reinforce the interconnections of globalized systems, but similarly 
omits the potential for theorizing agency.
 Once it is acknowledged that the myriad relations within complex social-ecological systems are 
always eco/power relations, the continued functioning of social-ecological systems is reframed as 
being dependent on the interactions between diverse agents.  In this sense, the interactions and 
relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments become important.  In this sense as well, 
there is an argument to be made that contemporary environmentalizing eco/power relations between 
humans, nonhumans and environments have increased the instability of globalized systems.  As Capra 
(2002) argues: ÒThe information circuits of the global economy operate at such a speed and use such a 
multitude of sources that they constantly react to a flurry of information, and thus the system as a 
whole is spinning out of controlÓ (140).  The contribution that an environmentalizing eco/power 
relation makes to the instability of contemporary globalized social-ecological systems is precisely the 
increasing rate at which it links diverse social-ecological systems throughout the planet.  The fact that 
ecological and power relations cannot be de-linked is the precondition for global destabilization.  
Globalization is destabilizing because environmentalizing eco/power relations are actually unable to 
manage the profound complexity and interconnectivity that it has generated.  In the following section I 
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will examine in greater detail the increasing instability, and hence unpredictability, of complex social-
ecological systems.
The Unpredictability of Complex Social-Ecological Systems
 Throughout this thesis, I have argued that a recognition of unpredictability is implicit within 
FoucaultÕs thought.  In the first chapter, I described how Foucault questioned the linearity of historical 
development by arguing that different epistemes move jerkily, and oftentimes randomly, from one to 
the next.  Epistemic shifts emerge as an unpredictable outcome of technological innovations or 
discursive changes or spatial rearrangements or any number of unforeseeable historical circumstances.  
Furthermore, FoucaultÕs argument that relations of power are always capable of being overturned ÐÐ 
that it is possible to act in other ways ÐÐ implies that power relations are inherently unpredictable.  
Indeed, as I have already argued, it is the dynamism and flexibility of contemporary eco/power 
relations that have contributed to the increasing unpredictability of social-ecological systems.  
Likewise, complexity theory argues that history is nonlinear, non-teleological and, frequently, 
unpredictable.  A notable characteristic and consequence of the nonlinearity of complex systems, is that 
they are more susceptible to fluctuations; Òcomplex systems (as opposed to the many linear non-
complex systems) are potentially unstable, nothing is fixedÓ (Urry 2005a: 240).  The importance of this 
recognition is that it links complexity theory to FoucaultÕs thought and it contributes to an 
understanding of how change is possible.  While Foucault did not explain the mechanisms by which 
historical shifts can emerge, complexity theory serves to illustrate some of the circumstances that give 
rise to unpredictability.
 One means by which complex systems can generate unpredictable events I have already briefly 
addressed.  The notion of positive feedback is one example of how complexity theory explains the 
means by which complex systems become more unpredictable.  As I discussed earlier in this chapter, 
positive feedback is feedback that continues to accumulate, reinforcing a pattern of behaviour once it 
has already begun.  The example of a ÔthermostatÕ using positive feedback would, instead of keeping 
the room a steady temperature, continue to make it hotter and hotter; positive feedback can lead to 
destabilization.  In this sense, positive feedback contributes to unpredictable nonlinear outcomes; 
ÒNonlinear behaviour is often referred to as positive feedback in which internal or external changes to a 
system produce amplifying effects.  In short, nonlinear means that small changes in system variables 
can have disproportionate outcomesÓ (Eve et al. cited in Jenks and Smith 2006: 4-5 emphasis mine).  
The notion of positive feedback helps to explain the unpredictability of complex systems, and the 
potential for them to shift unexpectedly, because it describes how individual behavioural patterns can 
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accumulate and eventually cause a system to shift unexpectedly.  Thus, the amplifying effects of 
positive feedback mechanisms mean that simple changes within complex systems can lead to 
unpredictable and potentially vast outcomes.
 Positive feedback loops pose a challenge to the stability of complex systems and to theorists 
who aim to understand them.  While negative feedback is statistically modelled and rather predictable, 
it is often impossible to predict the accumulative patterns of positive feedback.  As Steven Johnson 
(2001) points out, Òfeedback loops of urban life created the great bulk of the worldÕs most dazzling and 
revered neighbourhoods ÐÐ but they also have a hand in the self-perpetuating cycles of inner-city 
miseryÓ (137).  That positive feedback can be both beneficial and detrimental is consistent with the fact 
it is are unpredictable.  Thus, any reinforcing mechanism that occurs through positive feedback can 
never guarantee a specific result.  This unpredictability, as I have already argued, is similar to 
FoucaultÕs thought because it describes nonlinear systems and recognizes that nothing is ever 
guaranteed.  Foucault insisted that the omnipresence of power relations entails that there are constant 
risks because relations of power can always be overturned.  Complexity theory corroborates this 
interpretation because it recognizes that there are risks precisely because it is impossible to predict the 
outcome of any action; the accumulative reinforcements of positive feedback never guarantee a 
beneficial outcome.  
 The similarities between complexity theory and FoucaultÕs thought in terms of nonlinearity, 
unpredictability and the fact that nothing is ever guaranteed, serve to underscore my argument that 
relations of both ecology and power are inherent to complex social-ecological systems.  For instance, 
consider these examples of unpredictable behaviour; Òinteractions reinforce one another and result in 
behaviour that is very different from the norm.  The complex phenomena that arise in physical systems 
(like earthquakes, floods, and fires) and social ones (like stock market crashes, riots, and traffic jams) 
are decidedly not ÔnormalÕÓ (Miller and Page 2007: 51).  Interactions that reinforce such complex 
phenomena will necessarily include relations of power and ecological relations.  Consider the examples 
of riots, stock market crashes and traffic jams: they are unpredictable social events, but they could also 
be precipitated by ecological relations (icy roads causing an accident and a traffic jam) or reinforced by 
ecological relations (drought causing crop failure and intensifying drops in the stock market).  
Likewise power relations can also reinforce earthquakes, floods and fires because they may be directly 
caused by ÔsocialÕ behaviour (a fire that is purposefully lit or a flooded river that has been purposefully 
damned) or they may be reinforced by, for example, the processes of globalization (namely 
anthropogenic climate change contributing to the conditions necessary for these ÔphysicalÕ 
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phenomena).  In this sense, both ecological relations and relations of power can reinforce positive 
feedback loops.
 The instability that characterizes complex, global and industrialized systems means that they are 
more inclined to shift unpredictably.  Furthermore, the increasing interconnectivity of globalized 
complex social-ecological systems across different scales means that any change in any of the 
interconnected systems could precipitate unforeseen reactions.  Thus, I have argued that 
environmentalizing and biopolitical eco/power relations contribute to the instabilities of contemporary 
social-ecological systems because they function to legitimize particular relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments.  Because no relation of power is ever guaranteed to remain stable, it 
prefigures a recognition that all relationships are, to some extent, unpredictable.  Indeed, because 
complex systems are inevitably made up of intersecting relations of power at different scales, such 
relationships are inevitably unpredictable.  Indeed, as I have argued throughout this chapter, the 
increasing spread of Western environmentalizing and biopolitical eco/power relations serves to 
reinforce the unpredictability of globalized social-ecological systems that ÐÐ because eco/power 
relations can extend across the globe ÐÐ are unable to respond quickly to feedback loops or 
fluctuations.  
 Destabilized systems are labelled by complexity theory as far-from-equilibrium.  A far-from-
equilibrium system, precisely because it is not at equilibrium, is characterized by an inability to 
withstand the unexpected.  In other words, a far-from-equilibrium system is unstable because, were 
something unexpected to occur, it could respond drastically and unpredictably to such an unforeseen 
circumstance.  Moreover, such a circumstance might push an unstable system into an alternate stable 
state.  Alvin Toffler (1985) points out that Òaccording to the theory of changeÓ that Prigogine and 
Stengers (1985) describe, Òwhen fluctuations force an existing system into a far-from-equilibrium 
condition and threaten its structure, it approaches a critical moment or bifurcation pointÓ (xxiii).  A far-
from-equilibrium system is therefore threatened by continued instability and potential fluctuations.  A 
recognition that there is a critical moment, or bifurcation point, that can occur within complex social-
ecological systems is crucial to an understanding of how complex systems shift because such a moment 
is the moment in which a complex system shifts its trajectory to a different path.  The bifurcation point 
within complex systems represents the moment in which a system changes and transforms itself.  
Indeed, these bifurcation points are more likely to appear when a system is far-from-equilibrium.  The 
recognition that destabilized systems are more vulnerable to unexpected shifts is important because it 
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suggests that contemporary social-ecological systems could, were certain conditions to occur, shift into 
an unpredictable and, altogether different, state.
 The recognition that instability can give rise to alternate states within a system is also important 
because it underscores the possibility that sometimes one individual act or event can unpredictably 
precipitate such a shift.  The opportunity for an individual element to play an unpredictable, yet 
determining, role in the shift of a complex system occurs because; Òwhen a system switches from one 
stable state to another [É], minor fluctuations may play a crucial role in deciding the 
outcomeÓ (DeLanda 1997: 14).  While the notion of positive feedback describes how accumulative 
actions can add up to a new behavioural pattern that causes a system to shift, it is also possible that a 
shift into an alternate state could be triggered by one random action.  The possibility that individual 
elements within complex systems can play an inordinately large role in precipitating a shift is 
significant because it underscores the unpredictability of such shifts.  If one event were to trigger a shift 
to an alternate stable state, it would, precisely be an unpredictable one.  Prigogine and Stengers (1985) 
argue that Òthe amplification of a microscopic fluctuation occurring at the Ôright momentÕ resulted in 
favouring one reaction path over a number of equally possible paths.  Under certain circumstances, 
therefore, the role played by individual behaviour can be decisiveÓ (176).  The reason that it is possible 
for one individual or event to precipitate an unpredictable shift is that destabilized systems can be 
pushed unexpectedly and unpredictably into a new state.  Thus, it is exactly when systems are 
destabilized that the inordinate effects of one particular action are able to precipitate a shift into an 
alternate state.
 As environmentalists argue, contemporary globalized systems are at increasing risk of being 
pushed into an alternate stable state.  In terms of globalized food production systems, the increasing 
complexity destabilizes our ability to grow food.  Consider this example:
In our drive for efficiency, humans are constantly developing domestic livestock breeds and 
food crops that maximize production of food (and commercial return).  And, as we come up 
with bigger, faster-growing, easier-to-control species, we concentrate our efforts on just these 
breeds while allowing less efficient models to die out.  [É].  But while these fine-tuned, high-
tech breeds produce a lot, they also usually require intensive management and expensive inputs, 
like high protein feed, medication, and climate-controlled housing.  As these high-tech breeds 
displace the indigenous local breeds that have sustained agriculture for thousands of years, we 
lose our pool of species and genes that provide us with future options to make challenging 
circumstances.  WeÕre literally putting all our eggs in one basket ÐÐ becoming totally dependent 
on a very narrow genetic base (Salt and Walker 2006: 142-143).
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This example illustrates a key point about increasingly complex and interconnected systems; they are 
victims of their own efficiency.  The optimization characteristic of contemporary globalized economies 
and governmentalizing power relations exposes this tendency to Ôput all our eggs in one basketÕ which, 
necessarily, exposes such systems to the effects of destabilization.  By optimizing only particular 
aspects of food production, there is an increased possibility that any intervention within global systems 
of food production could have a disproportionate effect.
 If environmental resistances are aiming to mitigate the potential for contemporary social-
ecological systems to shift into an alternate stable state, what should their actions be?  Oftentimes, 
environmentalists seem to favour the very optimization and efficiency that has contributed to an over-
reliance on only a few particular resources.  Indeed, such resistances that aim to reduce carbon 
emissions by, for example, developing more efficient ways to burn fossil fuels instead contribute to the 
same processes of development that made globalization possible.  As I have already argued in previous 
chapters, such resistances also contribute to an environmentalizing biopower by making each 
constituent within social-ecological relations, whether human, nonhuman or environmental, more 
efficient at being economically productive.  In the following section, I will examine how contemporary 
environmental resistances contribute to the instability of contemporary globalized systems.  Such 
environmentalists sometimes do not acknowledge that they are embedded within relations of power, 
nor do they recognize the unpredictability and heterogeneity of consequences characteristic of vastly 
complex social-ecological systems.  In this sense, following from the discussion in this section, I will 
also argue that the outcome of any environmental intervention is often unpredictable.
Fossil Fuels, and Growing the Alternatives: Destabilizing Resistances
 For many environmentalists, the biggest indication that relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments are dysfunctional, is human use of fossil fuels.  Global use of fossil fuels 
has perpetrated destruction on the environment by releasing greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and 
contributing to global climate change.  In relation to agriculture and contemporary globalized food 
systems, I have already mentioned that transportation of food across large geographic distances can 
produce emissions, that the industrialization of agriculture has led to more intensive use of arable land, 
and that the Green Revolution led to the prolific use of fossil fuel based fertilizers, pesticides and 
herbicides.  Put simply, the use of fossil fuels has allowed the world the unprecedented ability to grow 
a large amount of food cheaply.  However, the complexity and highly regulated interconnectivity that 
characterizes contemporary industrialized and globalized agriculture ÐÐ because it is so dependent 
upon fossil fuel inputs ÐÐ is therefore destabilized and, hence, is susceptible to any event or 
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circumstance that affects fossil fuels.  The Green Revolution Òincreased the energy flow to agriculture 
by an average of 50 times its traditional energy input. [É].  In a very real sense, we are eating fossil 
fuelsÓ (Pfeiffer 2006: 7).  Fossil fuels have become so entangled within the complex systems that 
supply our foods, that there is no distinction between fossil fuels and the food that we eat. 
 According to contemporary environmental resistances, our reliance on fossil fuels to produce 
our food is both unsustainable, because it contributes to carbon emissions, and highly susceptible to 
destabilization.  In addition to arguments against the unsustainable use of fossil fuels, 
environmentalists and other activists suggest that eventually ÐÐ perhaps sooner rather than later ÐÐ non-
renewable fossil fuels are going to be extinguished.  Proponents of ÔPeak OilÕ argue that the 
unsustainable use of fossil fuels is rapidly depleting any remaining available resources and that the 
eventual inability to access fossil fuels (because of technological or financial limitations) will have 
grave consequences for industrial agriculture.  In short, this argument recognizes that the 
interconnectivity, globalization and complexity engendered by our use of fossil fuels has made 
planetary systems increasingly unstable and vulnerable to unpredictable shifts.  The combination of 
degrading the planetÕs climate and ecosystems, and the eventual inability to access fossil fuels, has 
meant a continued search for sustainable alternatives.  One alternative that has been developed to 
replace the use of fossil fuels are the so-called biofuels.  Biofuels, as opposed to fossil fuels, are made 
using renewable resources such as corn, soy, palm oil, sugars, algae, or other plants.  Because they are 
grown in soil, rather than extracted from the earth, biofuel advocates claim that these fuels allow 
industrial processes to continue without the deleterious effects of greenhouse gases.  However, because 
contemporary social-ecological systems are so complex and interconnected, such an intervention could 
have unforeseen consequences.  Indeed, environmentalists are now suggesting that switching to 
biofuels could have equally disastrous results.
 Biofuels, because they are derived from plant matter, necessarily require arable land on which to 
grow; any land that is used to grow biofuels is land that is not being used to grow edible crops.  The 
consequences of this potential change in land use would be to leave less space available for meeting 
human calorie requirements.  If biofuels were ever to replace any significant amount of fossil fuels, 
they would inevitably take over land that was once used to grow food.  The decrease in food production 
due to use of land by biofuel crops not only decreases food supplies, but increases the cost of those 
foods that are still available; Òstaple foods like bread become more expensive and less grain is available 
for export and as food aidÓ (Maynard 2007: 32).  The inevitable consequences of requiring limited 
arable land to produce both food and fuel highlights the flaws in approaching biofuels as if they 
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represented a simple equivalence to fossil fuels.  Substituting declining fossil fuels for plant-based 
biofuels is not a simple equivalence because both fuels are highly integrated within contemporary 
social-ecological systems, but in different ways.  By dismissing the complexity and profound 
interconnectedness of the worldÕs fuel supplies, the impact that biofuels might have in generating 
possible positive feedback loops are overlooked.  Such positive feedback could occur given the 
complex interlinkages between agriculture, fossil fuels and globalizing power relations.  
 Studies that look at the energy inputs and outputs of biofuels from a standpoint that analyses 
every step along the way, from a plantÕs seeds to manufacturing to transporting the processed fuels, 
Òshow that while it takes 6,597 kilocalories of nonrenewable energy to produce a litre of ethanol from 
corn, that same litre contains only 5,130 kilocalories of energy ÐÐ a 22 per cent lossÓ (Anslow 2007: 
34).  Because biofuels are a product of industrial agriculture, their production requires fossil fuel inputs 
to irrigate land, fertilize the soil, run the factories that produce them and distribute them.  Taking into 
account all of these fossil fuel inputs, a net loss of energy is observed.  Biofuels take more energy to 
produce than they can provide for industrial and personal use, which demonstrates the impossibility of 
describing different fuels as simple equivalents.  Since the inception of fossil fuel use that precipitated 
the Industrial Revolution, they have been the nucleus of the world economy and a globalizing force.  If 
fossil fuels ran out, and no viable alternative were found to replace them, such an event would 
inevitably destabilize the vast complex systems that have developed since the Industrial Revolution.  
The ramifications would be inconceivably far-reaching because such an event involves removing, or 
altering, the inputs on which contemporary, globalized food systems rely.  Without taking into account 
the complexities and interconnections involving industrial fuels, it is impossible to understand the 
possible impact that a transition from fossil fuel to alternative fuels could have on human food and 
agricultural systems.  Therefore, environmental actions that aim for optimization or efficient use of 
available resources often reinforce the destabilizing effects that they intend to mitigate.
 A simple approach to sustainability that involves substituting one fuel for another without 
sufficiently examining all systems involved, exposes the necessity of recognizing that contemporary 
social-ecological systems are characterized by profound complexity and interconnectivity.  Making 
agricultural, food and manufacturing systems more efficient and sustainable could thus have the 
adverse and unforeseen effect of destabilizing our systems even further.  Creating efficiency by using 
resources more effectively can actually diminish a systemÕs ability to respond to unpredictable 
fluctuations.  Salt and Walker (2006) argue this point emphatically:
Picard 117
The systems in which we live are always shifting, always changing [É].  When we aim to 
increase the efficiency of returns from some part of the system by trying to tightly control it, we 
usually do so at the cost of the systemÕs resilience.  Other parts of the system begin to change in 
response to this new state of affairs ÐÐ a part of the system, now constant, that used to vary in 
concert with others.  A system with little resilience is vulnerable to being shifted over a 
threshold into a new regime of function and structure.  And, [É], this new regime is frequently 
one that doesnÕt provide us with the goods and services we want (141).
In the example given of our reliance on fossil fuels and an attempt to replace those fossil fuels with 
biofuels, Salt and WalkerÕs argument is borne out.  As globalized social-ecological systems adapt to the 
use of biofuels, a whole series of other feedback loops are generated including the lack of arable land 
and the energy inputs used to produce the biofuels themselves.  Moreover, it underscores the fact that 
an over-reliance on a finite resource makes increasingly complex and interconnected globalized 
systems more susceptible to unpredictable shifts.
 The example of fossil fuels and their potential replacement with biofuels illustrates not only the 
unpredictability that is characteristic of nonlinear destabilized systems such as ours, it also exposes the 
inability of contemporary environmental resistances to account for such unpredictability.  A seemingly 
straightforward substitution of biofuels for fossil fuels ignores the complexity and interconnectedness 
of contemporary systems.  As such an example elucidates, the search for sustainability, efficiency and 
increased optimization within complex systems can have the effect of destabilizing those systems 
further.  By concentrating on only one particular aspect of our contemporary systems, actions that 
improve efficiency make our systems less able to respond to fluctuations.  Moreover, if a global switch 
to biofuels were initiated, the complexity and interconnectivity of globalized systems would necessitate 
a high level of environmentalizing regulations in order to enforce it.  Thus, in this sense, some 
contemporary environmental actions not only destabilize social-ecological systems, but they would 
also reinforce the very environmentalizing relations of eco/power that established such unsustainable 
practices.  Thus, the optimizations characteristic of certain contemporary environmental interventions 
actually highlights the contributions of environmentalism to globalizing processes.   
 The recognition that environmental resistances can contribute to the destabilization of 
contemporary social-ecological systems means that such actions, which do not account for the 
complexity, heterogeneity and interconnectivity characteristic of those systems, require rethinking.  
The environmental interventions that I have just described that simply substitute one type of fuel for 
another do not acknowledge the unpredictability and nonlinearity that is a feature of a radical relational 
agency.  Because causation and change within complex systems are decidedly nonlinear, it is not 
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possible to predict with certainty the outcome of any one intervention.  Indeed, to simply replace one 
fuel with another and expect linear results is increasingly difficult the more complex and 
interconnected that contemporary globalized systems become.  As I have already argued in various 
ways throughout this thesis, the result of any action is never guaranteed.  Rather, as both Foucault and 
complexity theory stress, unpredictability is a feature of complex systems and a precondition for any 
radical relational agency.  Given this unpredictability, there remains the question of what it is that 
environmental resistances can do in response to globalized instability.  In this sense, I argue that 
recognizing the existence of a radical relational agency within complex systems allows environmental 
actions to be rethought with an explicit acknowledgement of unpredictability, complexity and 
interconnectivity.  Because these qualities are the same qualities that generate a radical relational 
agency, throughout the remainder of this thesis I will argue that such a notion of agency is uniquely 
positioned to generate adequate responses within increasingly destabilized planetary systems.
 Throughout the remainder of this chapter I will examine how a radical relational agency exists 
as a dispersed and collective aspect of complex social-ecological systems.  In this sense, a radical 
relational agency can be applied not only to individual participants within power relations, but to entire 
systems as well.  By describing in specific detail how change happens within complex systems, 
complexity theory provides an explanation of how a radical relational agency can generate collective 
results.  Complexity theory describes the radical relationality of how individual components within 
complex systems ÐÐ humans, nonhumans and environments ÐÐ whose behaviour might accumulate and 
collectively cause a change within any given complex system.  According to complexity theory, shifts 
in complex systems occur when individual behaviour accumulates and generates collective results.  
Power generates a relational agency because it is relational and reversible; complexity theory helps to 
expand this argument by describing how many diverse and heterogeneous constituents within a system 
generate a kind of accumulative and collective radical relational agency.
Dispersed and Collective Properties of Complex Systems
 Complexity theory describes how individual actions, accumulating over time, can add up to 
widespread results.  Complexity theory illustrates that complex systems are self-organized in that 
system-wide behaviour emerges from within a system as opposed to being imposed onto a system from 
without.  A recognition that complex systems are self-organizing is essential to an understanding of a 
radical relational agency because self-organization illustrates how dispersed and decentralized actions 
can ÐÐ without one identifiable leader ÐÐ achieve large scale results.  To delineate such an occurrence, 
Prigogine and Stengers (1985) use the example of termites; Òthere seems to be no mastermind behind 
Picard 119
the construction of the termitesÕ nest, when interactions among individuals produce certain types of 
collective behaviour in some circumstances, but none of these interactions refer to any global task, 
being all purely localÓ (205).  In other words, each individual behaviour takes place at a local level, but 
once a pattern emerges and behaviour starts accumulating, global results will occur.  In this way, an 
episteme could shift, or a new way of growing food could take over industrialized agriculture, or fossil 
fuels could be replaced by another energy source, or an alternative stable state could emerge.  In short, 
self-organization is important to an understanding of radical relational agency because it serves as an 
explanation of how the agential capacities of individuals, through individual and disperse actions, 
could nevertheless accumulatively add up to widespread changes.
 Self-organization is about the relationships between individual elements, rather than the 
individual elements themselves.  In other words, it is a radical relationality that recognizes the 
profound interconnectivity between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Indeed, Jenks and Smith 
(2005) emphasize the ecological aspects of self-organization, arguing that:  
Self-organization, [É], is at least collectively and at most ecologically organized: there is no 
way that individual particles, plants, animals, humans organize anything at all.  Chance enters 
the picture precisely because we are now in the sphere of populations, of statistical probability 
that particles or individuals will occupy certain positions, have specific needs, death rates and so 
on.  This is not a picture of randomness but of possible correlations and degrees of freedom 
(93).
In this sense, self-organized systems change not because individuals possess agency, but because 
agency is radical and relational.  Thus, self-organization is the mechanism through which change 
occurs within a complex system.  Once a certain kind of behaviour accumulates without the insistence 
of any one individual and accumulates across an entire system, then the system itself acquires a new 
characteristic.  It is for this reason that the processes of globalization are inherently destabilizing ÐÐ as 
the processes continue, the behaviour accumulates and there is a greater likelihood that the system as a 
whole will undergo a monumental shift.
 When self-organization leads to new system wide behaviour, that new behaviour is viewed as an 
emergent phenomenon.  This notion of ÔemergenceÕ describes the moment at which a new characteristic 
emerges:
The complexity of the many linkages and feedbacks that make up a social-ecological system is 
such that we can never predict with certainty what the exact response will be to any intervention 
in the system.  Complex adaptive systems have emergent behaviour; that is, the emergent 
behaviour of the system cannot be predicted by understanding the individual mechanics of its 
component parts or any pair of interactions [É].  WhatÕs more, emerging results from studying 
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complex systems demonstrates that changes in one component can sometimes result in complete 
reconfigurations of the system; the system changes to a different stable state (or regime) (Salt 
and Walker 2006: 34-35).
The self-organization of complex systems means that such systems are adaptive ÐÐ each individual 
component must adapt to the behaviour and each new emergence within a system.  Furthermore, 
because complex systems are made up of many diverse agents, it is difficult to predict the form that any 
self-organized emergence might take. 
 According to Prigogine and Stengers (1985), when complex systems reach a critical bifurcation 
point they are confronted by a variety of possible paths.  When a critical bifurcation point occurs, 
complex systems follow Òone reaction path over a number of equally possible pathsÓ (176).  In other 
words, there are many possible opportunities for alternative stable states to arise within complex 
systems and many different paths that a complex system can follow, but through unpredictable events, 
only one option can be taken.  But, because Òcomplex systems have histories and futures, paths by 
which they come into being and possible directions dependent on many factors (such as energy, habitat, 
habit)Ó, the unpredictability that dominates shifts in complex systems turns out not to be as random as 
it at first appears (Jenks and Smith 2005: 23).  Constraints are imposed upon complex systems because 
future stable states are dependent upon those that came before.  Indeed, such constraint is necessary 
because it has determined the identity of each system and each component of a system.  Jenks and 
Smith (2005) argue that ÒRandomness is not a relationship; a randomly structured system would have 
no identity, nothing which energy could transformÓ (88).  The unpredictability of complex systems is 
not completely random because shifts into alternate stable states are always dependent upon particular 
histories.  As Jenks and Smith point out, total randomness is impossible because it would negate those 
identities ÐÐ those constraints ÐÐ that have been generated through historical developments.
 The interaction between unpredictability and constraint indicates that changes in complex 
systems are unpredictable, in part, because of the preceding historical situations that brought these 
complex interactions into existence.  As Jenks and Smith (2005b) describe:
Complexity evolves, it is the outcome of interaction and mutation.  [É], due to the interaction 
of materials and chance, complexity arises out of there being a number of different possible 
outcomes or ÔsolutionsÕ to the same state of affairs or ÔequationÕ.  The possible outcomes are 
Ônon-linearÕ.  Complexity does not require complex beginnings; on the contrary it demands 
simple origins that ÔbuildÕ their own complexity through self referential structural operations 
(155).
Because there are always a multiplicity of possible outcomes to any one situation, there is a certain 
unpredictability to the ways in which self-organized emergences can occur.  However, as has already 
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been discussed, that systems have evolved also suggests that there are constraints on possible 
emergences.  In this sense, the relationship between unpredictability and limitation generates the 
possibilities of self-organized emergence because, in a sense, self-organization is the result of dynamic 
adaptations to the current conditions of a system.  Indeed, complex systems are precisely those systems 
that are limited by their own self-organized emergences.
 Throughout this thesis I have argued that constraint does not foreclose the possibility of agency.  
Indeed, the limitations in complex systems are generative of new and creative solutions because 
Òcomplex, self-organizing systems are adaptive, in that they donÕt just passively respond to events the 
way a rock might roll around in an earthquakeÓ (Waldrop 1992: 11).  Because self-organization is a 
process of adaptation to the given conditions, such adaptations can produce creative responses to 
imposed constraints.  In other words, there are always possibilities that the situation could be 
otherwise.  Examining the notion of self-organized emergence helps us to understand how systems, and 
individual elements within a system, are interconnected to the extent that aggregated individual 
behaviour can create unexpected shifts or spontaneous changes that are nonetheless not attributable to 
any specific agent.  Thus, agency is not only locatable within individual relationships, but is also the 
sum of the relationships between participants; it emerges through the contingent histories of a system.  
Self-organization has profound consequences for definitions of agency because it suggests that a 
radical relational agency occurs not only as a result of the relationships between individuals, but as a 
characteristic of entire collectives.  Even more profound, therefore, is the implication that the planet 
itself is an agent.  It is this implication that I will discuss in the following section before, in the final 
section, explaining how a radical relational agency is appropriate to addressing the interconnectedness, 
unpredictability and instability characteristic of globalized systems.
Climate Change: The Planet as an Agent
 The implication that the planet is an agent is derived, in part, from James LovelockÕs ÔGaia 
hypothesisÕ.  According to Lovelock (1988), he Òfound it reasonable to call the Earth alive in the sense 
that it was a self-regulating and self-organizing systemÓ (31).  Thus, the Gaia hypothesis is 
synonymous with the view that all of the individual components of the earth ÐÐ humans, nonhumans, 
environments, rocks, trees, soil, farms, cities, waterways, highways, computers, factories, everything! 
ÐÐ are part of one system; the entire earth is seen as a self-organized complex system.  The recognition 
that the entire earth can be viewed as a complex self-organizing and self-regulating system is important 
because it suggests a radical relationality in which every individual behaviour on the earth accumulates 
and contributes to the stability (or instability) of the entire planetary system.  This radical relationality 
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ÐÐ which interconnects all beings, objects and processes on the planet ÐÐ underscores an interpretation 
of the planet as an agent because it explicitly denies the possibility that agency is only a possession of a 
specific individual.  Instead, the ability to change a system occurs as a result of the accumulated actions 
of all agents within a system.  If a radical relational agency is also generated as the sum of all 
relationships (as argued in the previous section), then just as the earth can be viewed as a complex and 
radically interconnected entity, the earth can be viewed as an agent.
 The Gaia hypothesis argues that ÒLiving organisms and their material environment are tightly 
coupled.  The coupled system is a superorganism, and as it evolves there emerges a new property, the 
ability to self-regulate climate and chemistryÓ (Lovelock 1988: 213).  Gaia, according to Lovelock, is 
the grouping of organisms and environments that make up our planetary ÔsuperorganismÕ and, Gaia has 
the ability to regulate its own processes.  In other words, Gaia describes the planet as a series of 
interconnected components that nonetheless aggregate into a whole ÐÐ a self-organized system that 
generates emergent phenomena.  The agential capacities of Gaia are thus not attributable to something 
like an internal function of the planet, but are defined as agential because the radically interconnected 
and radically relational components of our planetary systems accumulate emergent behaviour.  Because 
Gaia is a complex system, it necessarily means that planet-wide shifts are possible.  Moreover, as I 
have argued throughout this chapter, the possibility that such a shift could occur is increasing along 
with the increased complexity and interconnectivity that is destabilizing planetary systems.  In this 
sense, the argument that the planet itself is an agent has consequences for contemporary environmental 
action.
 Lovelock (1988) argues that the defining characteristic of Gaia ÐÐ that organisms are profoundly 
connected to their environments ÐÐ means that ÒWe no longer see the word adapt as a passive verb but 
one that is also active.  Organisms can, and nearly always do, change their environment as well as 
adapt to itÓ (211).  This planetary agency, because it is an example of self-organization, means that 
many different individuals contribute to the overall adaptations of planetary systems:
The implication is the co-evolution of life and the planet and, in particular, the active force of life 
in shaping the planet, not simply living on a dead surface.  The contribution of life to atmospheric 
oxygen is well known; so also is the contribution of calcified animal remains to rocks such as 
limestone (Jenks and Smith 2006: 259).
In the sense that Gaia is a living superorganism, Gaia is not a kind of anthropomorphic description of 
earth processes, but is entirely meant as the accumulative characteristics and changes of the earth as a 
complex system.  Like any complex self-organized system, Gaia adapts to changes made by any 
individual component.  However, in this sense, the detrimental effects of human behaviour on planetary 
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ecosystems ÐÐ such as climate change ÐÐ can be reinterpreted in a couple of ways.  On the one hand, 
because humans are one component of Gaia, there is a very real sense that we are actually harming 
ourselves.  On the other hand, because Gaia is ignorant of any one individual component, it is possible 
that Gaia will shift into an alternate state that is well-suited for humans.
 By pointing out that Gaia will respond to current changes in the climate is not to suggest that 
nothing needs to be done.  Rather, as I have argued throughout this chapter, any adaptation or self-
organized emergence is to some extent unpredictable, and is sure to be highly unpredictable in the case 
of our current destabilized systems.  Indeed, GaiaÕs adaptations to anthropogenic climate change are 
unlikely to account for human needs or comfort.  Lovelock (1988) argues that:
This is an occasion when we cannot look to Gaia for help.  If the present warm period is a 
planetary fever, we should expect that the Earth left to itself would be relaxing into its normal 
comfortable ice age.  Such comfort may be unattainable because we have been busy removing 
its skin for farm land, taking away the trees that are means for recovery.  [É].  Gaia is more 
likely to shudder, then move over to a new stable state, fit for a different and more amenable 
biota (227).
That the earth can be conceived as a self-organized system and as an agent in its own right means that 
it is possible for it to shift into a new stable state.  The earthÕs agential capacities are derived from a 
radical relational agency that includes the accumulative relationships of interconnected beings, objects 
and processes.  Because humans are embedded within a larger self-organized system that includes 
many more nonhuman and environmental agents, any self-organized emergent phenomena, or shift, 
will not be predicated on human needs.
 Recognizing that humans are part of Gaia rather than the one species with the ability to fix Gaia 
perhaps means forgoing anthropocentric control.  As Lovelock (1988) puts it: ÒIt takes a lot of hubris to 
think of ourselves as the stewards of the Earth.  In practice few of us can take care even of our own 
bodiesÓ (228).  The hubris that Lovelock identifies ÐÐ that humans can control the earth ÐÐ is, in part, a 
result of Modern scientific investigations and Modern definitions of agency.  As I have argued 
throughout this thesis, Modern notions of agency are contingent upon the emergence of Man within the 
human sciences; an emergence that inaugurated agency as a characteristic of humans (and not 
nonhumans) because Man was able to ÔknowÕ and shape Nature.  However, by redefining agency as a 
radical relational agency it is no longer possible to view ourselves as stewards of the planet because we 
recognize that humans are not the only components of complex systems with agential capacities.  
Indeed, a radical relational agency recognizes that agency is not a characteristic of one individual in 
particular, but exists in the relationships between agents and when individual behaviour contributes to 
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widespread emergences.  As Lovelock points out, shifts can be precipitated by any component within 
the complex systems that make up Gaia; ÒMany times in the EarthÕs history new species with some 
powerful capacity to change the environment have done as much and moreÓ (145).  In this sense, to 
attribute some special capability to humans would be, again, to reinstate a distinction between humans, 
nonhumans and environments.
 As the notion of Gaia illustrates, there is a radical relationality that has interconnected 
geographically dispersed ecosystems even prior to the emergence of environmentalizing biopolitical 
power relations that are making those relationships more acute.  The difference between Gaia and the 
globalizing forces of a biopolitical environmentalization is one, precisely, that can be attributed to 
contemporary relations of eco/power.  Because the environmentalization of power relations aims to 
manage the productivity of all humans, nonhumans and environments, the contemporary 
destabilization of globalized social-ecological systems is the result of a particular set of relationships 
and a particular emergence.  As I have argued throughout this chapter, contemporary social-ecological 
conditions are the result of contingent relations of eco/power.  Indeed, in the context of the globalized 
ecological systems that I have been examining, we could interpret the shift to industrialized agriculture 
during the Green Revolution as a result of self-organization; such a shift can be viewed as a cumulative 
change in individual farming and buying decisions that add up to the emergence of an entirely new way 
of organizing food and farming.  Likewise, the destabilization of contemporary social-ecological 
systems is a result of, and is reinforced by, self-organized emergences embedded within eco/power 
relations.  That planetary social-ecological systems are interconnected to the extent that global self-
organization is possible does not, however, negate the need for environmental action, but means that 
they require rethinking.  In the following section I will return to the example of globalized food 
systems and their potential instabilities in order to examine how a radical relational agency can inform 
contemporary environmental resistances.  This discussion is not meant as a final redefinition of 
environmental resistance, but serves to point the way to further discussion in the next chapter.
The Instability of Globalized Food Systems and Possible Responses
 Throughout this chapter I have argued that the increasing complexity, interconnectivity and 
instability of contemporary globalized systems increases the possibility that a new stable state will 
emerge.  As Lovelock argues, because of anthropogenic climate change ÐÐ induced, in part, through the 
industrial and economic processes consistent with globalization ÐÐ planetary ecosystems could shift 
into an alternate stable state that is not suitable for human habitation.  In this sense, environmental 
resistances argue that changes should be made to contemporary globalized industrial and economic 
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practices in order to prevent such a shift from occurring.  However, as I have argued throughout this 
chapter, contemporary environmental resistances can often contribute to the very processes of 
globalization that increase the complexity and instability of social-ecological systems.  By arguing that 
processes of globalization can continue only if they are made more efficient, optimal and sustainable, 
environmental resistances can actually reinforce the instability that globalizing practices generate.  
Indeed, such practices of optimization and global interconnectivity can have the effect of Ôputting all 
our eggs in one basketÕ, a situation that enhances the likelihood that planetary systems could shift into 
an alternate stable state.  Rather than stress the optimization and efficiency that makes globalized 
systems more dependent on a few resources (such as fossil fuels), an environmental resistance 
informed by the characteristics of a radical relational agency would stress the complexity, 
unpredictability and heterogeneity of globalized social-ecological systems.  In doing so, such 
resistances would not aim to generate stability, but create more flexible, dynamic and innovative 
systems.
 Vandana Shiva (2000) argues that Ò30 species provide 90 percent of world calorie intake, and 
only four species-rice, maize, wheat, and soybean-provide most of the calories and proteins consumed 
by the worldÕs population through global tradeÓ (79).  This reliance on a limited number of species for 
human food supplies indicates both a loss in species diversity, and a lack of diversity in human diets ÐÐ 
leaving both susceptible to fluctuations and instabilities that affect increasingly complex, and 
increasingly homogeneous, systems.  Loss of ecological diversity is one of the consequences of 
industrial agriculture because the overuse of petrochemical inputs threatens the health of 
interdependent species.  As ecosystems become destabilized due to intensive industrialized agriculture, 
the ability for a wide variety of species to be supported by less healthy soils, plants and ecosystems 
leads to inevitable species loss.  For example, in the UK, the population of certain birds are declining, 
plant species Òthat thrive in arable fields [É] are also under threat and with them, invertebrates that 
depend upon themÓ (Hughes and Thomas 2006: 47).  Loss of ecological diversity has repercussions 
that are more widespread than the localized systems being affected directly; because complex systems 
are connected across varying scales, the effects of increased homogeneity and decreased diversity are 
inevitably widespread.  
 Salt and Walker (2006) argue that we need diversity because it Òis a major source of future 
options and a systemÕs capacity to respond to change and disturbance in different ways [É].  Resilient 
social-ecological systems would celebrate and encourage diversity ÐÐ offsetting and complementing 
the existing trend toward homogenizing the world.  It would encourage forms of multiple land use and 
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other resource useÓ (145-146).  Diversity is integral to the continued functioning of complex social-
ecological systems because it allows such systems to respond more effectively to unpredictability and 
fluctuations.  The more diverse a system is, the better able it is to handle the sorts of changes that 
would otherwise cause it to shift.  Because diverse systems have more options to fall back on, they 
have greater flexibility when responding to positive feedback and other destabilizing interventions.  
Because globalized, industrial food production promotes intensive forms of agriculture that prioritize 
the production of only a few crops, it reduces the stability of the complex systems on which it relies.  
Furthermore, as we have already discussed, globalization decreases the ability to respond to changes in 
the system; Òfood itself and the taste for it are products of their environment.  This is exactly why 
globalized food makes no sense.  Each ecological niche has its own unique abundance to offer.  
Different regions offer different sources of abundanceÓ (Katz 2006: 138).  As I have argued throughout 
this chapter, contemporary globalized systems are destabilized because they are increasingly 
interconnected across vast distances.  Contemporary environmentalizing relations of eco/power, in 
attempting to manage economic productivity throughout the globe, have reinforced a situation in which 
each ecological niche is no longer able to respond effectively to perturbations within its own locale 
because those perturbations might have been generated by actions on the other side of the globe.
 In order to respond more effectively to the instability generated by globalized social-ecological 
systems, I argue that contemporary environmental resistances could benefit from a reconfiguration 
consistent with the characteristics of a radical relational agency.   A radical relational agency is 
generated as a result of the instability of contemporary globalized systems and its embeddedness within 
such systems.  A radical relational agency, as I have already argued, is not attributable to one individual 
agent but exists as a result of the radical relationality and the behaviour that accumulates across diverse 
components of a system.  An action that takes place at the local level does not remain at that level 
because of the complex interconnections and adaptations that characterize self-organized systems; ÒThe 
perpetually open condition of world-systems has repercussions on notions of self and collectivity.  
Communities are henceforth at once local and global, in constant variation, always part of ever-
transforming, complex systems.  Being is interacting, as a complex living organism, with other 
organisms on the planetÓ (Conley 1997: 67).  Indeed, a reworking of notions of self and collectivity is 
precisely the contribution of a radical relational agency ÐÐ and an indication that contemporary 
environmental resistances require rethinking.  This reworking of the relationship between the 
individual and the collective necessitates that each component maintains an ontological status that is 
not synonymous with the system as a whole because, as I argued in the previous chapter, a relationship 
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is not possible without something with which to relate.  Thus, a radical relational agency is both 
collective and individual simultaneously.
 That individual behaviour can self-organize and produce collective shifts contributes to an 
understanding of radical relational agency because it demonstrates precisely how such an agency is 
both collective and individual.  According to an understanding of emergent properties:
Local turns out to be the key term in understanding the power of swarm logic.  We see emergent 
behaviour in systems like ant colonies when the individual agents in the system pay attention to 
their immediate neighbours rather than wait for orders from above.  They think locally and act 
locally, but their collective action produces global behaviour (Johnson 2001: 74).  
And so, the notion of collective emergence describes how a radical relational agency underscores the 
changes that occur within complex systems.  Because individual actions can be significant within 
(collective) complex social-ecological systems, it thus engenders a reworking of the relationship 
between the individual and the collective.  On the one hand, widespread change is an effect of 
collective properties because it is the sum of individual behaviour.  But, on the other hand, the 
recognition that it is precisely individual behaviour that generates such shifts indicates that each 
individual component is not meaningless.  Because individual behaviour is important in generating 
collective results, as I have argued above, a diversity and multiplicity of agents is also necessary to a 
radical relational agency; it is such diversity and multiplicity that can generate creativity, innovation 
and allow destabilized systems to respond effectively to possible disturbances and perturbations.  As 
the examples above demonstrate, when diversity is limited, there is less opportunity for adaptation to 
unpredictable fluctuations because there are fewer possible options with which to respond.
 In order for contemporary environmental resistances to respond to the current practices of 
globalization and environmentalizing biopower that serve to destabilize planetary social-ecological 
systems, I argue that a radical relational agency is more appropriate than Modern notions of an a priori 
agency that is possessed by individuals.  Because a radical relational agency accounts for the agency of 
both individuals and collectives it can be used to underscore contemporary environmental resistances.  
Unlike Modern definitions of agency, a radical relational agency acknowledges the interconnectivity, 
unpredictability and complexity of the contemporary globalized systems in which we live.  
Furthermore, as I have illustrated throughout this chapter, environmental interventions which do not 
acknowledge such characteristics are likely to reinforce the environmentalizing processes that 
contribute to the destabilization of social-ecological systems.  Rather, an environmental resistance 
consistent with a radical relational agency would acknowledge that it is precisely the characteristics of 
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flexibility, creativity and invention that generate such an agency, and precisely those characteristics that 
allow a system to respond more effectively to unpredictability and instability. 
 In the following chapter, I will examine, in more detail, how environmental resistances 
consistent with a radical relational agency can respond effectively to the destabilization of 
contemporary social-ecological systems.  To do this I will examine the relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments not from Western culture, but from Indigenous cultures.  The purpose of 
doing this is to investigate possible alternatives for understanding human relationships with the rest of 
the world.  Furthermore, such examples underscore my argument that it is impossible to abstract power 
relations from ecological relations.  Thus, Indigenous knowledges and technologies serve as a point of 
departure for understanding how a radical relational agency might transform contemporary 
environmental resistances and allow them create social-ecological systems which are more adept at 
responding to disturbances and fluctuations.  To this end, the following chapter combines the insights 
of both FoucaultÕs thought and complexity theory by acknowledging that both ecological relations and 
relations of power contribute to the creation of a radical relational agency.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Indigenous Knowledges and a Radical Relational Agency
 In the previous chapter, I argued that both FoucaultÕs thought and complexity theory contribute 
to an understanding of how globalization leads to the increasing complexity, interconnectedness and 
unpredictability of contemporary social-ecological systems.  To this end, I argued that positive 
feedback loops generated by both ecological relations and relations of power can reinforce the 
instability of globalized complex systems.  Like complexity theory, contemporary environmental 
resistances also suggest that current globalized systems are unsustainable.  However, because 
environmental resistances do not always recognize the unpredictability of complex systems, sometimes 
their actions (such as the example of optimizing resource extraction) reinforce the instability of 
globally interconnected systems.  Because of this tendency to reinforce destabilizing systems, I argued 
that contemporary environmental resistances could benefit by becoming more consistent with a radical 
relational agency.  I argued that a radical relational agency, instead of ignoring the unpredictability of 
complex systems, would underscore resistances that aim to generate the innovations, creativity and 
flexibility that allow complex social-ecological systems to respond more effectively to potential 
fluctuations.
 As in the previous chapter, this chapter addresses the theoretical issues of a radical relational 
agency using a particular set of examples.  This chapter examines radical relational agency, as a 
response to the instabilities of contemporary globalized systems, through the example of Indigenous 
peoples as well as their technologies and knowledges.  The historical relationship between Indigenous 
peoples, their technologies and knowledges, and Western systems of thought demonstrates how 
alternate ways of conceiving the world have been ignored by contemporary globalizing processes, as 
well as environmental resistances.  Indeed, through the practices of colonization, Western nations have 
spread Modern exclusionary systems of thought throughout the globe.  More contemporaneously, 
environmentalizing practices and biopolitical management of humans, nonhumans and environments 
have continued to subsume Indigenous peoples and their territories into Western globalized capitalism.  
Throughout this chapter I will examine Indigenous peoplesÕ relationships to environments and 
nonhumans in order to illustrate that non-Western systems of thought can aid in the application of a 
radical relational agency to contemporary environmental resistances.  That environmentalism emerged 
in Europe and North America in response to the Industrial Revolution exposes it as a primarily Western 
phenomenon.  But the emergence of environmentalism in Western nations should not be taken as the 
Picard 130
ultimate expression of how to rethink human relationships to nonhumans and environments.  Rather, 
Western environmental resistances represent one particular definition of activism focussed on human 
interactions with the environment.  In this sense, the ways in which Indigenous peoplesÕ conceive the 
relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments function as an example for rethinking 
contemporary environmental resistances.  
 In this chapter, in order to broaden the scope of my analysis, I also turn to the thought of 
Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.  The importance of introducing these 
thinkers is to expand an understanding of contemporary globalizing practices and to refine an 
understanding of a radical relational agency.  Hardt and NegriÕs notion of a globalized Empire ÐÐ that 
emerged through the spread of biopolitical power relations ÐÐ serves to underscore the argument that 
Western systems of thought have been dispersed throughout the entire planet.  Their notion of Empire 
is, in turn, influenced not only by FoucaultÕs notion of biopolitics, but by Deleuze and GuattariÕs 
description of the deterritorializing flows that are characteristic of contemporary processes of 
globalization.  I argue that the notion of deterritorialization, because it implies both the spread of 
relationships throughout the globe and the fragmentation of those relationships, is also indicative of the 
possible destabilization of globalized social-ecological systems.  In order to combat the spread of 
biopolitical power relations and the disruption of deterritorializing flows, these thinkers argue that, 
because these relations of power are productive, they actually produce a concomitant and oppositional 
set of deterritorializing flows.  In this sense, they argue that contemporary deterritorializing resistances 
against globalization can create new identities and relationships as a result of deterritorializing flows. 
 Hardt and Negri, in particular, argue that the deterritorializing flows of a globalized Empire 
have generated an oppositional and globalized Multitude.  This Multitude, they suggest, functions as a 
dispersed and de-centralized collective resistance against contemporary globalizing power relations.  
Thus, in a sense, they argue that the Multitude is a kind of self-organized emergence demanding shifts 
in contemporary biopolitical power relations.  However, though there are similarities between the 
Multitude and a radical relational agency, I argue that the notion a deterritorializing Multitude does not 
acknowledge the full implications of the profound complexity of globalized social-ecological systems.  
I argue that the processes of deterritorialization, and by extension the creation of a deterritorializing 
Multitude, do not recognize some of the key consequences of globalizing deterritorializing flows 
which, as I argued in the previous chapter, are destabilizing and inherently unpredictable.  Furthermore, 
I argue that the notion of deterritorialization ignores the embeddedness of humans within complex and 
interconnected ecologies.  And, in this sense, I argue that it omits the implications of a radical 
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unpredictability that is characteristic of complex social-ecological systems.  It is for this reason that 
Indigenous ecological knowledges serve as an example of a radical relational agency ÐÐ they provide 
an alternate description of how we can understand the relationships between humans, nonhumans and 
environments.  Moreover, Indigenous ecological practices implicitly recognize that deterritorializing 
flows can further enhance the instability of globalized social-ecological systems.
 As Foucault gathered inspiration from ancient Greek practices of the self in order to define his 
notion of self-fashioning, I point to Indigenous ecological knowledges as a way to gather inspiration 
for rethinking contemporary environmental resistances in terms of a radical relational agency.  This is 
not to suggest that Indigenous cultures must be replicated by environmental resistances, but to 
demonstrate that there are other possibilities for thinking about the relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments than those which are contingent upon Western systems of thought.  
Throughout this chapter I will also use examples of power relations between Westerners and 
Indigenous peoples, such as those that fortified colonial expansionism and the persecution of 
Indigenous peoples throughout the world, that are indicative of the exclusionary practices of Modern 
power relations.  I argue that, in order to legitimize the violent removal of Indigenous peoples from 
their territories, the discourses of colonization have prevented Western knowledges from accepting any 
alternate interpretations of the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  In this 
sense, I argue that more could be learned by facilitating communication between disparate groups.  
Indeed, as I argued in the previous chapter, diversity is necessary in order to develop the flexibility and 
creativity that is needed for systems to adapt to unpredictability and instability.  Thus, I argue that the 
exclusionary practices of Modern systems of thought have forestalled possible lines of communication 
that could foster creativity, flexibility and resilience. 
 In order to explain how Indigenous knowledges can contribute to a radical relational agency I 
will begin by examining the Modern exclusionary power relations that function to deny those 
knowledges.  I argue that the legitimization of colonization is contingent upon the same systems of 
thought that serve to exclude nonhumans, environments and particular humans (such as non-
Westerners, women, children, non-whites) from having agential capacities.  In doing so, Western 
systems of thought have been spread throughout the globe, first by practices of colonization and then 
by an environmentalizing power that aims to manage capitalist productivity in all corners of the globe.  
The argument that both colonization and globalization have spread Western power relations throughout 
the globe hinges on Hardt and NegriÕs argument that the wealth gained through colonial practices 
served as the necessary resource for contemporary processes of globalization.  Thus, the 
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deterritorializing flows that destabilize contemporary social-ecological systems could be the same 
deterritorializing flows against which Indigenous peoples themselves resist.  It is partly for this reason 
that, rather than a deterritorializing Multitude, I argue that practices consistent with a radical relational 
agency, and influenced by Indigenous ecological practices, are more suited to responding to the 
unpredictability characteristic of globalized systems.  Because a radical relational agency exists, in 
part, because all relations and change within complex systems have unpredictable results, I argue that 
resistances consistent with such a notion of agency are adept at developing the creativity, flexibility and 
innovation that can underpin a response to the instability of contemporary social-ecological systems.
Colonization and Contemporary Colonial Practices
 Throughout the history of colonization, Western relations of power have prevented non-Western 
voices from being heard.  Colonization has been enforced not simply through the practices of 
geographic occupation and cultural assimilation, but through the very orderings imposed by Western 
knowledges and systems of thought.  These orderings have structured the relationships between 
Westerners and Indigenous peoples in order to facilitate the ease of colonizing foreign territories.  
Indeed, the exclusionary functions of Modern systems of thought are implicated in practices of 
colonization.  Without the reinforcing relations of power that constituted colonial knowledges, 
European practices of colonization would not have been able to proceed so effectively.  In this sense, 
practices of colonization are contingent upon the systems of thought that emerged in the Modern 
episteme.  As I have argued throughout this thesis, Modern systems of thought rest upon a series of 
exclusionary knowledges which prohibit nonhumans, environments and certain humans from 
possessing agential capacities.  As this chapter will illustrate, Indigenous peoples, because they were 
defined in opposition to Western Man, were constituted as non-agential.  Thus, the relationships 
between Indigenous peoples and Western colonizers serve as an example of how Modern systems of 
thought enforce practices of exclusion that limit who is defined as an agent.  Furthermore, the 
constitution of Indigenous peoples as non-agential is explicitly linked to the constitution of nonhumans 
and environments as non-agential.
 The Modern systems of thought that serve as the foundation for Western colonial practices are 
those that constitute Indigenous peoples as fundamentally without the agential capacities and, hence, 
without the right to manage their own territories and land.  In order to construct Indigenous peoples as 
without claim to their own land, the doctrine of terra nullius was used to justify colonial expropriation.  
Terra nullius is the form of discursive legitimation that reinforced colonization by overtly declaring 
lands without legal property rights or without environmental resource development to be legally 
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viewed as vacant.  In other words, the doctrine of terra nullius literally erased Indigenous peoples from 
existence on their lands and sanctioned the violent genocide or assimilation of those people that 
colonizers did encounter.  This linguistic ordering could then clear the way for the material, 
geographic, cultural and physical removal of Indigenous inhabitants from any lands being colonized.  
Constructing Indigenous peoples as non-existent in their own territories essentially transformed them 
into non-people.  This trick of discursively de-peopling colonial landscapes not only legitimated the 
violence that accompanied colonization, and the economic benefits that colonization precipitated, but 
this de-peopling also makes Indigenous peoples synonymous with an environment that, according to 
Modern systems of thought, was constituted as non-agential.  Terra nullius, by constituting Indigenous 
peoples as indistinct from the environments and geographies in which they lived, effectively 
constituted Indigenous peoples as objects of study rather than as subjects with agency.
 Colonial power relations actively silenced Indigenous voices; any knowledge or practice that 
contradicted Western definitions of agency, science or ÔprogressÕ was actively ignored, repressed, 
neglected, or stolen.  Terra nullius effectively invalidated societal structures, millennia of technological 
developments and entire philosophies.  The exclusion of non-Western knowledges and systems of 
thought is precisely the means by which Foucault argued Modern power relations function.  As Robert 
Young (1995) reminds us, Òdiscourse always involves a form of violence in the way it imposes its 
linguistic order on the world: knowledge has to conform to its paradigms in order to be recognized as 
legitimateÓ (2).  Discursive violence amounts to real physical violence for the Indigenous peoples who 
live in colonized territories.  By requiring that the knowledges and technologies of colonized peoples 
conform to Western worldviews meant that Indigenous voices were effectively silenced.  While the 
geographic, environmental, spiritual and cultural colonization worked to obliterate the inhabitants of 
colonized lands, Modern power relations either rejected outright, or assimilated, Indigenous 
technologies and knowledges.  This discursive violence has, in part, been perpetrated through Modern 
scientific knowledges that constitute only certain individuals ÐÐ those with access to knowledge ÐÐ as 
agential.  Throughout the discussion of FoucaultÕs thought, we discovered that his formulation power/
knowledge expresses this recognition and, more importantly, acknowledges the effects that systems of 
thought have on real, material relationships.  Thus, during the process of colonization, Western systems 
of thought ordered relationships between whites and non-whites in a hierarchical, binary fashion that 
prevented Indigenous peoples from being constituted as agents.  
 Although Foucault recognized the material violence inherent within Modern systems of thought, 
his texts have often been criticized for reinstating Eurocentric and colonial attitudes.  According to 
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Robert Young (1995), Foucault Òwas curiously circumspect about the ways in which [power] has 
operated in the arenas of race and colonialism. His virtual silence on these issues is strikingÓ (1).  Like 
his neglect in explicitly examining the power relationships between humans, nonhumans and 
environments, Foucault did not examine the power relations and systems of thought that legitimated 
colonial expansionism.  FoucaultÕs silence on the issues of race and colonialism has been interpreted as 
an implied failure to acknowledge the racist and colonial discourses that Modern Western relations of 
power perpetrate.  Although Foucault would not have intended to perpetuate colonial attitudes, because 
power functions through knowledge and discourse, his omissions do demonstrate a latent Eurocentric 
bias.  But, as Young (1995) points out Òthe lasting paradox is that despite the absence of explicit 
discussions of colonialism, FoucaultÕs work has been a central theoretical reference point for 
postcolonial analysisÓ (1).  In this sense, FoucaultÕs analysis of Modern systems of thought allows us to 
examine the philosophical and discursive legitimations that reinforced colonial expansionism.  And, 
indeed, it has also served to undermine those systems of thought.  As I have argued throughout this 
thesis, it is becoming possible to think in terms other than the binary ones prescribed by the Modern 
episteme.  And, to be sure, FoucaultÕs thought has contributed to this problematizing of Modern 
thought.  Furthermore, a nonlinear account of colonial processes likewise problematizes interpretations 
of colonization as a straightforward, linear event because such an account reveals that unpredictability 
and positive feedback loops all contributed to the contingent histories of colonization.
 An uncomplicated Western account of colonial expansionism narrates the discovery of an 
uninhabited wilderness and argues that this (discursively) unpeopled space only becomes (re)written 
once colonized by Europeans.  But a narrative of colonial expansionism that tells this fanciful story of 
inevitably linear progress neglects to acknowledge that its outcome is the result of complex interactions 
and relationships between environments, humans, nonhumans, technologies, biology, pathologies, 
ecologies and any number of other contributing factors.  As well as the contribution of particular power 
relations, colonization occurred due to a combination of contingent material and ecological relations 
such as: the need for new natural resources, control of shipping routes, agricultural technologies, 
human health, transportation technologies, geographies, and climate limitations, among others.  The 
importance of recognizing that the practices of colonization are contingent upon both power relations 
and ecological relations, is to acknowledge the complexity and unpredictability inherent to the 
historical shifts and emergences within complex social-ecological systems.  That colonization is a 
result of complex interactions and self-organized emergences means that it occurred, in part, 
unpredictably, was reinforced by positive feedback loops, and was subject to nonlinear changes.  For 
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example, Manuel DeLanda (1997) argues that colonization could only occur because of the impact and 
feedback generated by plants, animals and, most importantly, diseases.  Because colonization is itself a 
result of self-organizing and nonlinear processes within complex interconnected social-ecological 
systems, it meant that particular unpredictable and contingent relationships contributed to the historical 
practices of colonization.
 DelandaÕs description of the complex and nonlinear processes that precipitated colonization 
rests on the acknowledgement that human populations are never isolated from the ecosystems in which 
we are situated.  He proposes that cities and their outlying rural areas are to be thought of as 
ecosystems.  He argues that cities are, in fact, parasitic on the outlying rural areas because such areas 
provide the urban inhabitants with their food and other requirements.  Thus, he points out that: ÒFirst 
eastern Europe was transformed into a vast ÔcountrysideÕ for the urban complex to its west, then 
American and other foreign lands were converted into resource depots to feed western European 
citiesÓ (106).  In this sense, colonization is the outcome of particular material relationships between an 
increasingly urban population in Western Europe and that populationÕs correlative need for the 
increasingly vast spaces necessary on which to grow food and obtain other vital resources.  This 
recognition, while not necessarily particular to complexity theory, does, however, acknowledge the 
profoundly parasitic, and hence ecological, relationship between the colonizers and the colonized 
territories.  In addition to this parasitism, DeLanda argued that colonization occurred not only as a 
result of resource expansion, but also because Òhuman migration is not a movement into previously 
empty space, it involves the invasion of other peopleÕs landsÓ that necessarily entails Ògenetic 
exchangeÓ (114).  In this sense, the complex social-ecological systems relevant to colonization include 
not only the obvious examples such as agricultural lands, increasing populations and trade routes, but 
examples such as pathogens, disease, genes and other factors of material and microscopic scales.
 The role that disease and genetics played in the European colonization of the Americas worked 
as a form of positive feedback which reinforced colonizing practices, including the Modern systems of 
thought that legitimized colonization and the parasitic relationships between urban and rural 
ecosystems.  DeLanda (1997) argues that while genetics and pathogens prevented earlier European 
attempts to colonize the Middle East, they worked in their favour during the colonization of the 
Americas four hundred years later.  Because ÒGenes that provide resistance to malaria [É] were rare in 
the north [É] Crusaders from France, Germany and England were devoured from within by the 
particularly virulent malarial strains endemic in the Middle EastÓ (131).  Thus, practices of 
colonization do not always succeed because unpredictable and nonlinear outcomes ÐÐ which are a 
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result of the complex interconnections between humans, nonhumans and environments ÐÐ do not 
always generate the reinforcement needed to allow such a shift to occur.  The success of colonizing the 
Americas was due, in part, to the spread of diseases and pathogens west across the continents that 
occured subsequent to the first meetings between European explorers and the Indigenous inhabitants.  
Because Indigenous peoples lacked the immunity to European diseases, the diseases decimated their 
populations even before many cultures had ever come into contact with Europeans.
 DeLanda (1997) argues that, although Europeans might have had a small advantage because 
they had Òhorses, very primitive firearms, [and] metal armourÓ, those advantages Òwould have been 
quite insufficient for the task of conquering a densely inhabited territoryÓ (133).  In short, such 
advantages are not enough to explain why the European colonization of the Americas succeeded.  
Instead DeLanda points out that:
because the majority of native inhabitants died of disease, draining the reservoirs of skills and 
know-how that sustained their culture, that meagre advantage sufficed.  Culture certainly played 
a role here, but it was not the most important.  Cultural materials flowed together with genes 
and biomass (not all of it human) across the Atlantic, and it was the whole complex mixture that 
triumphed (133).
Colonization might not have succeeded without the decrease in population attributed to Indigenous 
peoplesÕ susceptibility to European diseases.7  In this sense, the success of colonization was an 
unpredictable outcome that occurred as a result of multiple interconnections and positive feedback 
loops that included humans, nonhumans and environments.  Colonization occurred not because of one 
determining factor, but because of an assortment of complex interactions and circumstances.  
  The complex interactions and circumstances that contributed to practices of colonization 
therefore include ecological factors such as land available for agriculture and an amenable climate, 
microscopic factors including genetics, immunity and pathogens, and cultural factors, as well as the 
reinforcement provided by legitimizing Modern exclusionary power relations.  By combining 
FoucaultÕs recognition of omnipresent power relations with complexity theory analyses, we are able to 
read the history of colonization as functioning through a series of feedback loops that were mutually 
reinforcing.  Thus, Western practices of exclusion and the erasure of Indigenous peoples from their 
lands reinforced ecological relations such as the parasitic interactions between cities and outlying rural 
areas, and the spread of disease throughout the Americas.  While the history of Western colonial 
expansionism underscores the notion of terra nullius and emphasizes the belief that colonized lands 
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7 Indeed, DeLanda (1997) notes the failure of European attempts to colonize the Middle East as well as previous 
attempts by the Norse to colonize North America (132).
were uninhabited territories, nonlinearity implies that notions of linear progress are no longer tenable 
because history does not follow a determined trajectory or endorse any particular belief system.  If the 
imperialist attitudes of Western colonialism were supported by an underlying belief in progress and 
technological superiority, then nonlinear notions of history underscore a far more varied and 
heterogeneous set of interconnections and relationships that reinforced colonial expansion.  A 
recognition of unpredictability exposes the contingency of colonial achievements upon the ecological 
limits, systems of thought, natural resources and pathogens discussed above; complexity theory shows 
us that such achievements are dependent upon a myriad of interconnected relationships and reinforcing 
positive feedback loops.  The unpredictability of colonization suggests that if even one circumstance 
was different, things could have turned out completely differently.
   Because processes of colonization are unpredictable, it was never a forgone conclusion that 
they would lead to the expansion of Western systems of thought throughout the globe.  In this sense, 
the outcome of Western practices of colonization was never guaranteed.  Furthermore, the actions of 
contemporary Indigenous peoples around the world attest to the fact that colonization has not erased, or 
even assimilated, Indigenous knowledges, practices or ways of life.  Indeed, Indigenous resistances to 
colonization still persist.8  More recent attempts at assimilation have not occurred as predictably as 
Modern systems of thought would suggest.  A belief in linear and assured progress caused European 
colonial powers to assume that Òthe colonies and lower peoples will become objects of the causal 
process of improvement, gradually shedding their primitive customs and ways, [É].  They will be 
assimilated into modern nations within European imperial structure or into independent modern 
constitutional nation statesÓ (Tully 1995: 65).  However, the history of colonization reveals that such 
attempts at assimilation did not occur linearly, nor did colonizers achieve their goals.  Rather, 
Indigenous knowledges and practices still exist as a radical counterpoint to the Modern systems of 
thought which served to legitimate European colonization.  Throughout this chapter I will argue that, 
because Indigenous histories, cultures and systems of thought are radically different from Western ones,  
and even implicitly recognize the existence of a radical relational agency, they serve as an opportunity 
to examine alternate responses to the instability of globalized social-ecological systems.
Opposing Definitions of ÔThe EnvironmentÕ
 Although the Òmain function of the environmental movement, [...], is to remind modern society 
that development inevitably binds humans and non-humans more closely together within complex 
socio-natural assemblagesÓ, environmentalism often remains latently attached to the Òdualistic 
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8 I will discuss such Indigenous resistances later in this chapter.
presuppositionsÓ characteristic of Modern thought (Murdoch 2006: 108).  As I have argued throughout 
this thesis, the binary distinctions that underpin Modern systems of thought have served to legitimate 
exclusionary practices with often violent results.  And, oftentimes, contemporary environmental 
resistances remain attached to such binary constructions in order to justify particular environmental 
interventions needed to ÔprotectÕ Ôthe environmentÕ.  Thus, the environmental movement does not 
always fulfill its stated aim of acknowledging the ecological interconnectedness of humans, 
nonhumans and environments.  However, as I suggested in the previous section, investigating 
Indigenous knowledges and systems of thought serves as an opportunity to examine alternate ways of 
understanding how humans exist in the world.  In particular, the ways in which Indigenous peoples 
often conceive of Ôthe environmentÕ is as a participant that is integral to both their ecological and social 
systems.  If contemporary environmental resistances often fall back on binary distinctions and 
exclusionary knowledges, then their risk of contributing to the spread of Western discourse is further 
increased.  Rather, if nonhumans and Ôthe environmentÕ are conceived as active participants and 
agents, as some Indigenous cultures constitute them, then humans become simply one constituent 
among many.  In this sense, I will argue that Indigenous knowledges and practices have something in 
common with a radical relational agency.
 Throughout this thesis, I have stressed that power, knowledge, materiality and ecology take part 
in the same processes.  In the previous section, I argued that the emergence and continuation of 
colonial practices were dependent on a variety of complex factors including both relations of power 
and ecological relations.  Therefore, because practices of colonization are the result of complex 
interconnected relationships that include humans, nonhumans and environments, I argued that spaces 
and geographies are not simply the bearers of social relations.  I argued that geographic space and Ôthe 
environmentÕ should be reconceived as active participants within contemporary social-ecological 
systems.  But, there are different ways in which space and Ôthe environmentÕ are constituted.  Indeed, 
because divergent ways of conceiving the environment intersect the relationships between Western and 
Indigenous cultures, it underscores both the focus of colonization and environmental resistances.  Both 
the history of colonization and contemporary environmental practices reveal that there are radical 
differences in how notions of space, geography, ecology and the environment are conceived.  In this 
sense, the recognition that space and Ôthe environmentÕ are constituted in different ways across 
different cultures is important because it highlights different ways of thinking through the relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments.
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 In The Production of Space Henri Lefebvre (1974) argued that a specific understanding of 
ÔnaturalÕ space serves a particular function within Western culture; Ònature obsesses us, [...].  Everyone 
wants to protect and save nature; nobody wants to stand in the way of an attempt to save its 
authenticity.  Yet at the same time everything conspires to harm it.  [...].  Even the powerful myth of 
nature is being transformed into a mere fiction, a negative utopiaÓ (30-31).  As I have already argued, 
the Modern distinction between Man and Nature reinforced the belief that Nature is eternal, passive 
and non-agential.  In this sense, when human interference with ÔnaturalÕ spaces and environments 
seems to threaten those spaces, human processes are necessarily constituted as imperiling the continued 
existence of those ÔnaturalÕ landscapes and ecosystems.  Thus, as I have argued throughout this thesis, 
there are powerful myths that underlie the constitution of ÔnaturalÕ landscapes and environments as 
spaces which humans should be prevented from entering.  Consistent with this constitution of the 
environment, conservation projects worldwide have sought to create National Parks and other 
ÔwildernessÕ reserves that eject humans from (supposedly) ÔvirginÕ landscapes so that they may 
preserve the ÔpureÕ sanctity of ÔnaturalÕ ecosystems.  However, Indigenous peoples are often the 
inhabitants of those territories and spaces that conservationists wish to preserve, and so 
environmentalizing practices in such instances reinforce those colonial practices that aimed to erase 
Indigenous peoples from their ancestral territories.  
 In his book Conservation Refugees, Mark Dowie (2009) documents the struggles that 
Indigenous peoples have faced in preventing their lands from being taken over by conservation trusts 
or governments.  He argues that many Òpeople who have been evicted from their homelands in the 
interest of conservation have been people of colour.  The unspoken (and rarely written) rationale for 
this policy is a certainty that European and American [É] science-based conservationists naturally 
understand the tenets of conservation, while primitive aboriginals do notÓ (xi).  Such conservation 
efforts not only reinforce the assumption that humans, nonhumans and environments should not 
interact in ÔnaturalÕ spaces, but also reinforce the assumption that Western knowledges are inherently 
superior.  Moreover, as I will illustrate later in this chapter, the tacit assertion that Indigenous peoples 
do not know how to ÔprotectÕ their own ecosystems is to deny the legitimacy of non-Western ways of 
interacting with the nonhumans and environments.  Indeed, such acts of Western ÔconservationÕ enact a 
continued colonial relationship in the guise of an environmentalizing concern with nonhuman spaces.  
In the name of conservation, some environmental activists ÐÐ because they constitute space as non-
agential ÐÐ do not acknowledge the possibility that human inhabitants are simply one constituent part 
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of complex social-ecological systems and might, in fact, be integral to that systemÕs continued 
existence.  
 Paradoxically, the emergence of conservationist environmentalities that evict Indigenous 
peoples from their ancestral lands actually opens those spaces to tourists and tourism-related 
infrastructure.  Lefebvre (1974) argued that Òcommodities which were formerly abundant because they 
occurred ÔnaturallyÕ, which had no value because they were not products, have now become rare, and 
so acquired value. [...].  Natural space under certain socio-economic conditions, becomes a scarce 
commodity.  Inversely, scarcity becomes spatialÓ (329).  The increasing scarcity of ÔnaturalÕ spaces 
means that conservation and capitalism coexist beneficially ÐÐ the removal of Indigenous occupants 
from their territories opens up new spaces to capitalist development.  The commodification of ÔnaturalÕ 
spaces therefore continues a series of relationships that began with colonization.  As resources became 
scarce in Europe, there was a need to search elsewhere to find those resources and, as DeLanda (1997) 
argues, there was Òa gradual conversion of the world into a supply region to fuel European urban 
growthÓ (106).  In the centuries since colonization instigated the development and urbanization of 
increasingly vast portions of the world, natural resources and undeveloped spaces have become 
increasingly scarce.  Processes of globalization have only increased the rapid development of all 
regions of the globe into spaces capable of supplying Western nations with affordable food, fuels and 
consumer goods; processes which have inevitably contributed to the scarcity of ÔnaturalÕ spaces.
 Because not only natural resources, but ÔnaturalÕ spaces have become scarce, globalizing and 
environmentalizing capitalist processes are incorporated into every corner of the planet.  
Environmental acts of conservation work in the service of an environmentalizing expansion to render 
all corners of the globe under biopolitical management.  Such practices of environmentalizing 
management are dependent upon the material and ecological realities of a finite planet in which 
scarcity is interpreted within the framework of capitalist exchange.  The notion of scarcity, therefore, 
contributes to the increasing globalization of disparate social-ecological systems because, in reflecting 
the scarcity of what is produced within Ôthe environmentÕ, it aims to actively manage all relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments.  In this sense, the removal of Indigenous peoples from 
their territories continues under the masked legitimation of ÔprotectingÕ the environment, rather than as 
outright colonial expansion.  As Dowie (2009) points out, Òthe removal of aboriginal human beings 
from their homeland to create a commodified wilderness is a deliberate charade, a culturally 
constructed neo-Edenic narrative played out for the enchantment of weary human urbanites yearning 
for the open frontier that their ancestors ÔdiscoveredÕ then tamed, a place to absorb the sounds and 
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images of virgin natureÓ (18-19).  The forced eviction of Indigenous peoples from their ancestral 
territories indicates that the constitution of space as a commodity is inherent within the discourses of 
conservation.  Thus, as Murdoch (2006) argues, Òspatial relations are also power relationsÓ (22-23).  As 
the example of conservation refugees attests, the ways in which ÔnaturalÕ spaces have been constituted 
as fundamentally separate from ÔhumanÕ spaces serves to reinforce the spread of globalizing capitalist 
relations of power.
 That Indigenous cultures constitute Ôthe environmentÕ and ÔnaturalÕ spaces in radically different 
ways than Western systems of thought means that there is no inevitability to the constitution of 
nonhuman spaces as in need of ÔprotectionÕ.  Indeed, within many Indigenous worldviews no 
distinction is made between humans, nonhumans and environments and so, to remove any one 
constituent part from an ecosystem, is not consistent with many Indigenous constructions of the 
environment.  Thus, Indigenous cultures explicitly recognize that they are not abstracted from their 
material environments:
Animals, plants, and minerals are not, [É], rightless resources, as is the case in Western 
economic assumptions.  They are as it were trading partners with human beings, and are 
pictured as profiting, from their own point of view, from exchange with human beings.  But 
exchange is not enough.  Human beings must assume proper attitudes toward the non-human 
members of their polymorphous community (Callicott and Overholt 1982: 155). 
Indigenous cultures often constitute nonhumans, environments and any available resources as members 
within a highly interconnected community.  Indeed, as the above example attests, certain Indigenous 
cultures recognize nonhumans and environments as essential contributors to their societies, cultures 
and knowledges; instead of positing a distinction between humans and nonhumans, nonhumans and 
environments are members of an extended Òpolymorphous communityÓ.  The separation of Indigenous 
peoples from their traditional territories underscores Eurocentric practices because it imposes a division 
between humans, nonhumans and environments that is a result of exclusionary Modern systems of 
thought and is, therefore not congruous with radically different ways of characterizing the relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments.  
 Because nonhuman and environmental participants are viewed as members of a more 
interrelated community, the eviction of Indigenous peoples is not merely a loss of geographic spaces, 
but it also underscores the loss of identity and an entire way of life.  In the sense that Ôthe environmentÕ 
and nonhuman spaces are constituted as members of a larger community that includes human cultures, 
the removal of Indigenous peoples from their own environments in the name of either colonization or 
conservation is tantamount to an attack on their radically divergent systems of thought.  The continued 
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eviction of Indigenous peoples from their traditional territories therefore represents the inability of 
certain kinds of environmentalism to acknowledge alternate ways of conceiving the relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Moreover, as I argue throughout this chapter, the 
silencing of non-Western systems of thought forecloses opportunities to communicate across divergent 
cultures and to discover other ways in which it is possible to live in the world.  For instance, because 
Indigenous cultures often constitute humans, nonhumans and environments as agential participants 
within diverse social-ecological systems, it also suggests that Indigenous knowledges share something 
with a radical relational agency.  In this sense, I argue that such examples serve as an opportunity to 
learn from different cultural practices and knowledges.
 I argue that Indigenous knowledges offer an opportunity to rethink contemporary environmental 
resistances because Indigenous cultures frequently view nonhumans and environments as relationally 
interconnected within complex social-ecological communities.  The acknowledgement that all humans 
are part of the ecosystems in which we live means that viewing humans as inherently destructive of 
ÔnaturalÕ spaces would no longer make sense.  Instead, the outcome of such a worldview would be to 
recognize that humans are simply one part of an environment that includes a wide variety of agents.  
Indeed, such a view is congruous with a radical relational agency.  In this sense, environmental 
resistances consistent with the insights gleaned from an understanding of radical relational agency 
would not advocate the removal of humans from ecosystems.  Therefore, the eviction of Indigenous 
peoples from their territories does not necessarily mean that such uninhabited ecosystems are more 
stable.  Rather, humans can actually contribute to a systemÕs ability to creatively respond to 
disturbances and fluctuations.  In the following section, I will examine how Indigenous knowledges 
and technologies can provide alternatives to Western systems of thought.  In doing so, I will argue that 
they also provide inspiration for understanding a radical relational agency.
Traditional Ecological Knowledges
 A perception that Indigenous peoples are connected to nonhumans and environments in ways 
that Westerners are not has initiated environmental interest in Indigenous worldviews.  However, the 
imposition of Western environmental concepts onto Indigenous worldviews actually demonstrates a 
continued ethnocentric bias in the sense that it defines environmental and ecological practices 
according to Western concepts.  Asserting that Indigenous peoples were environmentalists or 
ecologists:
is neither true nor false; rather, it is non-sensical.  There was not in the past nor is there today 
any ÔIndiansÕ per se ÐÐ there were and are extremely varied and diverse groups of American 
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Indian people ÐÐ and ecology is a highly sophisticated, quantitative, abstract, and precisely 
defined biological science, utterly embedded in the Western world view.  More accurately 
stated, there is a current popular impression that American Indian cultures included as part of 
their practical relations with the world what may be called an Ôenvironmental ethicÕ (Callicott 
and Overholt 1982: 153).
The interpretation that Indigenous knowledges are more ecologically sound is misguided because it 
poses the conclusion in terms of Western science and knowledges.  This popular belief, instead of 
acknowledging Indigenous peoplesÕ own interpretations of the relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments, imposes foreign sciences and systems of thought onto what are radically 
different Indigenous worldviews.
 The absorption of Indigenous knowledges into Modern ecological practices and environmental 
resistances is indicative of how colonization has legitimized an unrecognized assimilation of 
Indigenous technologies by Western colonizers.  Throughout, and since, colonization there has been 
unacknowledged borrowing of Indigenous technologies and knowledges that remains overlooked.  For 
example, the colonization of the Americas inaugurated an improvement in the lives of European 
colonialists:
Today, corn is the largest grain crop by weight grown in the world, and three root vegetables 
developed in the Americas ÐÐ potatoes, sweet potatoes, and cassava ÐÐ are collectively the 
largest source of global calories.  When you take into account an agriculture that also included 
coffee, cacao, tomatoes, avocado, peppers, cayenne, chillies, peanuts, cashews, tobacco, 
sunflower, safflower, vanilla, pineapple, papaya, blueberries, strawberries, passion fruit, pecans, 
butternut squash, pumpkin, zucchini, maple syrup, cranberry, tapioca (from cassava), and a 
whole assortment of beans, it is not difficult to concede that Amerindian farmers were the 
leading plant breeders in history.  Europeans, who had gone chronically hungry for centuries, 
came to an edible landscape farmed by people who by and large were well fed (Hawken 2007: 
98).
The reality of the relationships between Western and Indigenous knowledges is complex because it 
conceals the many contributions to knowledge that have been made by Indigenous peoples.  After the 
colonization of the Americas, a wealth of knowledge that was unknown to Western nations was 
subsequently adopted.  While Indigenous American food crops feed people around the globe, the 
Indigenous knowledges and technologies that developed these crops remain largely unacknowledged.  
 Although Indigenous knowledges have often been assimilated or stolen throughout the history 
of colonization, recent steps have been taken to acknowledge the contributions made to ecological 
practices by Indigenous peoples throughout the world.  Indigenous technologies and knowledges have 
come to be collectively known in academia as Ôtraditional ecological knowledgeÕ.  The academic 
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notion of traditional ecological knowledge Òcame into widespread use in the 1980s, but the practice of 
traditional ecological knowledge is as old as ancient hunter-gatherer culturesÓ (Berkes 1999: 4).  
Traditional ecological knowledge is somewhat of a catch-all term used to describe Indigenous 
technologies, knowledges and relationships to the environment.  Consequently, this terminology is 
often found to be less than ideal to describe the myriad ways in which non-Western Indigenous cultures 
interact with ecologies, climates and landscapes.  In his book Sacred Ecology, Fikret Berkes (1999) 
argues that there is not one Òuniversally accepted definition of traditional ecological knowledge.  The 
term is, by necessity, ambiguous since the words traditional and ecological knowledge are themselves 
ambiguousÓ (5).  Berkes recognizes the difficulty in defining traditional ecological knowledges that are 
unavoidably multiple, divergent and varied.  Furthermore, as I have already discussed, there are 
inherent problems in defining Indigenous knowledges using overtly Western concepts.
 After problematizing the terminology, Berkes (1999) offers a definition.  He defines traditional 
ecological knowledge as: Òa cumulative body of knowledge, practice and belief, evolving by adaptive 
processes and handed down through generations by cultural transmission, about the relationship of 
living beings (including humans) with one another and with their environmentÓ (8).  The notion of 
traditional ecological knowledge thus overtly recognizes that Indigenous knowledges are concerned 
with the relationship between humans, nonhumans and environments, but it also recognizes the 
processes of cultural transmission and the historical accumulation of social practices that are integral to 
these knowledges.  It is important to recognize the historical and accumulative aspects of traditional 
ecological knowledge because they underscore the fact that these systems of thought are adaptive, 
flexible and not historically homogeneous.  Indeed, the adaptability and flexibility of traditional 
ecological knowledges implies that such knowledges are effective at responding to historical 
emergences and unpredictability.  While all systems of thought are necessarily contingent upon 
historical developments, the difference is that traditional ecological knowledges often build 
adaptability, flexibility and accumulation into their practices.  As Fikret Berkes and Carl Folke (2002) 
point out, Òthere are local and traditional practices that behave like a disturbanceÓ (129) within local 
complex systems order to generate perturbations within those systems, so that; ÒInstead of removing or 
eliminating disturbance altogether, local and traditional adaptations seem to accept perturbations as an 
intrinsic part of ecosystem dynamicsÓ (145).  In this sense, a recognition of adaptation and flexibility is 
implicit within traditional systems of thought and practices when they seek to generate system 
disturbances.
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 Indigenous knowledges and technologies are passed down through oral traditions that extend 
Òback at least one hundred yearsÓ among some groups because Òinformation is carried by the elders 
and transmitted in the form of stories and myths; conservation practices themselves are encoded in 
ritualsÓ (Berkes and Folke 2002: 140-141).  This method of knowledge transmission within Indigenous 
cultures, in which information is passed down through stories and oral traditions, demonstrates the vast 
differences between Western scientific ecology and traditional ecological knowledges.  Although 
Western academic disciplines would have historically disregarded any non-Western knowledges and 
technologies, the recognition that traditional ecological knowledges might have insight into particular 
environments creates an opportunity to learn from Indigenous traditions ÐÐ without simply translating 
those traditional ecological knowledges into Western science.  In particular, the radically different 
historical dimensions of Indigenous knowledges provide additional insight into particular ecosystems 
because Indigenous peoples have been participating in relationships with nonhumans and environments 
in colonized geographies longer than have European settlers.  Because, for example, North American 
ÒFirst Nations knowledge, [É], predates European contactÓ they can provide a historical, dynamic and 
Òmultigenerational perspective on the environmental impacts of colonialism and industrial 
developmentÓ (Butler and Menzies 2006: 8).  Their historical presence on the North American 
continent means that Indigenous peoples have access to knowledges which predate the environmental 
and ecological effects of colonization and industrialization.  Indeed, their continued presence on the 
North American continent means that traditional ecological knowledges have information pertinent to 
environmentalism that activists in Western traditions do not have access to.  
 Fikret Berkes and Carl Folke (2002) argue that the ways in which Indigenous knowledges are 
accumulated, and the flexibility of their traditions, are important not only to the accumulation of 
ecological knowledges, but also to Indigenous cultures as a whole.  They point out that within 
Indigenous North American Òsocieties, ecological knowledge, resource management, and worldviews 
are inseparableÓ (141).  Because Indigenous worldviews do not constitute humans as distinct from 
nonhumans and environments, the knowledges that they accumulate are not abstracted from those 
environments.  In this sense, the accumulation of ecological knowledges does not occur in a separate 
realm of ÔecologyÕ, but happens throughout all cultural and social processes within Indigenous 
societies.  In traditional ecological knowledges Òall elements are viewed as interconnected and cannot 
be understood in isolationÓ (Butler and Menzies 2006: 9).  Thus, ecological knowledge is encoded 
within the rituals and histories of Indigenous communities because, as their oral traditions also attest, 
such knowledge is embedded within the functioning of their daily lives.  That traditional ecological 
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knowledge cannot be isolated from the histories, diverse relationships, wider cultural practices or even 
nonhuman environments, demonstrates their radical difference from Western science.  It is in this sense 
that I argue the inability of Western systems of thought to account for such radical otherness, 
demonstrates its own inability to remain flexible and adaptable.
 Traditional ecological knowledges, unlike Western ecology, generate information about 
resources, territories, animals and entire ecosystems via direct observation of human interactions with 
nonhumans and environments that accumulates through continued use and experimentation.  Because 
of the intimately situated way in which traditional ecological knowledges accumulate, they are 
embedded within the social and human aspects of daily life.  These knowledges are Òpart of the cultural 
capital by which societies convert natural capital ÐÐ that is resources and ecological services ÐÐ into 
human-made capital or the produced means of productionÓ (Berkes and Folke 2002: 123).  Moreover, 
because traditional ecological knowledges are embedded within local ecosystems, and knowledge is 
accumulated through historical adaptations, they acknowledge that systems can have multiple stable 
states.  For example, Berkes (1999) describes the traditional worldviews of North American Cree as 
Ònonlinear and multi-equilibrium.  They are used to an unpredictable, ever-changing 
environmentÓ(126).  Because indigenous knowledges and technologies recognize the unpredictability 
of social-ecological systems within their traditions, rituals and decision-making processes, they are 
often well equipped to deal with unpredictable shifts.
 Although traditional ecological knowledges are radically different from Western systems of 
thought, they nevertheless exhibit similarities to complexity theory.  Berkes and Folke (2002) argue 
that their research has led them to acknowledge that Òtraditional practices have certain similarities and 
parallels to the theory of complex systems, with emphasis on nonlinear relationships, threshold effects, 
multiple equilibria, the existence of several stability domains, cross-scale linkages in time and space, 
disturbance, and surpriseÓ (124).  They discovered that traditional ecological knowledges recognize the 
profound interconnectivity between humans, nonhumans and environments, recognize that systems are 
nonlinear and unpredictable, and that systems have multiple possible stable states.  Moreover, as I have 
argued throughout this section, traditional ecological knowledge places an emphasis on flexibility and 
adaptability, both in its accumulation of information and its insistence that such information cannot be 
abstracted from the historical contingencies of the social-ecological system in which it is generated.  
Traditional ecological knowledges thus recognize the profound unpredictability that is characteristic of 
complex social-ecological systems; an important recognition because it signals the possibility that such 
knowledges are applicable to an understanding of radical relational agency.  In this sense, traditional 
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ecological knowledges contribute to an understanding of radical relational agency because they reflect 
the insights of complexity theory from a radically non-Western perspective.
 Indigenous knowledges also intersect with a radical relational agency because, as I have already 
discussed, they explicitly recognize the agency of nonhumans and environments.  Indigenous 
knowledges therefore can contribute to an understanding of a radical relational agency because they 
acknowledge not only the embeddedness of humans within ecological systems, but also that 
nonhumans and environments are participants and agents.  Because traditional ecological knowledges 
historically understand the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments as 
interconnected and agential, they express a history of those interactions that is radically different from 
Western histories.  Throughout the previous sections, I have argued that Western systems of thought 
have historically excluded non-Western knowledges and technologies and, in doing so, have foreclosed 
opportunities to learn in radically different ways.  In the following sections, I examine the notion of 
deterritorialization as an explanation of how contemporary social-ecological systems are destabilized 
and as a kind of response to that profound instability.  In a sense, resistances that make use of 
deterritorializing processes have something in common with a radical relational agency because they 
acknowledge that radical interconnections can extend throughout the globe.  However, they neglect the 
unpredictability that is inherent within any complex system.  Therefore, I will return to a notion of 
traditional ecological knowledge and suggest that it might serve as inspiration for how environmental 
resistances can acknowledge unpredictability and a radical interconnectivity.
Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Instability of Global Systems
 In the previous chapter, I examined the complexity and interconnectivity of contemporary 
globalized food systems.  I argued that through the increasing complexity of these globally dispersed 
networks, global food systems have also become increasingly destabilized.  Likewise, the entire 
process of globalization integrates worldwide social-ecological systems in such a way that they have 
become immensely interconnected.  Thus, as I determined in the previous chapter, the simple act of 
purchasing dinner in Europe can influence social and ecological systems on the other side of the world.  
The increasing interconnectivity between geographically dispersed locations has meant that 
globalization, in the latter half of the twentieth century and into the beginning of the twenty-first, is 
characterized by the spread of an environmentalizing management and biopolitics throughout the 
world.  As I have already suggested ÐÐ though the terminology did not exist ÐÐ globalizing processes 
were a necessary affect of the race between European nations to build their own vast colonial empires 
and extended their access of resources and labour to all of the worldÕs continents.  Indeed, as Hardt and 
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Negri (2000) point out, ÒBy the end of the eighteenth century, the products of slave labour in the 
Americas constituted one third of the value of European commerceÓ (121).  Through colonial practices,  
European nations gained access to vast resources and technologies that allowed their wealth to grow 
more than was possible without colonization; the wealth provided by colonial territories allowed 
European nations to disperse Western practices and systems of thought throughout the world.  In this 
sense, the expansion of colonial empires around the world set the pace for contemporary globalization 
to continue with its increasingly environmentalizing practices. 
 Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that capitalism emerged because of the wealth accumulated 
through European colonial practices.  Without the products and slave labour provided by its colonies, 
European capitalism would not have been able to flourish.  Hardt and Negri maintain that Òslave 
production in the Americas and the African slave trade, however, were not merely or even 
predominantly a transition to capitalism.  They were a relatively stable support, a pedestal of 
superexploitation on which European capitalism stoodÓ (122 emphasis mine).  In other words, the 
emergence of capitalism would have been impossible without the vast material and financial wealth 
accumulated through the ÔsuperexploitationÕ of colonial geographies and the Indigenous peoples who 
inhabited them.  Globalization rests on the accumulation of resources achieved through colonial 
practices that, as I have previously described, are contingent upon complex factors such as Modern 
systems of thought, pathogens and resource scarcity.  Thus, both colonization and globalization are 
emergent phenomena which have been reinforced through positive feedback loops that necessarily 
include relations of power and ecological relations.  In this sense, globalization is the result of self-
organized emergences that have accumulated historically and, hence, facilitated the dispersal of 
Western practices and systems of thought.
 According to Hardt and Negri (2000), because colonial power relations were consistent with 
Modern exclusionary systems of thought, they functioned by constituting individuals according to 
binary arrangements (128).  In order to spread imperialist attitudes, a dualism structured European 
thought which constituted Indigenous peoples as radically Other.  As we have discussed throughout 
this chapter, exclusionary systems of thought have meant that Indigenous technologies and knowledges 
were systematically excluded, ignored, erased, assimilated or disregarded by Western institutions.  
Thus, Hardt and Negri point out that colonialism is Òan abstract machine that produces identities and 
alterities, imposes binary divisions on the colonial worldÓ that structure it according to European 
discourse and power relations (128).  But, they also argue that if colonial discourses and power 
relations served to exclude those knowledges, traditions and technologies that were non-Western, 
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contemporary globalized power relations operate according to an altogether different logic.  Indeed, as 
I have already argued, contemporary relations of power are characterized by an increasing 
environmentalization that aims to bring every corner of the globe under its management.  Hardt and 
Negri (2000) argue that globalization, because it is characterized by global capital, organizes relations 
of power differently; ÒThe global capitalist hierarchy that subordinates the formally sovereign nation-
states within its order is fundamentally different from the colonialist and imperialist circuits of 
international dominationÓ (134).  They argue that colonial imperialism has given way to a globalized 
ÒEmpireÓ that works to spread capitalist economics and power relations ever more efficiently around 
the world.  Likewise, they identify biopower as the primary means that Empire uses to structure 
discourse and power relations.  Because biopower produces identities and multiplicities, Hardt and 
Negri argue that contemporary power relations no longer produce binary constructions.
  Again, Hardt and Negri (2000) have expanded on FoucaultÕs thought and argue that global 
power relations have become entirely biopolitical.  Rather than the previous disciplinary power that 
Òfixed individuals within institutions but did not succeed in consuming them completely in the rhythm 
of productive practicesÓ (24), contemporary biopower Òregulates social life from its interior, following 
it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating itÓ (23-24).  Thus, Hardt and Negri argue that the 
disciplinary power relations that Foucault described have now been completely replaced by biopolitical 
systems of production.  Furthermore, their interpretation expands FoucaultÕs notion of biopolitics to 
include not only the production of physical bodies and life, but Òthe production of social life itself, in 
which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlapÓ (xiii).  In this sense, whereas I 
have previously argued that biopolitics leads to an increased environmentalization that aims to manage 
the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments, Hardt and Negri stress that biopower 
also produces identities and multiplicities ÐÐ and facilitates the communication between diverse 
groups.  Through the increasingly widespread production of social, economic, political and cultural 
life, contemporary globalized capitalism (or Empire as Hardt and Negri prefer), serves to create a wide 
variety of identities and heterogeneous relationships.  Within contemporary power relations Òcreativity, 
communication, and self-organized cooperation are its primary valuesÓ (83).  Biopolitics thus produces 
different kinds of biopolitical subjects than do disciplinary techniques because globalized power 
relations create dispersed multiplicities and a wide variety of possible identities and relationships.  
 Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that while colonialism created binary identities, ÒEmpire manages 
hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of 
commandÓ (xii-xiii).  Because Empire operates through the productive capabilities of biopower, it is far 
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more flexible than the disciplinary power relations that came before it.  And, like the Foucauldian 
biopolitical power relations through which it functions, Empire does not have a Òterritorial centre of 
power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriersÓ (xii).  This dispersed and decentralized power, 
however, is especially effective because it does not rely on territorial centres.  Thus, in a sense, Hardt 
and Negri suggest that contemporary globalized, biopolitical power relations are actually more 
successful than the colonial power relations that preceded them.  Hardt and Negri assert that Empire 
signifies an Òend of colonialism and the declining powers of the nation are indicative of a general 
passage from the paradigm of modern sovereignty toward the paradigm of imperial sovereigntyÓ (137).  
Because Empire destabilizes the Modern nation-state, it ushers in a transition to a globalized imperial 
system.  Therefore, Hardt and Negri suggest that a globalized Empire achieves the complete integration 
of world economies and the worldwide dispersal of capitalism that began with colonialism.  The 
importance of Hardt and NegriÕs argument that Empire is a continuation of the globalizing capitalist 
processes that began within colonization is that it likewise implies the extension of biopolitics not only 
within human social systems, but also the increasing environmentalizing management of nonhumans 
and environments.  From the initial conditions of colonial expansionism that included resource 
limitations, Modern systems of thought and other reinforcing positive feedback, emerged a highly 
complex globalized system that links humans, nonhumans and environments across vast geographic 
spaces.
 Hardt and NegriÕs notion of Empire is derived not only from a recognition that biopolitical 
power relations have succeeded in becoming dispersed throughout the globe, but it is also derived from 
an understanding of how deterritorializing flows serve to destabilize territories and identities.  Deleuze 
and GuattariÕs notion of deterritorialization describes globalization because it is precisely 
deterritorializing flows that interconnect dispersed geographic locations and, in the process, destabilize 
those locations.  Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari, like Hardt and Negri, suggest that deterritorializing 
flows have facilitated the shift from sovereign states to a globalized Empire because they radically 
interlink spaces and relations that have become dispersed throughout the globe.  In A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that contemporary globalized capitalism is anathema to 
the state form; Òit could be said that capitalism develops an economic order that could do without the 
State.  And in fact capitalism is not short on war cries against the State, not only in the name of the 
market, but by virtue of its superior deterritorializationÓ (501).  They insist that the deterritorializing 
capabilities of contemporary capitalism require the erasure of the state form.  While capitalism 
deterritorializes and decentralizes, it also contributes to the cultural homogeneity that characterizes the 
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increasing dispersal of Western systems of thought throughout the globe, and the correlative 
environmentalizing production of nonhumans and environments.  Hardt and Negri identify these 
deterritorializing processes as an Empire and argue that they have, in fact, finally been able to establish 
a homogenizing order that has spread capitalist power relations throughout the globe.  
 In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari (1984) offer a more nuanced description of the ability for 
a deterritorializing capitalism to contribute, contradictorily, to global homogeneity and the widespread 
effects of governmentalizing power relations:
 Concerning capitalism, we maintain that it both does and does not have an exterior limit: it has 
an exterior limit that is schizophrenia, that is, the absolute decoding of flows, but it functions 
only by pushing back and exorcising this limit.  And it also has, yet does not have, interior 
limits: it has interior limits under the specific conditions of capitalist production and circulation, 
that is, in capital itself, but it functions only by reproducing and widening these limits.  The 
strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is 
always capable of adding a new axiom to previous ones.  Capitalism defines a field of 
immanence and never ceases to fully occupy this field (271). 
In other words, the deterritorializing flows of capitalism enable it to constantly push towards a limit 
and, in the process, to continually redefine its own limits ÐÐ lengthening its own reach in the process.  
Deterritorializing flows therefore demonstrate a flexibility in redefining their own limits.  A flexibility 
that nevertheless brings more and more relationships and territories under the purview of capitalism 
and an increasingly homogeneous environmentalizing management.  Thus, Deleuze and Guattari argue 
that deterritorializing flows are capable of continually spreading throughout the globe and, in doing so, 
drawing ever more global territories into the limits of capitalism.
 Capitalism is effective because it is deterritorializing but, at the same time, it also 
reterritorializes the limits that it has just opened up through the deterritorializing processes of global 
interconnection and expansion.  The deterritorializing effects of the processes of globalization are 
mitigated and limited by the reterritorializations that aim to manage and produce identities and 
relationships in ways that are most beneficial to global capital.  In this sense, deterritorializing flows 
are inherently destabilizing because they are constantly seeking new limits, pushing boundaries and 
generating new interconnections between vastly different ecosystems.  Yet, the effects of 
reterritorializations are such that they aim to limit any instability that such deterritorializing flows 
might impose upon capitalism itself.  Thus, the paradoxical results of globalization are such that they 
amount to global homogeneity and the spread of environmentalizing, biopolitical power relations.  By 
simultaneously reterritorializing the deterritorializations that have opened up new spaces to 
environmentalizing management and global capital, Western capitalist power relations assert their 
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presence throughout the globe.  Although deterritorializing flows contribute to destabilization, 
capitalism nevertheless needs those processes in order to extend its limits and continue its Empire-
expanding growth before it can close up those limits behind it.  
 Deterritorializing flows, because they facilitate the interconnections between diverse geographic 
spaces and open up new places to environmentalizing management, necessarily contribute to the 
processes of globalization in significant ways.  Indeed, as I have argued throughout this thesis, 
globalization is the result of myriad self-organized interactions that, through reinforcing positive 
feedback loops, have resulted in emergent global phenomena.  In this sense, deterritorializing flows 
contribute to globalization by facilitating interconnections between disparate territories and by 
simultaneously facilitating a homogeneity of action and practice.  Globalization is characterized by 
Òrelationships that transcend the societal.  Criss-crossing ÔsocietiesÕ are many mobile, material systems 
in complex interconnections with their environments, having effects time-space distantiated from 
where they originate, and with positive as well as negative feedback mechanismsÓ (Urry 2005a: 244).  
Deterritorializing flows contribute to these globalized relationships by generating interconnections 
across vast distances and spreading the effects of local interactions throughout the globe.  Yet, as I have 
already argued, such practices of globalization ÐÐ and their concomitant contribution to a global 
homogeneity ÐÐ serve to destabilize planetary social-ecological systems because they make such 
systems less able to respond to unpredictable fluctuations and disturbances.  Thus, deterritorializing 
flows not only contribute to the globalization of contemporary social-ecological systems, but, in doing 
so, also contribute to their destabilization.  
 Deleuze and GuattariÕs notion of deterritorialization is a means of understanding how processes 
of globalization destabilize contemporary social-ecological systems.  As Hardt and Negri argue, the 
spread of a deterritorializing capitalism throughout the globe has contributed to the emergence of a 
contemporary globalized Empire.  In this sense, because capitalism is both deterritorializing and 
simultaneously reterritorializing, it extends its reach throughout the planet while, at the same time, it 
produces radically dispersed and interconnected relationships in increasingly homogeneous ways.  As 
we discovered in the previous chapter, complexity theory points out that when complex systems 
become increasingly complex and decreasingly diverse, such systems are destabilized and there is a 
greater possibility that the system could shift into an alternate stable state.  Because deterritorializing 
flows at once link different parts of the globe while simultaneously weakening local territorial links, 
they contribute to the destabilization of global systems.  The fissures created within local territories by 
a deterritorializing Empire thus lead to more interrelations with other geographically remote territories 
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and to less diversity between those territories.  In this sense, a deterritorializing Empire is destabilized 
because it establishes brittle networks throughout the globe that, because they are lacking diversity, are 
unable to effectively respond to fluctuations and disturbances. 
Multitude and Deterritorializing Resistances
 In order to counter the deterritorializing expansion of capitalism, Hardt and Negri, as well as 
Deleuze and Guattari, argue that a concomitant deterritorializing resistance exists.  As Deleuze and 
Guattari make clear, capitalism is characterized both by deterritorializing flows and its corollary ability 
to reterritorialize the limits that it has previously opened up.  Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that 
this Òis due to the deepest law of capitalism: it continually sets and then repels its own limits, but in 
doing so gives rise to numerous flows in all directions that escape its axiomaticÓ (522).  Thus, 
capitalism works because it opens up new spaces to deterritorializing flows yet ÐÐ at the same time ÐÐ 
it also generates deterritorializing flows that are not able to be reterritorialized.  In other words, the 
deterritorializing capacities of globalized capitalism always create flows which escape its limits.  
Because there are always deterritorializations that escape being reterritorialized by capitalism, it is the 
basis for Hardt and NegriÕs argument that there is necessarily a deterritorializing resistance.  That there 
are flows which cannot be reterritorialized suggests that a resistance can be generated by those flows.  
As we have already discussed, contemporary capitalism is also characterized by an environmentalizing 
management that produces identities and relationships.  In this sense, Hardt and Negri argue that there 
are always identities produced that escape being reterritorialized.
 Fundamental to Hardt and NegriÕs argument for a deterritorializing resistance is that biopolitical 
power relations, because they necessarily produce multiple identities and relationships, also produce 
resistances to Empire.  Expanding on Deleuze and GuattariÕs notion of deterritorialization, Hardt and 
Negri (2000) argue that such deterritorialization produces both capitalism and a ÔMultitudeÕ that 
threatens a globalized Empire.  Globalized capitalism produces a Òplural multitude of productive, 
creative subjectivitiesÓ that Òare in perpetual motion and they form constellations of singularities and 
events that impose continual global reconfigurations on the systemÓ (60).  Empire produces a global 
Multitude that threatens globalized capitalism and always threatens to destabilize it completely.  Hardt 
and Negri argue that, paradoxically, this Òdeterritorializing power of the multitude is the productive 
force that sustains Empire and at the same time the force that calls for and makes necessary its 
destructionÓ (61).  On the one hand, a globalizing capitalism requires deterritorializing practices 
because it functions in the movement, flows and schisms of capital, commodities and people around 
the globe.  On the other hand, those deterritorializing flows also generate movements, identities and 
Picard 154
schisms that escape capitalism and, in doing so, create the conditions for resisting capitalism.  In 
designating the surplus identities created by deterritorializing flows, Ôthe MultitudeÕ, Hardt and Negri 
are thus giving a name to those flows of capitalism that Deleuze and Guattari insist escape its ever-
expanding boundaries. 
  Not only do deterritorializing flows create movements and identities that escape being 
reterritorialized, but they also engender Òthe network struggle of the multitudeÓ, which Hardt and Negri 
(2005) argue is the antidote to capitalism (83).  In this sense, the resistance of the Multitude Òtakes 
place on biopolitical terrain ÐÐ in other words, it directly produces new subjectivities and new forms of 
lifeÓ that serve as the basis for an emerging deterritorializing resistance (83).  As a globalizing 
biopower works to produce individuals and populations, the Multitude is likewise produced and, hence, 
Hardt and Negri argue that the resistance to biopolitical power relations is, therefore, embedded within 
those relations.  According to Hardt and Negri, the Multitude is composed of many different agents 
who nonetheless share goals and commonalities, and share in the struggle against globalized 
capitalism.  They assert that this Òmultitude, though it remains multiple and internally different, is able 
to act in common and thus rule itself.  Rather than a political body with one that commands and others 
that obey, the multitude is living flesh that rules itselfÓ (100).  Thus, the notion of a globalized 
Multitude seems to express an emergent set of relationships that are occurring collectively as the self-
organizing behaviour of individuals accumulate into more widespread resistances.  Moreover, the 
Multitude represents an opportunity to actively Ôself-organizeÕ a collective resistance to globalized 
capitalism.  Hardt and Negri argue that there are, in fact, two Multitudes, the first of which Òis 
ontological and we could not conceive our social being without it.  The other is the historical multitude 
or, really, the not-yet multitude.  This multitude has never yet existed. [...].  This second multitude is 
political, and it will require a political project to bring it into being on the basis of these emerging 
conditionsÓ (221).  Thus, Hardt and Negri hope to create the conditions through which a Multitude 
could emerge which generates the shift which could eventually topple capitalism.  
 An emergent Multitude is what Hardt and Negri propose as a resistance to, and as a replacement 
for, globalized capitalism.  In this sense a deterritorializing Multitude is an example of an attempt to 
generate emergent, self-organized behaviour as a response to a deterritorializing Empire.  Hardt and 
Negri (2005) claim that the Multitude, even as a politically motivated collective, does not erase the 
differences between individual participants.  They argue that this Òcontradictory conceptual couple, 
identity and difference, is not the adequate framework for understanding the organization of the 
multitude.  Instead we are a multiplicity of singular forms of life and at the same time share a common 
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global existenceÓ (127).  Hardt and Negri acknowledge that each individual within the Multitude still 
retains their own identity and ontological existence without, nevertheless, being conflated with the 
identity of the Multitude itself.  Thus, it is in this sense that a deterritorializing Multitude is consistent 
with complexity theory and a radical relational agency.  However, while a notion of deterritorializing 
Multitude accounts for the fact that change occurs as individual behaviour accumulates into widespread 
results, it also insinuates the direction that those changes will take.  Because Hardt and NegriÕs notion 
of Multitude implicitly suggests that it is an antidote to Empire and that its emergence is beneficial, it 
does not account for the unpredictability inherent within contemporary globalized systems.
 I have argued repeatedly throughout this thesis that, because complex social-ecological systems 
are inherently nonlinear, no shift is ever given ÐÐ such systems can unpredictably veer off course at any 
time.  As both Foucault and complexity theory suggest, radically interconnected relationships between 
many diverse agents produce change that is inherently nonlinear and so, any prediction of that future 
change is necessarily constrained by unpredictability.  As I have already argued, globalization, as a 
nonlinear process, does not occur evenly and, furthermore, nor do any resistances that it generates.  
Thus, there is a certain optimism in employing a deterritorialized Multitude as a form of resistance 
because Hardt and NegriÕs notion of Multitude does not account for the numerous unpredictable 
emergences that nonlinear complex systems entail.  A deterritorializing resistance therefore cannot 
guarantee a beneficial outcome ÐÐ even the emergence of a deterritorializing Multitude does not 
guarantee the establishment of better relationships.  The possibility of the Multitude generating more 
strife than the current forms of organization is not considered as an effect of deterritorializing 
resistances because, embedded within the notion of Multitude, is the assumption that such an 
emergence is necessarily beneficial.  That it is precisely the increasing complexity and 
interconnectivity of deterritorializing globalized flows that generates the deterritorializing Multitude 
instead suggests that the Multitude itself is similarly destabilized and subject to unpredictable shifts.  
Thus, a deterritorializing resistance, because it generates the same complexity and interconnectivity 
that globalization generates, is also susceptible to unpredictable shifts.
 Prigogine and Stengers (1985) argue that Òthe more complex a system, the more numerous are 
the types of fluctuations that threaten its stabilityÓ (188).  The more complex a system becomes, the 
more susceptible it will become to positive feedback loops, which means that any fluctuation could 
entirely destabilize it and cause a new stable state to emerge.  In this sense, Multitude does not account 
for the possibility that contemporary deterritorializing flows could actually cause global social-
ecological systems to shift into an alternate state.  An inability to account for unpredictable shifts 
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means a greater risk that deterritorializing resistances might exacerbate instability and precipitate such 
a shift.  Yet, destabilizing global capitalism is precisely what a deterritorializing Multitude aims to do.  
The problem with assuming the outcome of any shift (such as the assumption that Multitude will 
replace capitalism with a more equitable system) is that there is no predicting the outcome.  The 
assumption that deterritorializing flows will necessarily generate a Multitude to replace Empire is 
consistent only with visions of the future as increasingly complex, but because highly complex systems 
are susceptible to drastic and unpredictable shifts there is also a possibility that emergent phenomena 
could generate a less complex stable state.  Paradoxically, deterritorializing resistances might ultimately 
lead to reterritorializations because complex systems that have been destabilized will shift into new 
stable states.  In this sense, a deterritorializing shift into an alternate stable state could generate a 
correlative reterritorialization to facilitate the transition into that new state.  Thus, I argue that a notion 
of deterritorializing Multitude is incomplete because it does not recognize the unpredictability inherent 
within complex systems.
 In addition to the assumption that Multitude will necessarily engender a shift to a more 
equitable system, there are concrete dangers associated with practices of deterritorialization.  Just as 
deterritorialization can engender the creation of new identities and relations, the instability that results 
from such deterritorializing flows can engender adverse effects.  As Smith and Jenks (2006) argue, 
deterritorialization can cause upset and hurt:
 where that which has been ecologically unstable is destabilized, one can expect, analogously 
wounds, not the overturning of convention, hurt, not liberation, debris, not a virgin field, 
resentment, not celebration.  It may be, and certainly the West would claim, that the 
destabilization will become a change for the better, but the predatory aspect of the 
transformation is as important as its reconstructive ambitions (271). 
Jenks and Smith point out that any time there is a shift within a complex system, such as those caused 
by deterritorialization, systems are necessarily destabilized and can produce risks for their constituent 
elements.  As well as transforming identities and relationships, destabilization also necessitates that the 
breakdown of previous systems will engender the loss of other identities and relationships.  Moreover, 
in complex destabilized systems such as ours, positive feedback loops can exponentially multiply such 
detrimental effects.  Thus, deterritorializing resistances cannot be viewed as a panacea for responding 
to contemporary globalizing forces.  
 When deterritorializing flows generate the loss of identities and relationships, the harmful 
effects are often felt most severely by Indigenous peoples and other non-Westerners; Ònative peoples 
are increasingly facing threats to their very survival as they try to preserve traditional land ownership 
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and usage patterns against the onslaught of the industrialized worldÕs insatiable demand for 
resourcesÓ (Gedicks 1995: 106).  For Indigenous peoples, as this chapter has illustrated, 
deterritorializing flows have entailed their literal removal from traditional territories.  Indeed, practices 
of colonization were fuelled by a European quest for accumulation of natural resources which ÐÐ 
through processes of deterritorialization ÐÐ have allowed these resources to come from Indigenous 
territories or from the global South, concentrating deterritorializing flows away from their territories.  
Furthermore, when deterritorializations flow towards Indigenous territories, they often serve to relocate 
to Indigenous territories those processes that are unacceptable to Westerners.  One example details the 
situation of Indigenous people within my own country; on Aamjiwnaang First Nation (an Anishinaabe 
reserve) numerous petrochemical factories have been developed with deleterious effects.  On 
Aamjiwnaang there have been Òmore than 800 spills [É] in the past 20 yearsÓ the effects of which 
have not been sufficiently acknowledged by the Canadian government (Cormier 2007: 46).  Effects 
such as a decline in male babies; Òonly one-third of the children born around the turn of the millennium 
were boysÓ, are indicative of the multiplex risks of deterritorialization (48).  Thus, deterritorializing 
flows such as these demonstrate that the disproportionate burden of such processes has not been felt by 
Westerners.  In this instance a deterritorializing resistance might generate more harm.
 Rather than contribute to the continued destabilization of contemporary social-ecological 
systems, an Indigenous resistance might aim to reterritorialize their own land because such 
reterritorializations are necessary in order to combat the removal of their resources and knowledge, and 
to prevent their relationships and identities from being swept up in deterritorializing flows.  Thus, in a 
sense, Indigenous resistances against evictions from their lands and the effects of globalization do take 
the form of a reterritorialization.  Practices of reterritorialization, if we appreciate them without the 
metaphorical overtones given by Deleuze and Guattari, are also apt at reflecting the aims of some 
contemporary environmental resistances.  Because certain environmentalists demand that humans 
recognize ourselves as firmly situated within material and ecological spaces, a reterritorialization is 
precisely what is being advocated.  Reterritorializations can be viewed literally as processes that 
acknowledge the embeddedness of humans within territories and environments.  Hence, 
reterritorializations would also generate identities and relationships because actions that assert the 
interconnectivity between humans, nonhumans and environments would engender ways of 
participating in those relationships that are divergent from contemporary Western practices.  Indeed, as 
I have argued throughout this thesis, to acknowledge that humans are only one type of agent among 
many is a radically different assumption from those assumptions that underpin Modern notions of 
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agency.  In this sense, the notion of an emergent Multitude neither addresses the unpredictability 
inherent within processes of deterritorialization, nor the potential benefits of a reterritorializing 
resistance.
Indigenous Ecological Practices and Reterritorialization 
 Indigenous ecological resistances are reterritorializing because, in resisting the continued 
colonial practices of eviction and attempted assimilation, they aim to situate their cultures and 
identities within specific places, histories and knowledges as an opposition to the deterritorializing 
flows that fracture their identities and territories.  These resistances not only aim to reterritorialize 
traditional Indigenous ecosystems and territories, but they are also acts of cultural, social and political 
reterritorialization that assert their own identities and knowledges that are radically different from those 
imposed by contemporary globalizing processes.  In this sense, retaining their own knowledges and 
identities allows Indigenous peoples to oppose the colonizing practices that still persist within the 
deterritorializing flows of contemporary globalization.  The importance of recognizing Indigenous 
ecological resistances as acts of reterritorialization is that it exposes Western accounts of environmental 
resistances as one option among many.  When indigenous peoples Òdefend their land and cultures they 
invariably draw upon their own spiritual traditionsÓ and, in doing so, illustrate different methods for 
negotiating the relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments (Gedicks 1995: 106).  
Because traditional ecological knowledges are always associated with a particular, local ecosystem, 
they are situated in opposition to the globalizing deterritorializing flows that spread contemporary 
capitalist power relations throughout the world.  In this sense, Indigenous ecological practices serve as 
an example of how it might be possible for contemporary environmental resistances to rethink their 
practices.
 As Foucault illustrated, systems of thought are not static, they are subject to unpredictable shifts 
and adaptive transformations.  Likewise, traditional ecological knowledges are necessarily changed by 
the ecological and power relations that have formed them.  Caroline Butler (2006) argues that Òthe 
history of Canada precludes the existence of a system of resource use unchanged by the forces of 
colonialismÓ (117).  Colonial power relations have inevitably changed the ways in which Indigenous 
peoples relate to ecosystems and landscapes, and so the accumulation of traditional ecological 
knowledges has often been interrupted or disturbed by colonizing forces.  In the Canadian context, 
Indigenous peoples have been confronted with government regulations limiting their ability to 
participate in their traditions, enforced education at residential schools which removed Indigenous 
peoples from their communities and cultures, industrial and urban developments on their land, as well 
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as changes to their local environments. As with any system of knowledge, ÒIndigenous knowledge has 
not developed, and does not exist, in a vacuumÓ (123).  While traditional ecological knowledges are 
often presented with an emphasis on the traditional that highlights the historical aspect of these 
knowledges, these knowledges should be seen as no less contemporary than Western sciences.  To 
acknowledge that Indigenous knowledges have developed within specific contexts is likewise to 
acknowledge that they have changed throughout time.  Indeed, as I have already argued, traditional 
ecological knowledges are characterized by flexibility and adaptability.  
 Traditional ecological knowledges are necessarily embedded within local and historical relations 
of power; ÒIndigenous knowledge is inextricably related to the experience of colonial domination 
because it is this experience that has constructed it as a separate way of knowingÓ and, in this sense, 
asserting cultural knowledge of a particular ecosystem can be seen as a form of resistance (Butler 2006: 
124).  The historical dichotomy between Western and non-Western knowledges still structures 
contemporary power relations by treating traditional ecological knowledges as inferior to Western 
science.  Because traditional ecological knowledges are often presented as divergent from Western 
sciences, ÒIndigenous knowledge is a political act ÐÐ it is a claim of Aboriginality, an assertion of land 
and resource rights, and a demand for management powerÓ (119).  Traditional ecological knowledges 
are thus asserted as a form of reterritorialization because such knowledges underscore Indigenous 
worldviews which interpret ecosystems and environments as fundamentally inseparable from 
knowledge, culture and daily life.  Thus, when Indigenous peoplesÕ claim land titles, establish political 
self-determination and fight for the ability to relate to environments according to their own cultural 
practices and knowledges instead of those imposed by colonizers, it is an act of reterritorialization.
 Throughout this chapter I have argued that Indigenous knowledges and practices serve as a 
counterpoint both to the Modern distinction between Man and Nature, and to the increasing 
deterritorializing flows of contemporary globalized capitalism that attempt to bring the whole world 
under an environmentalizing management.  Because traditional ecological knowledges are 
characterized by a refusal to abstract those knowledges, and the accumulation of those knowledges, 
from a particular ecosystem and because they are characterized by historical and flexible adaptation, I 
argued that such knowledges are radically distinct from those consistent with the spread of Western 
capitalism.  In this sense, Indigenous ecological practices serve as a form of reterritorializing resistance 
that allow Indigenous peoples to assert their own identities and knowledges and, because they 
acknowledge that humans are radically interconnected with nonhumans and environments, they serve 
as a point of communication between Western environmentalism and a divergent system of thought.  
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Thus, I argue that contemporary environmental resistances have something to learn by examining non-
Western ecological practices.  For example, whereas Òpeople of the developed world receive weak 
feedback signals about the consequences of their consumptionÓ, localized ecological practices, such as 
Indigenous ecological practices, generate tight feedback loops that are directly felt (Salt and Walker 
2005: 146-147).  To adapt effectively and creatively to destabilized systems, greater flexibility is 
possible when disturbances are known immediately and locally ÐÐ as is the case with some Indigenous 
ecological practices.  Therefore, I argue that Indigenous ecological practices can offer insight into 
generating flexibility and innovation when responding to contemporary instability.
 One method that Indigenous ecological practices have employed to develop more flexibility 
within social-ecological systems is, paradoxically, to generate disturbances.  In this sense, because 
such practices explicitly accept the instability of complex social-ecological systems by creating local 
disturbances, they can cause systems to become more adaptable.  Berkes and Folke (2002) argue that:
creating small scale disturbances can build social-ecological resilience, thereby increasing the 
adaptive capacity of a system to deal with larger-scale disturbances.  Some of these local 
knowledge systems thus anticipate large, infrequent disturbances, recognizing their existence as 
a natural feature of ecosystems.  Recent scientific understanding of complex adaptive systems 
and their management could be enriched by insights from local management systems (146).
The importance of this recognition, that communities ÐÐ because they are embedded within social-
ecological systems ÐÐ intentionally create disturbances within their local social-ecological systems is 
that, in doing so, they generate effective responses to instability not only at the local level, but also 
increase the ability for systems to respond to larger, unpredictable fluctuations.  Thus, such ecological 
practices demonstrate how flexibility might be generated through small-scale, local disturbances and, 
therefore, provide an opportunity for Western environmentalism to learn from ecological practices that 
do not aim towards optimization or efficient use of resources.  Rather, the flexibility and adaptability 
generated by these purposeful disturbances indicate the importance of acknowledging that 
unpredictability and fluctuation are inevitable characteristics of complex social-ecological systems.
 As the above example attests, human interventions within local ecosystems can actually 
generate flexibility, innovation and an ability to adapt effectively to fluctuations and disturbance.  Thus, 
the intention of some environmentalists to remove humans from ÔnonhumanÕ ecosystems is exposed 
not only as contingent upon certain Western constructions, but also as potentially destabilizing.  It is 
never possible to erase human impact on nonhumans and environments.  Indeed, human existence 
within nonhuman ecosystems may even be essential to their flexibility and longevity, such as when 
traditional ecological practices stimulate system responses and adaptability.  Dowie (2009) argues that 
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Òa closer examination of some traditional practices, such as the cultivation of selective perennials, the 
methodic grazing of livestock, and the deliberate setting of grass and forest fires, suggests that human 
interference can, if practiced wisely, enhance eco-complexity and species diversityÓ (Dowie 2009: 
134).  In this sense, the example of Indigenous ecological practices, because they recognize 
complexity, interconnectivity and unpredictability, can help generate creative responses and innovative 
adaptations to contemporary processes of globalization.  The success of traditional ecological 
knowledges is observable because of the simple fact that Òhuman societies can still be found in 
biodiverse habitats where they have been living for millenniaÓ (Dowie 2009: 111).  Within local 
environments, the presence of humans can generate diverse and adaptable ecosystems which reveal the 
role of humans in contributing to social-ecological systems that are flexible enough to respond to 
perturbations and disturbances.  In short, an ability to create flexible social-ecological systems has 
meant cultural and environmental longevity for many Indigenous peoples.
 That there is sometimes greater flexibility where Indigenous cultures interact with local 
environments does not mean that all Indigenous ecological practices produce adaptable social-
ecological systems.  Additionally, it is important not to romanticize non-Western knowledges or return 
to a view of Indigenous peoples as somehow Ôcloser to NatureÕ than Westerners; ÒNot all TEK 
[traditional ecological knowledge] is sound science, and not all Indigenous people are perfect land 
stewards.  Only cultural romantics believe that.  And even those who were good stewards in years past 
may cease being so due to population growth, erosion of culture, market pressures, and the misuse of 
destructive technologiesÓ (Dowie 2009: 111).  Local ecological knowledges, as well as being 
environmentally specific (based on the particulars of local ecosystems) are also culturally specific.  
While one local knowledge system might be adept at creating resilience, another may not.  
Recognizing that traditional ecological knowledges are the result of particular, historical relationships 
between humans, nonhumans and environments reinforces the conclusion that knowledge is always 
generated within the limits imposed by both ecological relations and relations of power.  As I have 
already discussed, local and traditional ecological knowledges are embedded within specific historical, 
cultural and environmental contexts and, therefore, they are always the outcome of complex and 
unpredictable interactions.  Thus, Indigenous ecological practices are necessarily as diverse as the 
cultures, geographies and ecosystems with which they are associated.  Nevertheless, I argue that those 
practices which generate innovation, creativity and flexibility within social-ecological systems can 
serve as motivation for contemporary environmental practices.
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 Reterritorializing practices are important to contemporary environmental resistances because 
they assert the recognition that humans are always embedded within ecological systems and participate 
in relationships with humans and nonhumans.  Such a recognition locates human cultures, societies and 
practices within the ecological limits of a finite planet.  Thus, a reterritorializing resistance aims to 
situate humans, nonhumans and environments in a series of relationships that can facilitate diverse and 
flexible responses to increasingly complex, interconnected and unstable social-ecological systems.  It is 
in this sense that Indigenous ecological practices serve as an example of how to rethink such 
relationships and demonstrate that a reterritorialization ÐÐ and not just a deterritorialization ÐÐ can 
contribute to the production of diverse identities and relationships.  Because, as I have already argued, 
there are a multiplicity of diverse local cultures, environments and knowledges, reterritorializations that 
have the potential to generate diverse identities and relationships.  Moreover, the assertion that humans, 
nonhumans and environments are radically interconnected ÐÐ at least in the context of Western cultures 
ÐÐ also represents an opportunity to develop new relationships where, previously, such relationships 
have been repudiated.  Reterritorializations are defined as those practices that assert the embeddedness 
of humans within particular ecologies and eco/power relationships to the extent that they attempt to 
impede the loss of diversity and homogeneity that is often associated with environmentalizing 
management. 
 The alternative systems of thought presented by traditional ecological knowledges are 
significant not only because they strive for flexibility, but also because they recognize that any stability 
is always subject to unpredictable shifts.  Because it is precisely unpredictability that a 
deterritorializing multitude does not account for, alternatives that promote innovation and creativity 
while simultaneously recognizing unpredictability are necessary.  Thus, traditional ecological 
knowledges can aid contemporary environmental resistances to generate resilient social-ecological 
systems that are flexible and adaptable.  Resilience is defined as Òthe capacity of a system to absorb 
disturbance; to undergo change and still retain essentially the same function, structure, and feedback.  
[É], itÕs the capacity to undergo some change without crossing a threshold to a different system 
regimeÓ (Salt and Walker 2006: 32).  Resilient systems are thus not static or unchanging systems.  
Rather, they are precisely systems that are flexible in their response to disturbances and fluctuations.
 Although Indigenous ecological practices have demonstrated how it is possible to generate 
resilience within complex social-ecological systems, in the following chapter I will investigate how 
contemporary environmental interventions might adapt their own practices to such examples.  I will 
argue that, in order to develop resilience, flexibility and adaptability in response to the increasing 
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complexity, interconnectivity, unpredictability and instability of contemporary social-ecological 
systems, it is necessary to recognize that humans are limited by both ecological relations and relations 
of power.  Recognizing that agents are always limited and constrained by power, knowledge and 
materiality, I argue that within such constraints it is nevertheless possible to facilitate communication 
between radically different agents in order to develop new relationships and identities.  The possibility 
of communication between humans, nonhumans and environments is important because it is a potential 
source of flexibility, innovation and adaptability.  In the final chapter, I  will examine how innovation, 
creativity and experimentation ÐÐ by developing new relationships and identities ÐÐ can facilitate the 
creation of resilient systems.  Because a radical relational agency is, in part, a result of the 
unpredictability of interactions between diverse agents, I will argue that unpredictability cannot be 
ignored.  Rather, I will argue that the unpredictability of contemporary social-ecological systems 





 In the previous chapter, I examined Indigenous ecological practices as a counterpoint to Western 
environmental actions.  Unlike the Modern distinction between Man and Nature, traditional ecological 
knowledges constitute humans, cultural practices, knowledges, nonhumans and environments as 
embedded within the same processes.  In this sense, I argued that contemporary environmental 
resistances could learn from non-Western practices that constitute the relationships between humans, 
nonhumans and environments in radically different ways.  In particular, I argued that contemporary 
environmental resistances could learn from Indigenous ecological practices because they explicitly 
recognize the unpredictability of social-ecological systems and generate flexibility, adaptation and 
innovation.  In contrast to Indigenous practices which acknowledge that dynamism and fluctuation are 
unavoidable, I argued that Hardt and NegriÕs insistence on a deterritorializing Multitude does not 
acknowledge the profound unpredictability of complex social-ecological systems.  Although such 
resistances are generated through a radical relational agency, because Hardt and Negri implicitly 
assume that an emergent Multitude will necessarily be beneficial, they fail to recognize that no 
resistance is ever guaranteed to succeed.  The danger of failing to recognize the unpredictability 
inherent within any emergence or resistance is that there is always a risk that those actions could be 
overturned.  To acknowledge such unpredictability does not mean that resistance is impossible, but that 
innovation, experimentation and resilience are required in order to generate the flexibility and 
adaptability necessary to respond to uncertainty.
 The aim of this chapter is to explore the possibility of generating resilient social-ecological 
systems in the face of increasing global complexity and deterritorializing flows.  A radical relational 
agency exists as an outcome of the omnipresence of power; all relationships are relations of power and, 
as such, all relationships are dynamic, unpredictable and capable of being overturned.   Instead of 
trying to make such relationships more predictable ÐÐ which is an impossibility ÐÐ I argue that 
environmental resistances should be reframed as practices that seek to generate resilience.  Resistance 
becomes resilience precisely because the result of any action or practice is never guaranteed.  In this 
sense, a notion of resilience is important because it recognizes that there is no such thing as one stable 
state.  Rather, resilience is developed, in part, because of a systemÕs ability to adapt to unpredictability.  
In order to cultivate resilience, I argue that communication between multiple and diverse humans, 
nonhumans and environments is necessary because it facilitates creativity and innovation.  Thus, I 
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argue that the recognition of disparate and multiple identities is essential to generating resilient social-
ecological systems.  It is in this sense also that I retain an acknowledgement of the experimentation and 
innovation that Foucault advocated because, as I have already suggested, such experimentation can 
facilitate flexibility and resilience.  Because a radical relational agency is generated by the 
relationships, differences and unpredictability inherent within complex social-ecological systems, such 
a notion of agency underscores the flexible and adaptable processes that generate resilience.
 This chapter also looks toward the future of our complex systems by examining the possibility 
of unpredictable shifts and fluctuations, and investigates human contributions to those possible future 
shifts.  Complexity theory suggests that order can emerge from chaos, and given the instabilities of 
contemporary systems, there is a possibility that a future emergence could reinstate a new kind of 
order.  Thus, I will also examine the continued shift away from Modern thought and the centrality of 
Man, to an environmentalization of knowledge.  Throughout this thesis I have argued repeatedly that 
no system of thought and no stable state will ever maintain indefinitely.  Indeed, I have suggested that 
through the transformation of Nature into Ôthe environmentÕ and through the extension of biopolitical 
management of global processes, it is no longer tenable to assert a distinction between human and 
nonhuman.  Given this continued shift in systems of thought, as well as the possibility that increasingly 
complex social-ecological systems could shift into an alternate stable state, I will examine potential 
scenarios for future emergences.  These emergences are not synonymous with collective resistances 
that are organized according to one identifiable principle.  Rather, such emergences occur locally, and 
only through the accumulated actions of numerous independent elements would a discernible pattern 
appear.  The questions in this final chapter are open-ended, inherently complex and the answers to them 
are ultimately unknown: Where do we go from here?  What comes next?
Possible Future Emergences
 As I have argued throughout this thesis, contemporary globalized systems are characterized by 
increasing complexity, interconnectivity and instability ÐÐ a situation that likewise increases the 
possibility that alternate stable states will emerge.  Although complex, destabilized systems such as 
contemporary globalized systems are prone to unpredictable shifts, emergent phenomena lead systems 
into new stable states.  While unpredictability is inherent to complex social-ecological systems, the 
very unpredictability and destabilization of those systems means that it is always possible for new 
kinds of stable systems to emerge.  Indeed, as the title of their text would suggest, in Order out of 
Chaos, Prigogine and Stengers (1985) set out to describe how destabilized systems can necessitate the 
emergence of order.  One of the main issues that their book seeks to understand is Ònonequilibrium as a 
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source of orderÓ (180 emphasis mine).  Thus, it is through the very disorderliness of complex systems a 
new order would emerge.  And this, precisely, underscores the possibility that radically different stable 
states ÐÐ different to those in which we currently exist ÐÐ can emerge unpredictably.
 It is with a recognition of emergent phenomena that I attempt to address the questions: What 
comes next?  Where do we go from here?  An acknowledgement of unpredictability is the outcome of 
both FoucaultÕs thought and complexity theory and so, as I have already argued, it is never possible to 
guarantee the future success of any action.  Indeed, the possibility that actions and relationships can 
always be overturned is the precise mechanism that generates a radical relational agency.  Because a 
new order can emerge from chaos, I echo Prigogine and StengersÕ argument Òfor qualified hope and 
caution for the future.  Hope, because no order is stable or legitimate.  Any order can be challenged and 
will change.  Caution, because bifurcations may bring about unexpected and disastrous 
catastropheÓ (Conley 1997: 73).  These vast unknowns associated with future emergences thus leave 
room both for possibility and for risk.  Such unknowns also mean that it is inherently impossible to 
plan for future emergences, but I would still like to examine the predictions of those environmental 
activists who suggest that particular emergences are imminent; their predictions serve to underscore 
the necessity of recognizing that any new stable state will entail both possibility and risk.  There is 
always the possibility that independent and localized actions could accumulate and lead to a 
reorganization of the processes of globalization, yet there is no guarantee that a future stable state 
would be any more beneficial.  It is in this sense that I approach the possibility of future emergences.
 Andres R. Edwards (2005) argues that we are presently in the midst of a Òsustainability 
revolutionÓ which:
draws its significance and global impact from a wide spectrum of interests with common 
fundamental values.  Like the Industrial Revolution, the Sustainability Revolution is far-
reaching and is having a profound impact, shaping everything from the places we live and work 
to the foods we eat and the endeavours we pursue as individuals and communities (2).
According to Edwards, this ÔSustainability RevolutionÕ is emerging as a response to the environmental 
degradation that industrial processes have perpetrated throughout the world.  Thus, the Sustainability 
Revolution is seen as an emergent corrective to the processes that are destabilizing planetary social-
ecological systems.  In this sense, the Sustainability Revolution is implied to be a necessary and 
already emerging response to destabilizing processes.  However, the success of such a revolution is in 
no way guaranteed.  Moreover, as I have argued throughout the previous chapters, the notion of 
ÔsustainabilityÕ itself often contributes to destabilizing processes.  In previous chapters I argued that 
ÔsustainabilityÕ does not take into account the interconnectivity and unpredictability of complex social-
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ecological systems.  Such notions have a tendency to be geared towards an ÔefficiencyÕ and 
ÔoptimizationÕ that allow the same relationships of extraction and commodification to continue.  Yet it 
is precisely such capitalist relationships of efficiency and optimization that have precipitated the 
destabilization of planetary systems.
 Actions that aim to make our contemporary systems more sustainable often Òrevolve around the 
notion that the key to sustainability lies in being more efficient with our resourcesÓ but Òthe more you 
optimize elements of a complex system of humans and nature for some specific goal, the more you 
diminish that systemÕs resilienceÓ (Salt and Walker 2006: 9).  Indeed, it is precisely the goal of 
increased efficiency and optimization that has necessitated the vast complexity and interconnectivity of 
contemporary globalized capitalism ÐÐ and, hence, those environmental resistances that generate 
efficiency likewise contribute to a diminished capacity for systems to respond to fluctuations and 
disturbance.  Although the aims of this Sustainability Revolution are to mitigate anthropogenic effects 
on ecosystems, it may unwittingly reinforce the effect of Ôputting all our eggs in one basketÕ by simply 
increasing the complexity and interconnections across vast geographic distances.  Moreover, as I have 
already argued, the practice of putting into effect a widespread sustainability necessarily requires a 
concomitant expansion of biopolitical management.  In this sense, a Sustainability Revolution would 
need the environmentalization of all life and dynamic processes to continue order in for it to be 
successful.  In fact, Edwards explicitly links the emergence of such a revolution to the 1983 UN World 
Commission on Environment and Development, and subsequently describes many international, 
juridical and biopolitical attempts to generate sustainable practices (16).  Thus, the Sustainability 
Revolution not only threatens to destabilize world social-ecological systems, but also entails the 
establishment of ever more systems of environmentalizing management and observation.
 As one prediction of an emergent phenomenon, the possibility that there will be a ÔSustainability 
RevolutionÕ serves as an example of how a shift from contemporary globalization could precipitate an 
alternate stable state.  According to this example, the shift seems less like a drastic reorganization of 
current systems of thought and eco/power relations, and more like a continuation of the biopolitical 
production and deterritorializing flows that characterize contemporary social-ecological systems.  
Therefore, this example again demonstrates that resistances are never guaranteed and, in this particular 
instance, it could have disastrous consequences by increasing the spread of environmentalizing 
management.  Like Edwards, Hawken (2007) in his text Blessed Unrest describes what he sees as an 
emerging environmentally motivated social movement.  However, unlike Edwards, Hawken does not 
see such a movement emerging from international juridical bodies such as the UN, but as a movement 
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that Òengages citizensÕ local needs.  This movementÕs key contribution is the rejection of one big idea 
in order to offer in its place thousands of practical and useful onesÓ (18).  In this sense, HawkenÕs 
description of an emergent movement is similar to Hardt and NegriÕs notion of a deterritorializing 
Multitude.  Yet, as with the notion of Multitude, HawkenÕs notion of resistance is no more cognizant of 
unpredictability.
 According to Hawken (2007), this movement is profoundly altering contemporary globalized 
systems because it is so dispersed, divergent and decentralized:
The movement canÕt be joined because it is so atomized ÐÐ a collection of small pieces, loosely 
joined.  It forms, dissipates, and then regathers quickly, without central leadership, command, or 
control.  Rather than seeking dominance, this unnamed movement strives to disperse 
concentrations of power.  It has been capable of bringing down governments, companies, and 
leaders through witnessing, informing, and massing (12).   
Identifying this global emergence, Hawken describes what could be a self-organized and emergent shift 
ÐÐ taken all together these separate actions could amount to a radical shift in contemporary social-
ecological systems and systems of thought.  But, like Hardt and NegriÕs description of Multitude, 
HawkenÕs emergent movement is implied to be incontrovertibly beneficial.  As I argued in the previous 
chapter, the failure of Hardt and NegriÕs notion of Multitude is precisely that it does not account for 
unpredictability.  Likewise, HawkenÕs notion of a self-organized environmentally aware movement 
does not account for unpredictability because it is assumed that, were such a movement to succeed, its 
success would inevitably be beneficial.
 A failure to recognize unpredictability is to ignore the certainty that no action or resistance is 
ever guaranteed to succeed.  There is no guarantee that, what appears to be an emergent movement at 
the present time, will accumulate enough individual and local behaviour and shift contemporary social-
ecological systems into an alternate stable state.  Neither the emergence of a globalized Multitude nor 
an emergent environmental movement can guarantee their own success.  Moreover, were such a shift to 
occur, there are likewise no guarantees that the new stable state would be more favourable than our 
current one.  Indeed, as I argued in the previous chapter, Hardt and NegriÕs insistence on a 
deterritorializing resistance makes the outcome of any emergent behaviour generated by that resistance 
potentially destabilizing, not only to Empire, but to the Multitude as well.  Similarly, Hawken does not 
account for how the increasing spread of biopolitical production could alter the perceived benefits of 
such an emergence.  Thus, while there is the possibility that a deterritorialized Multitude is forming, or 
that an environmental movement is emerging in various places throughout the world, there are always 
unforeseen consequences that could make these possibilities either untenable or profoundly dangerous.  
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Because there are both possibilities and risks inherent to unpredictability, it is necessary to account for 
the likelihood of both.
 Radically divergent from the possibility of a Sustainability Revolution or an emergent 
environmental movement, are those scenarios that predict absolute catastrophe and total collapse of 
contemporary social-ecological systems.  Indeed, it is in response to such a possibility that many 
environmentalists urge the active creation of a new system, in order to change planetary social-
ecological systems before those systems disintegrate completely.  According to some theorists and 
activists, the degradation of planetary ecosystems, and the brittleness of globalized capitalism present 
the conditions for just such a drastic shift; ÒThere is no question that the contradiction between the 
modern worldÕs imperative towards growth and EarthÕs finite resources will ultimately be resolved in 
some way.  The only question is how that will unfoldÓ (Gallopn 2002: 363).  The contradiction 
between ecological limits, and the deterritorializing flows that spread biopolitical management and 
efficient production throughout the globe, have caused some environmentalists and theorists to predict 
not a beneficial emergence ÐÐ but the emergence of an alternate stable state that is decidedly 
detrimental.  The form that such a shift could take includes dire predictions about rising sea-levels, 
desertification of large swathes of the planet, starvation, social unrest and the Ògeneral collapse of 
social, cultural, and political institutions along with the market economyÓ (381).  Indeed, if the worldÕs 
social-ecological systems were to shift into a radically alternate stable state, the likelihood is that the 
shift would precipitate such profoundly massive changes and it would make necessary the complete 
reconfiguration of nearly every feature of our present systems.
 The recognition that complex social-ecological systems could collapse is important for a 
number of reasons.  First, it shows that the beneficial emergences predicted by a Sustainability 
Revolution or an emergent Multitude could instead be pre-empted by ÐÐ or even contribute to ÐÐ 
collapse, destruction and further harm.  Second, it acknowledges that the instability of contemporary 
social-ecological systems leaves them more susceptible to fluctuations and disturbances and, therefore, 
more prone to radical shifts.  And, finally, it does makes us wonder what can be done to prevent such a 
scenario.  Indeed, as I have already suggested, the above descriptions of emergent phenomena that 
oppose the deterritorializing processes which have generated such instability are often suggested as a 
means to prevent such collapse.  Many environmentalists, at any rate, argue that changes must be made 
so that our contemporary systems can be re-stabilized.  Yet, as I have already argued, there is no such 
thing as an infinitely stable state; ÒEcosystems do not have a single equilibrium with homeostatic 
controls to remain near it.  Rather, multiple equilibria commonly define functionally different states.  
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Normal movements of variables between states maintain structure, diversity, and 
resilienceÓ (Gunderson and Holling 2002: 26).  Given that contemporary social-ecological systems are 
increasingly unstable, that it is inherently impossible to predict when those systems might shift and that 
no outcome is every guaranteed, the questions remain: Where do we go from here?  What comes next?
 Although contemporary globalized systems are increasingly unstable, there is no system that is a 
correspondingly stable system.  Given that stability is, at best, a temporary possibility, I have argued 
that contemporary environmental resistances must acknowledge the unpredictability inherent within 
complex social-ecological systems.  Therefore, I argued that because a radical relational agency is 
generated from the very instability of ecological relations and relations of power, environmental 
actions consistent with such an understanding are uniquely able to respond to contemporary instability.  
In particular, I argue that to facilitate resilient systems is corespondent to a systemÕs ability to adapt to 
multiple possible states.  Resilient systems are flexible and adaptable.  As Salt and Walker (2006) 
argue, ÒThere is no such thing as an optimal state of a dynamic system.  The systems in which we live 
are always shifting, always changing, and in doing so maintain their resilienceÓ (141 emphasis mine).  
To develop resilience does not suggest that social-ecological systems are static, but that they are 
interconnected systems which must change and adapt.  Throughout the remainder of this chapter I will 
argue that innovation and experimentation are essential to creating resilient, adaptable and flexible 
systems.  As I have already suggested, innovation and experimentation help to generate resilience 
because such practices function as resources that facilitate flexibility and adaptive response.  In the 
aims of creating opportunities for innovation and experimentation, I have also argued that the 
interaction between radically diverse agents can generate new relationships and identities that 
ultimately lead to resilience.  In the following section I will examine how communication between 
diverse agents, whether human, nonhuman or environmental, can contribute to resilience.
Communication and Identity as Resilience
  Throughout this thesis, I have discussed how Modern systems of thought constituted 
nonhumans and environments as non-agential ÐÐ a constitution that serves as the foundation for 
contemporary relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  According to Modern 
systems of thought, communication between humans, nonhumans and environments would be viewed 
as a laughable impossibility.  As I argued in the first chapter, Modern systems of thought constitute 
nonhumans and environments as non-agential because they are seen as passive objects of study rather 
than as subjects who know.  Because Modern systems of thought constituted nonhumans as objects of 
study, the interactions between humans, nonhumans and environments did not take the form of 
Picard 171
communication, but that of a distinction between those who study and those who are studied ÐÐ they 
were monologues.  In other words, throughout the Modern episteme, humans endeavoured to 
ÔcommunicateÕ with nonhumans through the intermediary of science.  In this Modern sense, 
communication is defined as something that takes place between humans only.  However, once it is 
acknowledged that nonhumans and environments are agents in their own right, it becomes possible to 
redefine communication as an action that includes more than just humans.
 Latour (2004) argues that scientists Òmake the mute world speak without being challenged, put 
an end to the interminable arguments through an incontestable form of authority that would stem from 
things themselvesÓ (14).  He suggests that experts and scientists, in claiming to speak for objects of 
study, necessarily erase the agency and communicative capacities of those objects.  He argues that there 
is a political advantage to this system of knowledge in both its expediency and its authority; by 
situating experts and scientists as those with absolute knowledge about things, not only is the 
multiplicity of possible voices silenced ÐÐ but by ignoring nonhumans and environments, a false 
simplicity is imposed upon complexity.  A shift from viewing nonhumans as passive objects of study, to 
active and communicative participants within social-ecological systems, means that it is no longer 
tenable to silence nonhumans.  Prigogine and Stengers (1985) argue that, ÒScientific description must 
be consistent with the resources available to an observer who belongs to the world he describes and 
cannot refer to some being who contemplates the physical world Ôfrom the outsideÕÓ (217 emphasis 
mine).  Indeed, as I have argued throughout this thesis, a radical relational agency is generated 
precisely because of the fact that humans are embedded within social-ecological systems and, 
therefore, belong to the world which scientists describe.  By recognizing that humans are inextricably 
linked to nonhumans and environments, it is possible to facilitate forms of communication that include 
a multiplicity of agents.
 According to Haraway (1991) science Òrequire[s] that the object of knowledge be pictured as an 
actor and agent, not a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally as slave to the master that closes 
off the dialectic in his unique agency of ÔobjectiveÕ knowledgeÓ (198).  Just as Prigogine and Stengers 
argue that science and, hence, communication, take place within vastly interconnected and complex 
social-ecological systems, Haraway argues that all objects of study must be conceived as agents.  
Because it is possible to conceive of nonhumans and environments as agents, I argue that 
communication between humans, nonhumans and environments becomes possible.  Latour (2004) 
argues that agency proliferates once we rethink the Modern designation of nonhumans as objects; 
Òobjects and subjects can never associate with one another; humans and nonhumans can.  As soon as 
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we stop talking about nonhumans as objects, as soon as we allow them to enter the collective in the 
form of new entities with uncertain boundaries, entities that hesitate, quake, and induce perplexity, it is 
not hard to see that we can grant them the designation of actorsÓ (76).  Instead, by designating 
nonhumans and environments as participants within complex social-ecological systems ÐÐ which is 
precisely the recognition of a radical relational agency ÐÐ it is possible to facilitate communication 
between disparate agents.  In this sense, communication is also a participative action that is an aspect 
of a radical relational agency.
 A radical relational agency is generated because humans, nonhumans and environments are 
profoundly interconnected in both ecological relations and relations of power.  In this sense, I argue 
that, because many different kinds of agents exist together, participating in equally diverse kinds of 
ecological and power relations, a kind of mutual intelligibility or communication occurs within all of 
these disparate relationships.  Communication, in this sense, is reconceived as a kind of participatory 
action that takes place in all relationships between humans, nonhumans and environments.  Such a 
notion of communication therefore acknowledges that myriad forms of mutual intelligibility are 
possible given the radical diversity of participants who must interact within complex social-ecological 
systems.  In Chapter Two, I argued that signification should be reframed as communication because it 
is more in keeping with the insights of a radical relational agency.  More precisely, I argued that 
because nonhumans and environments can no longer be constituted simply as the passive recipients of 
human signification, there must be a correlative recognition that acknowledges the active participation 
of nonhumans and environments in their relationships with other participants.  Thus, I argue that 
participation within complex social-ecological systems and relations of power necessarily includes 
communication.
 As I have already suggested, the recognition that nonhumans and environments are not passive 
recipients of human signification leads to a reconfiguration of the Modern scientific assumption that 
they are merely objects of study.  In this sense, the Modern scientific practice of silencing nonhumans 
and environments by imposing a distinction between humans, nonhumans and environments is no 
longer credible.  Indeed, this is precisely what Prigogine and Stengers (1985) suggest has been the 
outcome of complexity theory.  They argue that a consequence of complexity theory has been the 
recognition that it is nonsensical to posit scientific investigation as an interaction between those who 
study and those who are studied.  Rather, such investigations Òhave shown us that nature cannot be 
described Ôfrom the outside,Õ as if by a spectator.  Description is dialogue, communication, and this 
communication is subject to constraints that demonstrate we are macroscopic beings embedded in the 
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physical worldÓ (300).  In other words, scientific investigation always entails dialogue and 
communication because it is a process that occurs between agents rather than between an active subject 
and a passive object.  However, as Prigogine and Stengers argue, this communication is always subject 
to constraints because we are embedded within diverse relationships with a multiplicity of other agents.  
Because numerous different kinds of agents are always interacting in a variety of different 
relationships, throughout the course of those relationships it is certain that many actions and 
interactions will be constrained by limits imposed by both ecological relations and relations of power.  
 Because limits are always imposed within communicative and participative relationships, it does 
not mean that communicative action or participation is impossible.  Rather, as I have stressed 
throughout this thesis, that there are limits and constraints does not foreclose possibility or potentiality.  
Indeed, because relationships between diverse participants within social-ecological systems are both 
ecological relations and relations of power, it is possible to act in other ways.  Because there are a 
variety of diverse agents and different kinds of agents within complex-social ecological systems, there 
are always threats and risks associated with the participative action that takes place within those 
systems.  But, in this sense, I argue that limitation and constraint can actually generate innovation, 
flexibility and experimentation.  That embeddedness within complex social-ecological systems 
necessitates the sometimes risky and sometimes beneficial interaction with many diverse kinds of 
different agents suggests that, through communication, it might be possible to create new identities and 
relationships.  A willingness to communicate with different agents can generate new relationships and 
identities because it facilitates the kind of innovation and experimentation that engenders creative 
action.  Thus, I argue that communication can lead to adaptability, flexibility and resilience.
 In order to generate resilient complex social-ecological systems, what is required is an 
unambiguous attempt to communicate across differences.  This is not simply a way of approaching the 
relationships within complex social-ecological systems, but it is implicated because we exist within 
complex systems.  Because humans are embedded within increasingly interconnected and complex 
social-ecological systems, it necessitates that communication take place between different kinds of 
agents.  Indeed, such communication is necessary because it allows constituents within complex 
systems to respond more effectively to possible fluctuations and to acknowledge the effects of positive 
feedback loops.  As Prigogine and Stengers (1985) point out, communication is needed within complex 
systems in order to generate stability; there is a Òstabilizing effect of communicationÓ that could help to 
mitigate fluctuations within vastly complex and interconnected systems (189).  Therefore, 
communication is a potential tool for creating resilience within increasingly complex systems.  This 
Picard 174
communication between humans, nonhumans and environments underscores the recognition that all 
constituents within complex social-ecological systems are acknowledged as agents.  Without an 
acknowledgement of this radical relational agency, the communication within contemporary systems 
will remain monologic and one-sided.  Such one-sided communication, characteristic of Modern 
science, cannot generate resilience because it does not acknowledge the interconnectivity and 
unpredictability of complex social-ecological systems.  In this sense, one-sided forms of 
communication, or exclusionary definitions of agency, forgo the ability to respond to unpredictability 
and positive feedback loops and, hence, are less resilient.
 Implicit in my argument that communication between disparate kinds of agents can generate 
innovation, creativity and experimentation is a correlative argument that the radical differences and 
identities between agents are required in order to facilitate the flexibility and adaptability that 
communication can engender.  Indeed, as I have argued throughout this thesis, a radical relational 
agency is generated because there is communication between different agents and different kinds of 
agents.  In order to generate new relationships, rather than deny those disparate agents their own 
identities, communication establishes the possibility of learning from those disparities and, in the 
process, developing flexible, adaptable and resilient social-ecological relationships.  Throughout this 
thesis I have argued that it is precisely the diversity and heterogeneity of complex systems that 
generates resilience; ÒResilient social-ecological systems would celebrate and encourage diversity ÐÐ 
offsetting and complementing the existing trend toward homogenizing the worldÓ (Salt and Walker 
2006: 145-146).  Diversity and divergences provide complex systems with the resources to develop 
resilience because, as I have argued, it is precisely when different kinds of agents interact that new 
relationships can be generated ÐÐ and the ability to adapt to such differences is strengthened.  Thus, I 
argue that a radical relational agency does not deny a subjectÕs ontological status.  
 While the Foucauldian self-fashioning discussed in Chapter Three often Òdissolves the subjectÓ, 
a radical relational agency acknowledges that a subjectÕs ontological differences contribute to the 
resilience of complex social-ecological systems (During 1992: 82).  Because a radical relational agency 
acknowledges the ontological status of the diverse agents that make up complex social-ecological 
systems, it does not, however, mean that an identity is constituted completely and is forever 
unchangeable.  Indeed, it is because identities and relationships are constituted that a radical relational 
agency is generated.  Instead, I argue that diverse identities and ontological differences are necessary 
because such differences generate a limit or constraint to which other agents must respond.  When 
agents must respond in different ways to the identities and limits imposed by other agents, I argue that 
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the effect is similar to generating a small-scale ecological disturbance because it often requires an 
innovative response ÐÐ the result is greater adaptability, flexibility and resilience.  John Urry (2005b) 
points out that:
Ecological systems are on the edge of chaos without a ÔnaturalÕ tendency towards equilibrium, 
[É].  Indeed, many ecological systems themselves depend not upon stable relationships but upon 
massive intrusions, of extraordinary flows of species from other parts of the globe and of fire, 
lightning, hurricanes, high winds, ice storms, flash floods, frosts, earthquakes and so on.  The 
ÔnormalÕ state of nature is not one of balance and repose; the normal state of nature is to be 
recovering from the latest disaster (6).
That social-ecological systems are not dependent on stability, but on intrusions, means that 
disturbances caused when diverse agents interact, can contribute to the resilience of those systems.  In 
this sense, interactions between diverse agents of all types contribute to the ecological and social 
adaptability of complex systems.
 Although a Foucauldian re-fashioning sometimes advocates the effacement of current identities, 
it also contributes to an understanding of how different relationships can emerge.  Because Foucault 
advocates creativity, innovation and experimentation, I argue that such an invitation to invent is 
precisely what is needed to develop flexible, adaptable and resilient social-ecological systems.  Thus, it 
is in this sense that a Foucauldian notion of agency as re-fashioning is not entirely abandoned, because 
the insistence on flexibility and experimentation that Foucault argued is intrinsic to those processes are 
the same characteristics that generate resilience.  Indeed, Foucault (1997f) argued that through 
practices of experimentation and innovation he wanted Òto create a new relational right that permits all 
possible types of relations to exist and not be prevented, blocked, or annulled by impoverished 
relational institutionsÓ (158 emphasis mine).  It is this sense of experimentation and creativity that, I 
argue, is important to generating resilient social-ecological systems.
Self-Fashioning, Creativity and Experimentation
 FoucaultÕs notion of agency-as-fashioning ÐÐ as a form of experimentation ÐÐ is useful to 
understanding how resilience can develop because it stresses the importance of creativity and 
flexibility.  Thus, I argue that FoucaultÕs impulse to foster the creation of new relationships remains 
relevant.  Innovation, experimentation and creativity are important because they engender different 
ways of existing and relating within complex social-ecological systems.  An ability to develop other 
relationships and behaviour within complex social-ecological systems is required because it is such 
flexibility that makes systems more resilient.  Moreover, I argue that such experimentation is necessary 
not only because a new and useful behaviour might emerge, but because complex systems are 
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inherently unpredictable.  Because complex systems are unpredictable, those systems with an ability to 
be flexible in the face of such unpredictability will be more resilient.  It is in this sense that processes 
of experimentation and innovation are necessary because, inherent within those processes of re-
fashioning, is the recognition that no result is ever guaranteed.  Indeed, this is what Foucault (1989a) 
himself argued; Òthe idea of a program of proposals is dangerous.  As soon as a program is presented, it 
becomes a law, and thereÕs a prohibition against inventing.  [...].  The program must be wide 
openÓ (139).  While Foucault explicitly recognized that programs can instigate a limit on innovation 
and experimentation, the other danger associated with programs is that their results can never be 
guaranteed.  But, as I have argued throughout this thesis, experimentation ÐÐ as an open-ended practice 
that recognizes that the result of any action is never guaranteed ÐÐ is important because it facilitates 
more varied and flexible responses to unpredictability.
 The argument that experimentation and adaptability are essential to complex systems 
underscores the need to rethink contemporary environmental resistances.  Because contemporary 
environmental resistances are often premised on the assumption that particular goals can be achieved, 
they do not necessarily facilitate the flexibility and learning that allow complex systems to adapt to 
unpredictable shifts.  Indeed, as examples throughout this thesis have shown, such resistances often 
facilitate stasis rather than resilience.  Thus, I argue that the experimentation and invention integral to 
practices of re-fashioning should be applied to contemporary environmental resistances as a whole in 
order to facilitate the flexibility and resilience of global social-ecological systems.  In this sense, I 
mean the re-fashioning of entire systems ÐÐ not as the invocation of one stable state ÐÐ but as a 
continual process of creating adaptable, innovative and resilient systems.  In terms of contemporary 
globalized social-ecological systems, it is possible to adopt such characteristics; ÒThe emphasis should 
be on flexible institutions and human organizations that can build adaptive capacity in synergy with 
ecosystem dynamics and reward systems that respond to feedbackÓ (Yorque et al 2002: 435).  The 
experimentation that I am advocating explicitly takes place within both ecological relations and 
relations of power.  To create resilient systems would, I argue, require experimentation and innovation 
not only in explicitly ecological relationships, but within institutions, governments and our daily lives.  
Thus, I argue that contemporary environmental actions should aim to generate flexible, adaptable and 
resilient systems that are able to respond to fluctuations in numerous possible ways.
 To facilitate the experimentation, innovation and creativity that contributes to a systemÕs 
resilience, I have argued that practices of reterritorialization can generate new interactions and 
relationships because they precipitate communicative practices between disparate agents within local 
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ecosystems.  In the sense that practices of reterritorialization are local practices, they are important 
because ÐÐ as participants within self-organized systems ÐÐ agents must respond to local stimulus.  
Indeed, it is only by interacting with other local agents that individual behaviour accumulates into 
emergent phenomena.  Though Richard Day (2005) is concerned particularly with anarchist practices, 
he explicitly argues that it is local action that facilitates experimentation and generates alternatives 
within the limits of already existing social-ecological systems.  He argues that:
 Unlike revolutionary struggles, which seek totalizing effects across all aspects of the existing 
social order by taking state power, and unlike the politics of reform, which seeks global change 
on selected axes by reforming state power, these movements/networks/tactics do not seek 
totalizing effects on any axis at all.  [É].  And in doing so, they challenge the notion that the 
only way to achieve meaningful social change is by way of totalizing effects across an entire 
ÔnationalÕ or ÔtransnationalÕ society (45).
As Day suggests, local action can be effective at reorienting local practices without the need for 
organization at the national or global level.  Because self-organized social-ecological systems generate 
emergent phenomena through the accumulated behaviour of many local agents, innovation and 
experimentation can result from the accumulation of local acts.  Although deterritorializing flows may 
seem to generate the greatest amount of diversity and heterogeneity, I argue that localized acts of 
reterritorialization, which create new relationships and interactions within any local geography or 
ecosystem, can generate diversity and flexibility through those local interconnections. 
 As the examples of how Indigenous peoples have been affected by deterritorializing flows attest, 
those flows often contribute to the destabilization, and increasing environmentalization, of globalized 
social-ecological systems.  In this sense, deterritorializing resistances can have unpredictable 
consequences.  Moreover, the insistence that deterritorializing resistances place on global action and a 
globalized Multitude suggests that they do not account for the profound unpredictability inherent 
within vastly complex and destabilized systems ÐÐ such as contemporary globalize systems.  Indeed, 
Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that ÒEmpire can be effectively contested only on its own level of 
generality and by pushing the processes that it offers past their present limitations.  We have to accept 
that challenge and learn to think globally and act globally.  Globalization must be met with a counter-
globalization, Empire with a counter-EmpireÓ (206-207).  In fact, Hardt and Negri explicitly argue that 
their notion of a deterritorializing resistance is to push those globalizing flows to their ultimate limits 
because ÒWe cannot move back to any previous social formÓ (206).  But, as I have argued throughout 
this thesis, the result of any action is never guaranteed and so, the outcome of any resistance is 
ultimately unpredictable.  Although Hardt and Negri assume that the future will continue to be 
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increasingly complex, it is possible that the complex globalized systems in which we live, having 
reached the point of regime change, may shift into an alternate stable state that is less complex.  And, as 
I have already suggested, the impetus for many environmental interventions is precisely the possibility 
that contemporary social-ecological systems could collapse.
 In the previous chapter, I examined Indigenous ecological practices as a source of inspiration as 
to how resilience can be generated.  However, I would like to briefly address the opportunities for 
creating resilience within Western cultures.  First, while they are not explicitly influenced by an 
understanding of resilience, there are those who seek to join, or start, an ecovillage.  Ecovillages are 
local intentional communities that acknowledge the radical relationality between humans, nonhumans 
and environments; they recognize that humans are embedded within, and cannot be abstracted from, 
local ecosystems.  Ecovillages are reterritorializing because they aim to establish human habitation as 
an aspect of local ecosystems and geographies.  Indeed, the establishment of ecovillages is consistent 
with complexity theory; Òthe ecovillage model was seen as mirroring the transformation in how we 
understand the world ÐÐ mirrored in the findings of complexity theory and systems thinking ÐÐ 
emphasizing the connections and relationships between activities, processes and structuresÓ (Dawson 
2006: 14).  Instead of a globalized deterritorializing resistance, the ecovillage model seeks to create 
new relationships locally, right now, within currently existing systems.  Ecovillages serve as an 
example of how it might be possible to generate resilience through the forms of experimentation and 
innovation that can take place at a local level.
 The Transition Towns movement is also a form of localized practice that explicitly aims to 
develop resilience.  Rob Hopkins (2008), one of the co-founders of the Transition Network, argues that 
within contemporary industrialized societies Òeverything is working against [É] local resilience 
buildingÓ (68).  Hopkins recognizes that the increasing complexity of global social-ecological systems 
sacrifice adaptability for efficiency and increasing interconnectivity between geographically disparate 
locations.  As such, the Transition Towns movement acknowledges that contemporary social-ecological 
systems are more susceptible to fluctuations and, hence, that those systems could shift into an alternate 
stable state.  Indeed, in The Transition Handbook Hopkins (2008) suggests that Òwe are going to see 
extraordinary change in every aspect of our livesÓ due to climate change, peak oil and the 
destabilization of global markets (44).  It was to avoid the worst effects of such change that Hopkins 
developed the Transition Towns model as an initiative to make local communities (initially Kinsale in 
2005 and Totnes in 2006) more resilient and adaptable when confronted with global instability.  Instead 
of relying on unstable globalized systems, the Transition Towns movement aims to create resilient local 
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economies based on available resources, environments, skills, and cultures.  Transition Towns aim to 
generate resilience by creating a localized social-ecological system that is adaptable, flexible, 
innovative and creative.  
 Influenced by notions of resilience, Transition Towns seek to generate flexibility by actively 
creating diversity, by avoiding interdependence with globalized systems, and by tightening local 
feedback loops, so that actions can be more easily adapted (Hopkins 2008: 55-57).  The importance of 
the Transition Towns movement is that such acts of reterritorializing resilience are explicitly developed 
so that particular local social-ecological systems are resilient even if globalized social-ecological 
systems were to collapse around it.  In this sense, the Transition Town movement acknowledges the 
inherent instability of vastly complex and interconnected globalized systems.  Yet, while the Transition 
Towns movement explicitly focuses on generating ecological resilience, it does not address the need 
for facilitating experimentation and innovation within social and cultural institutions.  The failure to 
address experimentation, innovation and invention within social and cultural institutions means that 
such initiatives may fail to address the relations of power that are consonant with ecological relations.  
In failing to address relations of power, the Transition Towns movement may unwittingly reinforce 
stasis and inflexibility.  Because a radical relational agency is generated from omnipresent power 
relations, to ignore the risks and possibilities that are inherent within power relations is to neglect a 
potential source of innovation and creativity.  For local communities seeking to create resilient social-
ecological systems, to recognize ÐÐ like Foucault ÐÐ that fashioning new relationships and identities is 
possible, because both ecological relations and relations of power are omnipresent, would be to 
acknowledge a source of innovation, creativity and experimentation.
 As I have argued throughout this thesis, there are both possibilities and risks associated with 
being embedded within ecological relations and relations of power.  Because we are embedded within 
both ecological relations and relations of power, those relations generate agency not only for humans, 
but also for nonhumans and environments.  This proliferation of agents and agency means that there is 
always a limit or risk that confronts us.  In this sense ÐÐ there is always something to be done.  A 
radical relational agency is generated because such relations are always capable of being overturned; a 
radical relational agency is generated because there are both risks and possibilities within ecological 
relations and relations of power.  As I have argued, the possibility that any action can be overturned 
means that the outcome of any action is never guaranteed.  Yet, our task is not to keep every option 
open, because it is an impossibility.  There will always be limits ÐÐ limits within power relations, 
ecological limits, radical otherness.  Rather, our task is to be creative, innovative and flexible given the 
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impossibility of escaping those limits.  And, in terms of self-organized, complex, multi-agential and 
collective actions, our task is to generate resilience ÐÐ not stability, not permanence, not stasis ÐÐ but 
adaptable, flexible and resilient systems.
What comes next?  Where do we go from here?
 Throughout this thesis I have argued that a notion of radical relational agency emerges through 
the combination of both FoucaultÕs thought and the insights gleaned from complexity theory.  What 
FoucaultÕs thought contributes is the recognition that any definition of agency is contingent upon the 
systems of thought in which it emerges, an important recognition because it establishes the 
inseparability of power and knowledge.  Furthermore, Foucault argued that any system of thought is 
never permanent, and so they shift throughout history.  Similarly, complexity theory describes complex 
systems as impermanent and susceptible to unpredictable shifts.  Yet, complexity theory moves beyond 
FoucaultÕs thought because it explicitly describes the means by which self-organized systems shift, in 
part, because of the localized behaviour of individuals.  FoucaultÕs notion of a power as a relation leads 
to a notion of relational agency because of the fact that any relation of power can be overturned.  
Importantly, complexity theory adds to a radical relational agency because it recognizes that humans 
are embedded within planetary ecosystems.  But, because complex social-ecological systems are 
becoming increasingly interconnected and globally dispersed, they are becoming increasingly 
destabilized and therefore more susceptible to the emergence of an alternate stable state.  This inherent 
unpredictability, and the recognition that the outcome to any action is never guaranteed, has 
underpinned my argument that a radical relational agency is consistent ÐÐ not with the aim of 
environmental resistances ÐÐ but with attempts to generate resilient, flexible and adaptable social-
ecological systems.
 To end this thesis, I want to briefly examine what I consider two important and representative 
statements that help to define a radical relational agency ÐÐ one each from Foucault and from 
complexity theory.  Foucault (2000e) argued that:
No one has the right to say ÒRevolt for me; the final liberation of men depends on it.Ó  But I am 
not in agreement with anyone who would say, ÒIt is useless to revolt; it is always going to be the 
same thing.Ó  [...].  People do revolt; that is a fact.  And that is how subjectivity (not of great 
men, but that of anyone) is brought into history, breathing life into it.  [...].  Moreover, no one is 
obliged to support them.  No one is obliged to find that these voices sing better than the others 
and speak the truth itself.  It is enough that they exist (452).
The acknowledgement that no action or form of resistance is ever guaranteed is important because it 
underscores the emergence of a radical relational agency, and is the caution that such an agency 
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recognizes as essential.  It is in this sense that a radical relational agency occurs continually.  Indeed, a 
radical relational agency is a proliferating and omnipresent agency.  But, at the same time, the very 
unpredictability that generates a radical relational agency is the reality that undermines any attempt at 
generating a static system.  Thus, a radical relational agency does not generate resistances that seek to 
overcome this lack of guarantees, but acknowledges that unpredictability is sometimes the source of an 
unexpected stability.
 Finally, I would like to argue that an essential insight from complexity theory is not only its 
recognition of unpredictability, but the insistence that this unpredictability applies not only to humans, 
but to nonhumans and environments as well.  Throughout this thesis, I have argued that Modern 
systems of thought and relations of power have constituted nonhumans and environments as non-
agential, passive and, hence, static.  However, complexity theory acknowledges that humans are 
embedded within finite planetary ecosystems that place limits on our behaviour and subject.  Jenks and 
Smith (2006) argue that Òthe awkward, fuller voice of complexity theory [is] when it engages the actual 
consequences of their [sic] being no pure social or physical phenomena, only hybridsÓ (266).  The 
recognition that there are no purely social or physical phenomena has meant that agency and 
unpredictability are no longer viewed as merely human characteristics.  Importantly, this is the point at 
which complexity theory also contributes to the disruption in Modern systems of thought.  At the very 
least, it surpasses Modern notions of agency because it does not exclude nonhumans and environments 
from participating as communicative agents within social-ecological systems.  Thus, we anticipate 
future shifts ÐÐ whatever those shifts may be.
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